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PREFACE
In 1852, Karl Marx wrote:
"Men make their own history,
but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted from the past."
Thus, the comprehension of past developments holds the key to an under-
standing of the present. In a thesis which examines the process of urban
development, this observation is important in two senses--one concrete, the
other theoretical. On the one hand, the impact of many concrete develop-
ments which occurred from the 1830's to the 1880's in London has extended
beyond that period to the present and, therefore, an understanding of these
developments is crucial to an understanding of the social and spatial geography
of London today. On the other hand, the developmental processes which
shaped London during these five decades of the 19th century can be abstracted
and synthesized at a theoretical level to provide a generalizable basis for
analysing and understanding the processes which shape modern cities.
It is in this dual light that I have undertaken this thesis. I have
studied London's development during this period in an attempt to discover
how the totality is constructed; which elements of that totality are most
influencial in producing changes in urban form, and which are more susceptible
to change; what are the correct questions to ask in relation to urban devel-
opment both past and present; and what are the crucial relationships on
which to focus attention. Stated concisely, the purpose of this thesis is
both to analyse and explain an important period of London's development and
to use this study as the empirical foundation for a theoretical synthesis
-7-
which, it is hoped, will be more generally applicable to the analysis and
understanding of the processes and problems of urban development under
capitalism.
I have approached the subject from a radical, or Marxist, perspective
for I believe that the philosophy of society and social change upon which
this perspective is based most closely reflects the real-world situation.
The thesis cuts across accepted disciplinary boundaries into fields with
which Itam only superficially familiar but which I believe must be integrated
into the study of urban development at both an empirical and a theoretical
level. The empirical section is based mainly on a secondary analysis of-data
already gathered and processed by others. Its value--if it has any--consists
not in 'discovering' hitherto unknown facts, but in the analytical framework
which it proposes and applies to the study of London's development. Whether
this framework and approach indeed provide a useful basis for understanding
London's development in particular and urban development in general is, of
course, for the reader to decide.
The period from the 1830's to the 1880's saw the flowering of laissez
faire capitalism in Britain. In Chapter 1, I will argue that the relation-
ships between classes arising out of developments in London's economy .essenti-
ally hinged on three important struggles: the political and social integra-
tion of the capitalist class with the landed aristocracy to form a new ruling
class; the economic and social separation of the capitalist and petty-capi-
talist classes from the much larger working class and the impoverishment of
the bulk of the working class; and the broad economic and social stratification
of the working class into the skilled 'labour aristocracy' and the unskilled
or semi-skilled remainder. After setting the scene in Chapter 2 of London
-8-
in the 1830's, I will argue in Chapter 3 that the ways in which these class
relationships were expressed in the housing process, together with the drive
to improve the city's efficiency as a locus for capital accumulation, consti-
tuted the fundamental forces which patterned London's development. Further,
I will attempt to show that the interaction of these forces in the land and
housing markets, mediated by the economic and social relations inherent in
various forms of the leasehold system of tenure--and this was the crucial
element--determined the actual shape and evolution of London's social and
spatial fabric. However, this interaction was such that it frustrated the
residential aspect of the 'labour aristocracy's' struggle to disassociate
itself from the remainder of the working class and this, we will see in
Chapter 4, precipitated the housing crisis which beset London in the 1880's.
The threat to the maintenance of social stability, which the crisis consti-
tuted, generated a search for new forms of tenure and urban development which
would produce more congruent and acceptable outcomes.
During this period, approaches to London's chronic working-class housing
problems essentially stemmed from the view that these problems were the fault
of the 'demoralized' slum-dwellers themselves. In Chapter 5, I will argue that
this view was an extension of the prevailing laissez faire ideology into the
field of housing policy and that it served a system-maintenance, rather than
problem-solving, function until the housing crisis of the 1880's necessitated
and precipitated an ideological change.
In Chapter 6, I will attempt to abstract the analytical structure which
is embedded in the historical analysis and synthesize it in the form of
notes towards a radical theory of urban living and city form, thereby
connecting the thesis to present-day urban issues, enquiries and practice.
-9-
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CHAPTER 1.
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLASSES
The Organization of Production
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, London was the most important
and powerful centre of production and exchange in Britain, if not the
1]* [2]
world. Its economic dominance rested on four factors. It was a
major port, both in relation to British and world markets. This gave
London's merchants access to a wide range of raw materials and enabled
them to export finished products--and their economic power--to major mar-
ket places at home and abroad. But this economic dominance did not exist
in a vacuum. It was buttressed by the might of the British state which
[31
aimed at ensuring favourable terms of trade for British merchants as
it spread its colonial tentacles across the globe. London, as the centre
of government and the royal court, was also the locus of Britain's politi-
cal power. Thus it was an advantageous location for merchants to base
their operations which rested so heavily on international trade and inti-
mate relations with government. These two factors established London as a
centre of world commerce and finance, a position which it maintained at[4]
least until the First World War. Furthermore, London was the largest[5]
local consumer market in the country. The process of feeding, clothing
and housing its vast population (almost twice as large as Paris, its[6]
nearest rival at the turn of the 19th century) provided employment for
large numbers of people. Possibly of greater significance was the fact[7]1
that London was the centre of conspicuous consumption, a consequence of
the second factor. In addition, capital goods and semi-processing industries,
*Notes will be found at the end of each chapter.
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such as shipbuilding, sugar and leather manufacture and silk production,
were prominent. But the supply of commodities, particularly luxury and
capital goods, in those pre-industrial days depended on a highly skilled
labour force, and this was the fourth factor which, together with the[81
third, made London the dominant manufacturing centre.
But the changes in the organization and technologies of production[91
which occurred during the Industrial Revolution altered the balance of
power., New forms of industry grew and prospered in provincial towns such
as Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham. This is not to imply that London
ceased to be important as a manufacturing centre. On the contrary, it
[10]
remained the largest centre of production in Britain. What did change,
however, was the nature of the products which were produced, the division
of labour and the organization of production. It should be pointed out
that these changes only occurred in those industries which faced direct
provincial competition.
Why did London lose its grip on the productive activity of Britain?
Why did its employers not adopt the new modes of production which began to
flourish in the Midlands and the North, with a view to maintaining their
competitive advantage? Three factors mitigated against this course of
[11]
action. The new machines used tons of coal and London was some dis-
tance from sizeable coal deposits. The new factories were land intensive
and rents in London were high. And the factories had to be manned by
armies of unskilled workers. Though London had proportionately more
skilled to unskilled workers than provincial towns, there was nevertheless
an abundance of adaptable, unskilled workers ready to acquire fairly
[12]
elementary skills. The main drawback was that London wages were
-12-
[13]
historically significantly higher than elsewhere in England. In con-
sequence of these three factors, the costs of production and, assuming
similar profit margins, the final cost of commodities produced in London
would be higher than those of provincial towns. Unless there were other
overriding considerations, London was an unfavourable location for large
factories.
Certain sectors of London's economy were unaffected by this growing
competition. The aristocracy and nouveaux riches continued to value hand-
made luxuries which held them abreast of current fashions. Though new
technologies facilitated mass production of clothing, shoes and furniture,
the markets for luxury versions of those commodities remained strong.
Consequently, the production of luxury goods remained in the hands of skilled
craftsmen working in small workshops using well-established techniques
which had been handed down since the days of the craft guilds. These
workshops were predominantly located in the West End close to the final
[14]
consumers. Other trades did not come under pressure during this
period because new technologies had not as yet been developed. Service
industries, tied to a localized area, such as building, transportation
and urban infrastructure (gas, water, sewage, etc.), prospered in fits
and starts, their fortunes following the ebbs and flows of other sectors
of London's economy. The non-residential segment of the building industry
specializing in public and commercial buildings and railways, mainly com-
[151
prised relatively large firms. The residential segment, on the other
hand, was, with a few.notable exceptions, comprised of a myriad of small[16]
firms using extensive sub-contracting. In the transportation sector,
large concerns predominated though small scale operations played important
-13-
[17]
parts in omnibus, stagecoach and hackney cab travel. Finally, as
Britain's international dominance increased and as its economy prospered,
so the commercial, financial and public administrative sectors of London's
economy, located mainly in the City and Westminster, expanded. By the
mid-1860's, the economist Walter Bagehot characterized London's money
market as "by far the greatest combination of economical power and economical[18]
delicacy that the world has ever seen."
$he responses and fates of those trades which came under the impact
of growing provincial pressure can be divided into two categories: those
which prospered in their present locations by adapting the organization and
technologies of production to suit London conditions, and those which
declined in their central locations and tended to move to the outskirts
of London or to the provinces. In general, according to Gareth Stedman
[191
Jones:
"The London trades which prospered after 1850 tended to be those
producing commodities of relatively high value and low bulk,
involving a great deal of specialization in warehousing and
preparation for final manufacture, calling on the services of
many ancillary trades, and requiring large inputs of labour
and small inputs of power; in general, they were products which
could be sold directly to final users. Conversely those trades
which moved either to the outskirts or to the provinces tended
to be those producing commodities of low value and high bulk,
involving little specialization, much power and little labour,
and not generally sold directly to final users."
The most important finishing trades in the first group were those
segments of the clothing, footwear and furniture industries which produced[20]
ready-made goods for mass consumption. Entrepreneurs in these indus-
tries, usually the owners of wholesale or retail outlets, attempted to
reduce London overheads to a minimum by extensively adopting the
[21]
sweating system. The use of relatively cheap, 'people-powered'
machinery (which also reduced fuel costs) like the sewing machine and the
[22]
band saw which were developed during the 1840's and 1860's, made it
possible to dispense with the services of most skilled workers and to
exploit London's abundant supply of adaptable, unskilled workers, including
women and immigrants, who had little choice but to work at or below sub-
[23]
sistence wages. Thus the sweating system facilitated drastic cuts in
wage btlls, and the extensive use of subcontracting was well suited, from
the employers point of view, to the arbitrary nature of demand in these
markets as it gave him great flexibility in expanding and contracting
production to cope with unpredictable seasonal fluctuations. The impact
of London's high land rents was minimized by reducing workshop production[24]
to a minimum and expanding home-work. These operations were predomi-
nantly located in the East End, but could also be found to the north-east
of the City. Thus London's manufacturers competed with the factories of
the provinces in the growing markets for cheap, ready-made goods by
tightening the screws on the weakest sectors of London's labour market.
[251
As Charles Booth wrote in 1888:
"The economy effected under the factory system by a more extensive
use of machinery, and by more highly organized and regular
employment seems in London to be replaced by the detailed pressure
of wholesale houses, or middlemen acting for them on master tailors
who transmit this pressure to those working under them, masters and
men suffering alike from the long hours, unsanitary conditions and
irregular earnings characteristic of the East End workshop."
Industries in which the nature of the production process did not
facilitate mutation to counteract high London overheads began to decline
in their inner-London locations. Those which had little to gain by
-15-
remaining within the Greater London region migrated to other parts of
Britain. The most important of these were shipbuilding, heavy engineering,[26]
silk manufacture and leather tanning. Others, which relied heavily on
proximity to London's consumer markets, moved to areas on the circumfer-
ence of the then built-up area, such as West Ham, Stratford, Tottenham,
Croyden and Willisden. As the 19th century wore on, these became important
industrial districts where medium and large scale factory production
occurred in printing, book-binding, chemical and rubber production and the[271
like. Finally, a proportion of these declining industries remained in
their central locations, predominantly in south London but also in the
[28]
East End, for a variety of reasons. Thus, while inner-London industry
gradually declined and/or migrated elsewhere, industrial production
remained important in London as a whole.
The London labour market was divided into three sub-markets which
were relatively distinct geographically and in terms of the nature of
[29]
employment available and the organization of the labour movement.
Three main factors contributed to the formation of these sub-markets by
severly curtailing working class mobility, thereby forcing workers to live
within a short walking distance from their workplaces. These were the
[30]
lack of cheap, convenient transportation; the underdeveloped communi-
cations media which forced most workers to rely on personal acquaintances
for Job information; and the characteristics of casual and sweated trades
whose essence "was that the work offered was insufficient to provide a
regular livelihood but sufficient to prevent the worker straying perma-
[31]
nently into some other occupation" and which necessitated frequent
immediate contacts with employers and other workers.
The three sub-markets were as follows. The North and West region
comprised mainly of politically conservative, well-organized skilled
craftsmen engaged in luxury production. This region was separated by a
band of business, open space and medium and high quality residential land
uses from the North and East region, comprised mainly of semi-skilled
workers and casual labourers who were, until the 1880's, atomized and[32]
disorganized. This duality was noted by Henry Mayhew in the 1850's:
"In passing from the skilled operative of the West End to the
unskilled workman of the Eastern quarter of London, the moral and
intellectual change is so great that it seems as if we were in a
new land and among another race."
Finally, the above two regions were separated by the Thames River from
the South region, comprised of relatively highly organized radical
industrial workers.
Thus, the Industrial Revolution in London differed significantly
from the standard picture of rapidly expanding large scale factory produc-
tion, which is generally painted of provincial towns like Manchester. The
manufacturing sector was not dominated by one large industry as were many
[33]
provincial towns. Those capital and semi-processing industries which
remained in Greater London either declined slowly in their central loca-
tions or moved to outlying areas where new industrial districts gradually
became established. The service sector was substantially larger and more[34]
diversified than other towns in the country. London maintained its[351
position as the "foremost finishing centre for consumption goods."
An industrial revolution did occur in these trades but it did not lead to
the growth of large factories. Instead, it engendered the sweating system
-17-
which was a most appropriate response to the specific conditions which
prevailed in London. As a result, small scale production remained a
significant element in London's industrial geography until the late 19th
century. In sum, the "effect of the Industrial Revolution on London was
to accentuate its 'pre-industrial' characteristics...[and this] determined
that its economic structure, its social and political character and its
pattern of poverty remained largely distinct from those of other nine-[361
teenth4century industrial regions."
The following section will explore the consequences which these
developments in the structure of London's economy had for both the life
chances and aspirations of, and the interactions between, broad groups of
London's population, as a function of their respective positions in the
economy.
Class Structure and Struggle
A discussion of the formation and development of a class structure in
London from the 1830's to the 1880's (and also to the present) and of the
dynamic interrelationships between different classes presents two signifi-
cant difficulties. Firstly, the problem of the extent to which the evolu-
tion of class relationships in London are influenced by struggles at the
national level. This difficulty always arises when one is analysing broad
currents in a local context, but it is particularly vexing in the case of
London where the economic structure was (and is) so different from that of
[371
other towns in Britain, while with a few notable exceptions, the litera-
ture on the development of class relations in Britain focuses mainly on
the national scale. Without detailed original investigation of local
patterns, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is difficult to
separate the general from the particular. One consolation lies in the fact
that concurrent with the centralization of capital, the widening of markets
and the development of modes of communication, local struggles have become
integrated into the national (even international) picture. But this does
not obviate the need for local research.
The second difficulty is one of finding a model characterizing certain
periodp within the overall process of societal development and of confining
that model to relatively specific temporal limits without generalizing to
a level of inconsequence. The boundaries*of change from one system of
socio-economic organization to another are fuzzy--they cannot be precisely
defined. The change from Feudalism to Capitalism took approximately three
[38]
hundred years. Yet it is legitimate and instructive to differentiate
one system from the other for, while they are part of the single complex
process of human social evolution, they represent essentially separate and
[391
discrete stages in that process. The difficulty becomes more acute
when differentiating periods within the process of capitalist development
itself. Nevertheless, I would argue that this type of abstraction also
40o]
has substance and validity. In fact, this thesis will attempt to show
.that such comprehension is crucial in analysing the process of urban
development under capitalism. Unfortunately, this difficulty increases as
the period under discussion approaches the present and it becomes problem-
atic to discern long term trends whilst in the midst of present-day reality.
In the following discussion of the relationships between classes in
London from the 1830's to the 1880's, I do not mean to imply that these
processes began during that period. In fact, their roots probably lie
-19-
buried in the mid-16th century, a date which denotes the start of the[41]
capitalist revolution in England, according to Maurice Dobb. The
change gathered momentum from 1750, the 'start' of the Industrial
[42]
Revolution in Britain. I have chosen the 1830's as a starting point
of my analysis for two main reasons. Firstly, during this decade the
1431
major political and economic institutions of capitalism as we know
it today,were finally established by the passage of important legislation.
It was. also a period in which the working class became class conscious
and placed the capitalist and aristocratic ruling class under strong
[44]
pressure. In 1832, the Reform Act established representative govern-
ment elected by means of a qualified franchise which excluded the working
class. Since then, the qualification has changed and the vote has gradually
been extended, but the institution of elected parliamentary government
has remained essentially the same. On the economic front, the Poor Law
Amendment Act of 1834 marked the final step in the institutionalization of
the market in labour and of markets in essential commodities like food,
clothing and shelter. These markets were based on individual economic
incentives, the cornerstone of capitalist motivation, as opposed to any
form of state or squirarchical control of and responsibility for the
individual. When seen in conjunction with the factory, municipal and
church reforms of the period, the 1830's certainly were a "decade of
[461
reform" which marked the culmination of centuries of struggle and the[471
beginning of the heyday of competitive capitalism.
The second reason for beginning in the 1830's relates to London's
spatial development. The 1830's mark the beginning of the extensive
application of public transportation technologies which had only
-20-
recently been developed. Horse drawn omnibuses began to ply the streets of[48] [491.
London in July 1829 and the Railway Age dates from 1836. These new
modes of urban transportation facilitated major changes in the social and
spatial fabric of London in line with its evolving economy and class
structure. As such, they distinguish subsequent developments from the
[50]
previous era of essentially private urban transportation.
Keeping in mind the foregoing reservations, we may now proceed to
elucidate briefly the progression of class relationships in London from
the 1830's to the 1880's. The importance of class analysis is stressed by
[51]
Maurice Dobb:
"History has been to date the history of class societies: namely,
of societies divided into classes, in which either one class, or
else a coalition of classes with some common interest, constitutes
the dominant class and stands in partial or complete antagonism
to another class or classes."
The formation of, and relationships between, social classes in
London was (and is) rooted in the relationship in which each group as a
[52]
whole stood to the process of production and hence to each other.
In my estimation, the local class structure and the dynamic interactions
between and within classes were essentially moulded by three strong
thrusts and a weaker one: firstly, the formation of a new, intrinsically
[53]
capitalist, dominant class by the integration of powerful capitalist
employers and merchants with the established landed aristocracy; secondly,
the aspirations of the middle stratum of small employers and shopkeepers,
clerks, professionals and government officials towards a 'junior-capital-
ist' status and existence--and this was the weaker force; thirdly, the
separation of the capitalist and petty capitalist classes from the much
-21-
larger working class and the impoverishment of the bulk of the working
class; and fourthly, the growing split which was occurring within the
working class between the skilled 'labour aristocracy' and the remainder
of the working class. Thus the period was characterized by integration at
the top of the power structure and stratification below. Let us proceed
to explore each of these forces in turn.
The struggle for political dominance between the rising capitalist
class and the established landed aristocracy in England resulted in the
peaceful integration of these two classes to form a new, intrinsically
capitalist, ruling class. It did not lead to the overthrow of the aris-
tocracy by the capitalist class which was characteristic of bourgeois
revolutions in Europe. The formation of this integrated ruling class
dates from the Reform Act of 1832, though struggles between its constituent
parts continued for some time after that. A major factor responsible for
this unique outcome in England was the strength of the restless, class
[54]
conscious working class during that period. This tension threatened
both elements of the ruling class and forced them to bury their differences
and unite in the face of working class opposition. "It was a contest
between 'blood and gold'; and in its outcome, blood compromised with gold[551
to keep out the claims of egalite." This opposition was, in turn,
masterfully manipulated by capitalist political representatives to serve
[56]
their integrative purpose. The enormous letdown of working class ex-
pectations which inevitably followed the passing of the Act was mainly
responsible for the crystallization of working-class consciousness in
157]
opposition to the capitalist ruling class. This, in turn, led to a
critical change towards liberalization in the structure of English
-22-
[58]
society in the middle years of the 19th century.
The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, representing the anti-climactic
culmination of the struggle for Zaissez faire, andthe Factory Acts of 1847,
which legislated a 10-hour day, are further examples of the concessionary
attitude within the dominant class. Each side's 'victory' occurred when
economic conditions were such that the opposition would be minimally
[591
affected by conceding 'defeat.' Over the years the aristocracy had
[60]
become increasingly capitalistic in their economic behaviour. The
leasehold system enabled them to turn their land holdings into income-
generating assets, and thereby, to benefit from the rapidly rising land
[61]
rents. The Reform Act enabled the aristocracy to maintain much of
their political power, but they were forced to share political control
with capitalists who were steadily gaining control of the economic reigns
of Britain. Capitalists, on the other hand, aspired to emulate aristo-
cratic lifestyles thus signifying their submission to the ancien regime.
[62]
In the words of Zygmunt Bauman:
"In political terms, it [the aristocracy] had not only not been
defeated but had actually gained victory, by inducing the
nouveau riche stratum to dream of advancement into the aristo-
cratic world. In accepting the superiority of the aristocratic
system of social values, the new class that dominated the economy
also accepted its own position, in which it had to look up to the
aristocracy."
The growth of financial, commercial and governmental functions in
London's economy led to an increase in the number of clerks, shopkeepers
[63]
and assistants and public sector employees. Many of these white-
collar workers played important roles in the day-to-day operation of the
economy. As a result, most were relatively well paid and regularly
-23-
employed for shorter hours than most working-class occupations, and their
livelihoods were relatively secure. They did not constitute a very large[641
segment of the working population at this stage. However, when grouped
together with other members of the middle stratum, such as professionals
and petty capitalists, they constituted a sizeable group which was striving
to improve their lot in society by saving money, consuming the 'right'
commodities, living in respectable areas and pandering to the needs of the
ruling .class.
The separation of capitalist employers and middlemen from their
workers and the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class were two
essential aspects of the realization of capitalist productive relations,
and of increasing the rate of capital accumulation, during this adolescent
[651
phase of capitalism. According to Zygmunt Bauman:
"After the sudden loss of their individuality and any possibility
of keeping their own existence separate from that of the frag-
mented masses, the workers of the time were also abruptly con-
fronted with a sharp increase in social distance between them-
selves and the owners and managers of the factories [or sweated
trades] where they worked....The manufacturers of that period
... seized with eagerness on every opportunity of widening the
gulf that separated them from those who were subordinate to them
....The only limit was set by the physical endurance of the
workers."
This separation and impoverishment was based on, and in turn promoted,
the institutionalization of the market in labour. According to this
institution, workers, who own only their ability to work, are 'free' to
sell this labour power to employers, who own capital and control the
production process, in return for a 'market-determined' money wage. They
are then 'free' to spend this money in markets for essential and
non-essential commodities to buy a quality of existence which they deem
desirable; the harder they work, the higher their wage--at least in
theory. As Frederick Engels so sarcastically put it in his 1844 study of
[66]
the condition of the English working class:
"In law and in fact the worker is the slave of the middle classes
[i.e., capitalist class], who hold the power of life and death
over him. The middle classes offer food and shelter to the worker,
but only in return for an 'equivalent;' i.e., for his labour. They
even disguise the true state of affairs by making it appear that
the worker is acting of his own free will, as a truly free agent
and as a responsible adult, when he makes his bargain with the
middle classes. A fine freedom indeed, when the worker has no
choice but to accept the terms offered by the middle classes or
go hungry and naked like the wild beasts."
Due to the separation between work and existence--connected only by the
money wage--the incentive of potential economic gain, which can buy a
better existence and, conversely, the threat of a subjectively or
objectively inadequate existence, are the major forms of motivation and
[671
control acting upon workers to give more effort.
Clearly, the relative integration between master-craftsmen and
journeymen and the journeymen's relatively high level of social mobility,
which existed under the guild system, was antithetical to the capitalist
class interest as it subverted the operation of the market in labour.
Capitalist employers simply could not afford to assume responsibility for
the welfare of their workers as this would ruin the incentive and control
system of the market labour and thereby potentially reduce the rate of
capital accumulation. They had to separate themselves from workers who
had to learn to fend for themselves according to the behavioural rules of
this new institution. "Pre-industrial experience, tradition, wisdom and
-25-
morality," in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, "provided no adequate guide for[68]
the kind of behaviour which the capitalist economy required."
Poverty and hardship were necessary evils associated with the creation of
wealth at this state of labour intensive capitalism. This was the basis
of the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class, not the malicious
intent of capitalists. Besides facilitating a growing rate of capital
accumulation--the lifeblood of 'progress'--it socialized workers to accept
the 'rules of the game' because it made the nature of the economic gain
incentive system, especially the threat to survival aspect of it, and the
power and control which capitalists could exert over their existence, real
[69]
to workers in their everyday lives.
The obverse of this separation and impoverishment process was the
creation of a place for the capitalists as indisputable and indispensible
leaders of the production process. This was the capitalists' only way of
gaining control over the productive capabilities of society. As
[70o]
Maurice Dobb has argued:
"A role was created for a new type of capitalist...as captain of
industry, organizer and planner of the operations of the pro-
duction-unit, embodiment of an authoritarian discipline over a
labour army, which, robbed of its economic citizenship, had to be
coerced to the fulfillment of its onerous duties in another's
service by the whip alternatively of hunger and of the master's
overseer."
Clearly, the split between the capitalist and working classes and the
impoverishment of the working class were integrally meshed into the
struggle surrounding the rise to power of the capitalist class. Conse-
quently, it is not surprising that the semi-patriarchal relationship
between master and journeymen, both parties having similar tastes and
-26-
ideals, was replaced within a few generations by complete social separation
between the employer and his employees. Henry Mayhew's description of the
working class in 1851, from a dominant class point of view, as "a large
body of people of whom the public has less knowledge than the most distant
[71]
tribes of the earth," was no idle chatter; it was a statement of fact.
State subsidization of the working class also had to be curtailed
to achieve the mobility and socialization of labour necessary for the
[721
smoothi functioning of a competitive labour market. Under the
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, each parish was responsible for the welfare
of those who could not fend for themselves. In 1795, the Speenhamland
Law had essentially pegged the level of poor relief to the cost of living
[73]
and paid relief in aid of wages which fell below a certain minimum level.
This legislation was contrary to the capitalist class interest, as it too
hampered the smooth functioning of the labour market and had to be revoked.
Workers had to learn to take care of themselves by hard work and
thrift. Sponging a living off the State negated the norms of the market
in labour and placed a heavy burden on local rates. It had to be stopped,
irrespective of the hardship which might, and did, result. This argument[75]
was succinctly stated by The Economist in 1848:
"Suffering and evil are nature's admonitions; they cannot be
got rid of; and the impatient attempts of benevolence to
banish them from the world by legislation before benevolence
has learnt their object and their end, have always been
productive of more evil than good."
This task was essentially accomplished by the Poor Law Amendment
Act of 1834. It abolished the 'right to live' principle which character-
ized previous poor Laws. Outdoor relief (i.e., relief in aid of wages)
-27-
was abolished. Workers could only receive relief if they were unemployed,
and doing so meant exposing themselves to the extremely severe discipline
of the sexually segregated workhouses, which were consciously designed to
make their existence 'less eligible' than that of the least prosperous
[761]
outside workers--surely an impossible task! One result of the Act was
to teach the working class the hard way that the state operated in the
interests of the dominant class, not in the 'national interest' or for the
'commoH good.' The radical activist James 'Bronterre' O'Brien put it this
[77T
way, in 1836:
"Previously to the passage of the Reform Bill, the middle orders
were supposed to have some community of feeling with the la-
bourers. That delusion has passed away.... It vanished with the
enactment of the Starvation Law (Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834).
No working man will ever again expect justice, morals or mercy
at the hands of a profit-mongering legislature."
The new Poor Law
combined with the Enclosures Acts, the rural population explosion and the
ruin of village handicrafts which caused extensive rural over-population
[78]
pressuring workers to migrate to the towns, and with capital intensive
technological developments, led to the formation and perpetuation of what
1791
Karl Marx called a 'reserve army' of unemployed or underemployed workers.
This 'reserve army' performed two essential functions in this adolescent
phase of capitalism: firstly, of depressing urban wages to or below subsis-
tence level, thereby facilitating a high rate of capital accumulation; and
secondly, of tightening the employers' control over the labour force,[80]
thereby ensuring the foundation of capital accumulation. In fact,
Gareth Stedman Jones has convincingly argued that employers in London
-28-
often adopted a deliberate policy of casualizing (i.e., increasing the
reserve of underemployed labour) as a means of increasing the power of their
[811
control over their workers.
But we have seen that production at this state in the development of
capitalism in London also required skilled workers. This requirement was
the basis of the fourth major struggle which occurred within the working
class itself but was supported by employers as it served their purposes as
well. ,The productive relations of London's economy stratified the working
class into two broad groups according to the nature of the workers' jobs
and the remuneration and security (or lack of these) which was part and
parcel of such employment. This division was fundamentally a function of
the skill required of workers in the execution of their tasks, and was based
on the importance and scarcity of skilled labour in the economy. Thus, the
working class was essentially split into skilled workers and the remainder
--semi-skilled or unskilled, casually employed or unemployed. The upper
stratum consisted of two kinds of skilled workers: one was the dying
breed of artisans and craftsmen whose origin lay in the guild system;
the other was a growing group of skilled factory workers born out of the[82]
requirements of the new industrial technology. Together they comprised[831
what was known as the 'labour aristocracy.'
"Because of its higher wages and potentially higher living
standards, this stratum in fact constituted the aristocracy
sui generis of the working class. The use of this metaphorical
term is justified in part by the fact that both objectively and
subjectively the relationship of this stratum to the remainder
of the working class was in many respects reminiscent of the
relations of the real aristocracy to the remainder of the
English upper and middle classes."
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For reasons which are outlined below, these workers aspired to separate
themselves from the rest of the working class and to secure for themselves
a lower-middle-stratum existence: to become, in the words of Ray Challinor,[84]
"junior partners in British Capitalism Limited."
[851
The skilled craftsmen laboured at trades which had existed since
the Industrial Revolution to produce goods mainly for the consumption of
wealthy members of society. They were gradually declining in size and
importance within the economy: their continued existence in the upper
levels of the working class was perpetually threatened by the possibility[86]
of new machine technologies making their skills redundant. Conse-
quently, they fought to maintain their already established privileged[871
position within the working class. They did so by banding together in
trade clubs which sought to regulate the number of workers permitted to
practise each trade, thereby reducing the supply of skilled craftsmen and
keeping wages high and to control production techniques in an attempt to
ward off the incursion of new technologies. They had never been a part of
the industrial working class and struggled to maintain their independence.
They developed numerous mutual aid societies, such as friendly societies,
co-operatives and building societies, in order to maintain a secure
existence for themselves and their families. These organizations and[88]
trade unions were highly organized but without a leadership elite:
leadership roles were mutually shared. Their rearguard struggle to main-
tain their position in society seldom led to demands for revolutionary[89]
change. For them, a secure existence rested on accepting the behavi-
oural requirements of capitalist institutions--thrift, temperance and
social stability would assure their status.
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The second sector of the 'labour aristocracy' consisted of skilled
factory workers who were part of the growing industrial working class.
These 'mechanics' as they were often called performed essential functions
during this stage of relatively primitive industrial technology, such as
1901
keeping the machines running. They too organized unions along craft,
as opposed to class, lines; but their struggle was to gain a secure place[911
for themselves as responsible workers in a capitalist society. In so
doing they emulated their craft-based counterparts in the 'labour aristoc-
racy' by forming similar societies and cultivating acceptable social values.
However, their unions were bureaucratic with organizational structures
similar to those of the factories where they worked. They made few
demands for revolutionary changes in society: in fact, in their everyday
behaviour, they aspired to be 'more capitalist than the capitalists them-
selves.' So much so that in 1870 Thomas Cooper, an old Chartist leader,[921
lamented the 'capitalization' of the working class:
"My sorrowful impressions were confirmed...you will hear well-
dressed working men talking, as they walk with their hands in
their pockets, of 'co-ops' and their shares in them, or in
building societies. And you will see others, like idiots,
leading small greyhound dogs."
Though their unions did produce a capable leadership elite, recruited
from their ranks, these leaders believed in negotiation, not insurrection,
and often used their high status within the union as a springboard to
[931
politics and an improved existence.
Both segments of the 'labour aristocracy' were regularly employed
under adequate working conditions and received relatively high wages.
941Together they comprised b twe n 10% and20%
Together they comprised between 10% and 20% of the labour force.
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Their trade unions were stratified along occupational lines and this lack
of unity added to their politically conservative posture. As Engels
[951
put it:
"They form an aristocracy among the working class; they have
succeeded in enforcing for themsleves a relatively comfort-
able position, and they accept it as final."
The societies which they established--for support in case of illness or
unemployment, to buy food cheaply and to build homes for themselves--went
a long way towards securing their existence and diluting demands for change.
In fact, capitalists tended to support these developments in subtle ways
as they saw in them a means of maintaining social stability by controlling
[961
the organized, politically mature sector of the working class. The
Education Act of 1870, providing public support for elementary education--
an increasingly important device for socializing and controlling the work-
ing class--was an excellent example of this subtle process of domination,
especially coming so soon after the 'labour aristocracy' achieved enfran-
[97]
chisement as a result of the 1867 Reform Act.
But there was another important aspect in the struggles of the
'labour aristocracy' for a place in capitalist society. In order to gain
acceptance, they had to prove to the rulers of that society that they were
totally unlike the remainder of the working class who were variously
described as dangerous, immoral, irresponsible or lazy. Indeed, this
negation of the behavioural norms and values of the mass of the working
class was a major reason why they strove to cultivate capitalist norms and[98]
values. As Thomas Wright, an artisan, wrote in 1873:
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"The artisan creed with regard to the labourers is that the
latter are an inferior class and that they should be made
to know and kept in their place."
As a result, the 'labour aristocracy's' daily actions and their aspirations
and consciousness were constantly focused on the drive to separate them-
selves from the remainder of the working class: resisting becoming one of
the masses and possibly even crossing the fuzzy boundary separating them
from the bottom of the middle stratum.
The remainder of the working class were expendable products created
by the down-grading effects of capitalist productive relations and new
forms of technology. Workers in this stratum of the labour force competed
desperately for vacant jobs which required little or no training for pro-
[991
ficiency. Consequently, their wages were generally low, often below
what was needed to buy even a meagre existence. Their working conditions
were usually depressing and unhealthy. Some worked in sweated trades,
at home or in small workshops; others at the machines of the new factories.
A substantial number were casually employed by the day or hour often at[100]
the whim of a dock foreman. Seasonality of production and fluctu-
ations in consumer demand caused their jobs to disappear and re-appear
almost at random. Clearly, they lacked even a modicum of social or
economic security. What the middle stratum defined as 'demoralized' be-
haviour on the part of these workers was, more often than not, a rational
[101]
response to their economic predicament. To paraphrase Zygmunt Bauman,
[102]
they were fragmented--their traditional hierarchies and social bonds
were shattered in their struggle for survival; they were alienated--deprived
of any rights in society; and they were an amorphous, though not entirely
-33-
homogeneous, mass--their minimal occupational differentiation meant that
they could be moulded to suit the changing requirements of the economy.
As a result they were generally disorganized politically. On the
occasions when they did organize, however, they did so on a class basis.
Their protests were often violent and usually opposed to the existing
[103]
order, but the focus of their attacks was often irrational. They
inspired fear and trepidation in the hearts of the rest of society, and
consequently their protests were rapidly and sometimes violently, and
[io4]
equally irrationally, repressed by the authorities. Their unions had
no integrated leadership elite. Their leaders came from the working class
or the middle stratum. They were charismatic and imposing, manipulating
these 'butterfly existence' unions which usually disintegrated under an
early defeat.
[1051
"To sum up, therefore," in the words of Zygmunt Bauman:
"there were, among the population...two fundamentally different
groups at this time: one was amorphous, while the other had
occupational structure.... one was fragmented, the other firmly
embedded in its occupational (and social) groups... one was
alienated from society, while the other was strongly rooted
in it; the one was totally antagonistic in attitude to that
society, the other was eager for society to recognise the
privileges it had already gained, and hoped for new ones."
With this general outline of the essential characteristics of the
class struggle from the 1830's to the 188 0's, we may now proceed to
examine how London's social and spatial structure responded to, and in
turn affected, these class pressures. This is the subject of Chapter 3.
But first we must set the scene of London in the 1830's.
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74. "During the most active period of the Industrial Revolution, from
1795 to 1834, the creating of a labour market in England was pre-
vented through the Speenhamland Law .... Indeed, nothing could be more
obvious than that the wage system imperatively demanded the with-
draoal of the 'right to live' as proclaimed in Speenhamland--under
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the new regime of the economic man, nobody would work for a wage if
he could make a living by doing nothing." Polanyi [1944] pp.77-78.
75. Quoted in Tarn [1971] p.3.' Samuel Smiles' bestseller, Self Help
[1894], was another example of the prevailing laissez faire ideology.
76. "The doctrine of discipline and restraint was, from the start, more
important than that of material 'less eligibility,' the most inven-
tive State would have been hard put to...create institutions which
stimulated conditions worse than those [of the worst situated workers
outside]...'our object [said an assistant commissioner] is to estab-
lish therein a discipline so severe and repulsive as to make them a
terror to the poor and prevent them from entering.'" Thompson [1963]
p.267. The more traditional argument goes as follows: "The whole
point of 'less eligibility' was that it should be unpleasant and de-
grading to take poor relief. Becoming a pauper did not just mean
being poor. It was an actual legal status and, like a black person
in South Africa today, paupers were denied many basic human rights
....The essential thing was humiliation." Martin [1971] p.60, and
see pp.50-62.
7y. Quoted in Thompson [1963] p.822 .
78. Huberman [1936] pp.107-111,171-174; Morton [1938] pp.326-330, Dobb
[1963] p.274.
79. "But if a surplus labouring population is a necessary product of
accumulation or of the development of wealth on a capitalist basis,
this surplus-population becomes, conversely, the lever of capital-
istic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist
mode of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army,
that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred
it at its own cost." Marx [1867] p.632, and see pp.628-40. Mayhew's
guess as to the size of the reserve army in London in the 1850's was
as follows: "estimating the working classes as being between four
and five million in number, I think we may safely assert...that...
there is barely sufficient work for the regular employment of half of
our labourers, so that only 1,500,000 are fully and constantly
employed; while 1,500,000 more are employed only half their time,
and the remaining 1,500,000 wholly unemployed, obtaining a day's
work occasionally by the displacement of some of the others."
Quoted in Thompson [19631 p.250.
80. On the depression of wages, see Engels [18921 p.366 . On the impor-
tance of the reserve army in perpetuating working-class stratifica-
tion, and control on the principle of 'divide and rule,' see
Hobsbawm [1954] pp.290-291.
81. The nature of casual work was that it "placed tyrannical power in the
hands of the foreman or man responsible for hiring and firing."
Jones [1971] pp.81-82,116 . The film On the Waterfront, made in the
1950's and starring Marlon Brando, excellently portrayed the power
and infectiousness of this.control.
82. "The period therefore probably saw a transfer of the centre of gravity
within the labour aristocracy from the old pre-industrial crafts to
the new metal industries." Hobsbawm [1954] p.284 . "During the period
under discussion (1850-1890), therefore, two processes were occurring
side by side which were transforming the structure of the working
class. One was the disappearance of the division which had played
a fundamental part in the preceding period, a specific division which
belonged to the 'prehistory' of the working class; the other was the
emergence of a new stratification within the working class that had
been created by the industrial revolution ... Occupational barriers
remained high, and differences of occupational interests overshadowed
b~y identity of class interests." Bauman [1960] P.75.
83. Bauman [1960] p.67. And see Hobsbawm [1954] pp.273-275 and Bauman
[1960] pp.67-68 for a discussion of the elements which created a
"labour aristocracy."
84. Challinor [1971] p.18.
85. Bauman [1960] pp.16-21; Thompson [1963] pp.234 -264 .
86. "But we must also bear in mind the general insecurity of many skills
in a period of rapid technical innovation.... Invension simultaneously
devalued old skills and elevated new ones." Thompson [1963] p.244 .
87. "Where a skill was involved, the artisan was as much concerned with
maintaining his status as against the unskilled man as he was in
bringing pressure upon the employers." Thompson [19631 p.244 .
88. Bauman [1960] pp.22-38,51-53,95-98 ; Morton [1938] pp.441-44 2.
89. "The first unions were set up with aims that were defensive, not
offensive, with the intention of maintaining the existing status quo,
not of forcing through any progressive changes." Bauman [1960] p.30.
But revolutionary fervour was high even among this group during the
1830's and 1840's; see Thompson [1963] p.831.
90.. "As a result, the new industry produced a new stratum of skilled
workers, men with definite jobs and a permanent place in the new
system of production. These men were not identical, easily changed
components; instead, precisely because of the difficulty of replac-
ing them, and their important part in the production process, they
had a lasting position in the social structure of production."
Bauman [1960] p.63, and see pp.63-74,77-7 8 . Hobsbawm [1968] pp.117-118 .
91. "If one were to try to convey briefly the essence of their new social
attitude, one would have to stress that their aim was the emancipation
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of the stratum as a whole within the framework as a scale of values
that was firmly linked with the capitalist system." Bauman [1960]
p.69.
92. Quoted in Challinor [1971] p.17. For an analysis of their 'new
model' unions, see Bauman [1960] pp.80-95,98-108.
93. Bauman [1960] p.131, and see pp.110-126.
94. Thompson [1963] p.251; Hobsbawm [1954] pp.278-284 . But Jones [1971]
p.387 estimates their numbers to be about 30%.
95. Engels [1892] p.368. "Given the 'law of uneven development' within
capitalism...a purely 'economist' labour movement must tend to
fragment the working class into 'selfish' (petty bourgeois )
segments, each pursuing its own interest, if necessary in alliance with
its own employers, at the expense of the rest." Hobsbawm [1970] p.123.
96. Challinor [1971] p.17.
97. Bowles [1971] pp.4-7. And see the entire article for an excellent
argument of the function of education in reproducing capitalist
class relations.
98. Quoted in Hobsbawm [1954] p.275. "Its [the 'labour aristocracy']
members' pursuit of social advancement was thus expressed both by
their raising themselves to the position of the lower middle class
and by a definite dissociation of themselves from the unskilled."
Bauman [1960] p.74 .
99. "Here men regard their fellows not as human beings, but as pawns in
the struggle for existence." Engels [1892] p.31. "The living
conditions of the mass of unskilled workers remained at a pitifully
low level. Such workers were still easily interchangeable and not
linked with any particular industry. This often made their position
weak in the economic struggle which had to be waged with the
employers if they were to improve their lot. In contrast to their
skilled fellow workers, they did not play a key role in the produc-
tion system." Bauman [1960] p.66 .
100. "Casualized workers and their families comprised about 10 percent
of the population--around 400,000 persons.... To be subject to
casualization, an occupation had to fulfill several conditions.
Firstly, no natural barrier of specialized skill or knowledge re-
stricted the field of potential applicants in the labour market;
or else, the special qualifications were so widely shared or so
easily attained that in fact they did not act as a barrier. Secondly,
the nature of the occupation rendered it liable to sudden and arbi-
trary changes i.n the volume of the demand for labour. Thirdly, in
casual occupations, employers gained only the most marginal advantages
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from regularity, reliability, sobriety or other virtues of work
discipline considered to be associated with constant employment;
or else these advantages were offset by the availability of a cheap
and elastic supply of labour." Jones [1971] p.56 , and see pp.33-126
for an excellent analysis of the casual labour market in London in
general, and the East End in particular.
101. "Habitual uncertainty of employment, as all social investigators
know, discourages forethought and gives rise to the familiar cycle
of hardship alternated with the occasional spending-spree when in
work." Thompson [1963] p.264.
102. Bauman [1960] p.16.
103. P'The working population from which the new skilled workers had imper-
ceptibly emerged was noncomformist in all spheres. It was in revolt,
not against its position in society but against society itself and
the whole social hierarchy." Bauman [1960] p.68, and see pp.40-50,
53-59, for an analysis of these unions and their leaders.
104. Morton [1938] pp.365-366.
105. Bauman [1960] p.20.
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CHAPTER 2
LONDON IN THE 1830 's
From Feudal to Capitalist London
A snapshot of London in the 1830's obscures the fact that its social
and spatial fabric was in the midst of a major process of transition which
had begun during the 18th century and continued at least until the mid-20th
century. London's internal organization was changing from a situation in
which the workplace and the home were closely integrated, to one in which
workplaces were concentrated together and substantially separated from
residences. This process had its gradual beginnings when the craft guilds
began to crumble as they became subservient to merchants and bankers, and
as mastercraftsmen became capitalist employers themselves. It was part of
a larger transformation whereby cities assumed increasing dominance over
[1]
their rural hinterlands. But we are here concerned with the internal
transformation of the city--from feudal to capitalist London.
[2]
In the days when the craft guilds were powerful, the City of London
was controlled by the guilds. They regulated who could work, trade and live
within the walls. Production was not too obnoxious and mastercraftsmen
usually lived with their journeymen and apprentices above their workshops.
The West End was the domain of the idle Royalty and aristocracy and as such
was more uniformly residential and socially homogeneous. The areas sur-
rounding the northern, eastern and southern boundaries of the City, the
suburbs of the 18th century, were inhabited by all classes, with the poor,
the unemployed and the tradesmen predominating, as they had been excluded
from the City, either because they represented unwanted competition or
(31
because their trades were obnoxious. The early housing legislation,
which controlled the quality and quantity of housing built in the suburbs,
was part of general legislation enacted by the guilds in an attempt to
maintain their dominant economic position. Broadly speaking, London's
social and physical structure was shaped by the guilds' activities.
But as merchants, and subsequently capitalist employers, became more
prominant so the guilds' protective practices were eroded and replaced by
competitive market relations. Merchants encouraged production in the
suburbs to escape guild restrictions in the City which increased costs.
They bought goods from craftsmen whose prices were low, whether or not they[4]
were located within the City walls. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, the capitalist labour market was antithetical to the guilds'
practice of assuming responsibility for the essential needs of their
journeymen and apprentices. In fact, the new labour market was predicated
upon the separation of work and living--the essential commodity, housing,
was the workers' responsibility and had to be paid for out of their wages.
In any case, employers had enough headaches worrying about production: if
others would provide housing for their workers, then well and good. Thus
the development of the labour market was paralleled by the development of
markets for housing and for land on which to build it. Work and living
increasingly became separated in space. Productive and commercial facili-
ties grew and gravitated towards the central area which became less attrac-
tive as a place in which to live. The surrounding countryside was more
enticing, so those who could moved to the suburbs. But this was a slow,
uneven process. Those with wealth and power were first to move, others
followed, yet even today many poorer people are trapped in undesirable
parts of the central area, though they do live away from their workplaces.
15]
Thus, in the words of H. J. Dyos:
"London suburbs have at different times performed different functions.
At one period they were reception areas for the urban poor, almost
literally the outskirts of urban society, and at another they were
the exclusive residential areas of the middle classes. During the
course of the period [1580-1836]...there was, in general, a charac-
teristic change from the first of these residential functions to the
second."
Py the 1830's, due to the lack of suburban transport and other facili-
ties, this suburban migration was confined to prosperous merchants and
government employees, though the beginnings of this movement had already
been recorded in the mid-18th century. There had been no working-class
migration from the centre. London's workers lived within the confines of the
central area within walking distance from their work. There were few
socially homogeneous neighbourhoods; except in the north-west and West End,
[61
rich and poor lived cheek by jowl. The population of the metropolis
was approaching two million and was mainly concentrated in the City,
171
Westminster, Marylebone, Finsbury, Tower Hamlets, Lambeth and Southwark.
The Location of Classes and Economic Activity
The City was the commercial and financial heart of London. Merchants
and employers still lived there, but the more prosperous ones had migrated
[8]
to the north and west and to suburban villages. The working class also
resided in the City, often confined to decaying slums. Most of the struc-
tures had been built shortly after the Great Fire of 1666. Old homes were
gradually being converted into businesses, or were being demolished to
make way for more up-to-date commercial structures.
I
-149-
Abutting the City, the East End was a motley area of industry and
predominantly working-class housing. Silk manufacture dominated Spital-
fields, sugar-refining was located in Whitechapel, and shipbuilding and
1[9
warehousing proliferated in Dockland along the Thames river. The
sweated clothing, shoe-making and furniture trades were diffused through-
out the whole area. The East End was home for all levels of the working
class. The better paid skilled workers probably lived in reasonable
accommodations by the standards of the time, but the bulk of the workers,
particularly the multitudes of casual workers, lived in densely packed,
overcrowded, unsanitary rooms and lodging houses for which they paid high[10]
rents. There must have been many who were literally homeless. For
many sweated workers, their homes had to double up as workplaces.
To the north of the City, there was a sprinkling of light industry[ll]
and sweated trades, but this area was predominantly the home of clerks,
public employees, professional and petty capitalists. Some merchants and
employers lived there and so did a good deal of workers. The Duke of
Bedford's Bloomsbury estate was well managed, strictly controlled and in-
habited by wealthy families. Its squares were pleasant and inviting, in
contrast to its unimaginative architecture. The physical condition of most
of the northern area was adequate, but there were some slums, like those[12]
in St. Giles, and in Clerkenwell on the Duke of Northampton's estate.
The Figs Mead estate on the northern extremities of London was inhabited
by artisans and labourers living in 'third and fourth rate' houses. The
manager of the estate was fighting a valiant battle to prevent its decay
to the level of the adjacent slums of Camden Town and Somers Town.
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The north-west was altogether another kettle of fish. It was a
highly fashionable residential area populated by successful merchants,
employers, top civil servants and professionals. With such high class
tenants, the Duke of Portman must have had few problems maintaining the
high standards of his estate. There were, however, sprinklings of slums
in awkward alleys and secluded courts. What little production there was in
this area was concentrated around the Oxford street shopping precinct
where the respectable bespoke tailors and dressmakers had their workshops.
Most of the West End was prime property. It was the traditional
home of royalty and the aristocracy. A small proportion of highly success-[14]
ful businessmen and bankers probably lived there. The Palace had
recently been moved to its present position at the end of The Mall. The
seats of Government and Courts of Justice were dotted about the area.
St. James and Green Parks were decidedly pleasant and Hyde Park attracted
the upper crust on Sundays when they strolled and rode along the banks of
the Serpentine to see and be seen. Mayfair, Pall Mall and Belgravia were
superb, spacious neighbourhoods. Bond and Regent streets were exclusive
(15]
shopping precincts. Again there were some slums in out-of-the-way
places. In fact, Regent street was built in 1815 both to increase the
desirability of Regents Park by improving accessibility to the West End[16]
and as a barrier between the West End and the slums of Soho.
Finally, south London was much more like the East End. Various
mixed industries, such as tanneries, iron-foundaries, gasworks, dye-works,
117]
breweries and shoe and hat manufactureres were located there. A few
employers and more clerks lived south of the river, mainly on the outskirts
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of the built-up area in places like Camberwell, Dulwich, Brixton and
[18]
Clapham. But the area was filled with all strata of the working class
most of whom worked in local factories, though some crossed London Bridge
along with the clerks to work in the City and East End. The area was
polluted and most of the housing was dilapidated and overcrowded.
The distinction between town and countryside was sharp. Beyond the
built-up area there were market gardens and brickfields waiting to be
[19]
consumed by the relentless march of houses. There was some ribbon
development along main roads leading to London, and some large residences
were dotted about the countryside, but the latter were not generally used
as permanent residences by those who worked in the centre.
Compared with what was to come in the decades ahead, the modes of
transportation in 1830 were primitive. Longer distances were traversed
in stage coaches and private coaches, shorter distances in short-stage
[20]
coaches, hackney cabs and private carriages. The use of these vehicles
was generally restricted to the wealthier members of society who could
afford to own them or pay the fares. The working class and most of the
middle stratum walked to work. Goods were transported by sea, river or
canal and were conveyed by carts within the city.
[21]
The government of the metropolis was fragmented, chaotic and corrupt.
The City of London was the only local area which had one effective authority
responsible for the provision and maintenance of pu'olic services in the
area. The City Corporation, as it was called, was an ancient body which
represented the interests of the powerful City businessmen. It reigned
supreme within the boundaries of the City, was constantly at loggerheads
with Parliament in matters affecting the City's interests or challenging
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the Corporation's authority and usually was the victor in those forays.
The Council of Aldermen was the most powerful body within the Corporation.
Its members were elected by a complex procedure which enabled them to
remain in office for long periods of time. They often acted against the
expressed wishes of the Court of Common Council, a much more representative
body.
The remainder of London was governed by a myriad of local bodies.
Almostr 200 highly autonomous parish vestries were responsible for the
paving, lighting and cleansing of streets and the relief of the poor.
[22]
According to Lynn Lees:
"London parishes.. .possessed the right to self-government almost up
to the point of urban anarchy; no effective government beyond that
of the City of London was installed until 1889 when the London
County Council came into being."
More than half of these public bodies were 'open' vestries where all male
ratepayers were entitled to attend. But in the fashionable western areas
'close' or 'select' vestries were more common. Here membership and power
were restricted to a small, nominated group of 'principal inhabitants.'
Public commissions and private companies were responsible for turnpikes,
sewers, water and gas services, which were primitive at this stage. Juris-
dictional irrationalities surrounding the distribution of responsibility for
most of these public goods proliferated and led to inequities, inefficiencies
and constant arguments between authorities. The one consistent fact in this
maze was that the residential areas of the wealthy were generally far better
served at lower rates than working-class districts. In 1839, Dr. Southwood
[231
Smith, the famous sanitary reformer, reported:
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"While systematic efforts, on a larger scale, have been made to
widen the streets...to extend and perfect the drainage and sewerage
...in the places in which the wealthier classes reside, nothing what-
ever has been done to improve the condition of the districts inhabi-
ted by the poor."
Except for the Metropolitan Police which was formed in 1829, London lacked
a city-wide governing body until the inception of the Metropolitan Board
of Works in 1855.
IThe Origins of the Leasehold System
Finally, we must explore the systems of tenure which mediated rela-
tions between the owners and occupants of residential land and housing.
Outright ownership by the occupant, of both the house in which he/she
lived and the freehold of the land on which it was built, was rare.
More prevalent, though not widespread, were cases in which houses were
owned by their occupants, by means of their own funds or money borrowed
from solicitors or building societies, but the land was leased from an
aristocratic or corporate freeholder. These systems of tenure, which are
explored in the next chapter, were effectively subservient
[24]
until the 1880's to the overwhelmingly predominant leasehold system.
A brief exposition of the historical origins of the leasehold system is
instructive as it shows why it, and not a freehold system, for instance,
was so prevalent during the 19th century, a factor of paramount importance
in the evolution of London's social and spatial structure.
Basically, the leasehold system evolved out of the feudal form of
land tenure as it increasingly came into contradiction with capitalist
market relations. In many respects, it was a product of the integration
which was occurring between the landed aristocracy and merchants and
employers. In the Feudal era, all land was ultimately owned by the Crown.
Under a law instituted by William the Conqueror in 1066, all other persons
having rights over land were his tenants and received their rights from
him. He assigned control of the land in large portions between his retainers
who comprised the landed aristocracy. In return these nobles had to
furnish the king with military aid in times of war or with the equivalent
value in money. They were regarded as 'freemen' and the holding of land
on these terms was called freehold. With the passage of time, the free-
holders' obligation to the Crown fell away and the term 'freehold' in[25]
England came to mean absolute right of ownership of land. Each
aristocrat's land holdings could be handed down within his family. The
freeholder could 'by copy of court roll' convey the land to his retainers,
a form of tenure known as copyhold. Undoubtedly, land changed hands in
this way as freeholders attempted to offset debts which they had incurred.
But land could not be bought and sold at will--it was inalienable. As[261
Karl Polanyi has correctly argued:
"Land, the pivotal element in the feudal order, was the basis of
the military, judicial, administrative and political system; its
status and function were determined by legal and customary rules.
Whether its possession was transferable or not, and if so, to whom
and under what restrictions; what the rights of property entailed;
to what uses some types of land might be put--all these questions
were removed from the organization of buying and selling, and
subjected to anentirely different set of institutional regulations."
However, this system progressively came under pressure, particularly
in London, as its rate of expansion increased and as the potential for
realizing ground rents dawned on the freeholders of peripheral land. The
change to a new form of tenure occurred first in urban areas as a result
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of the basic difference in the formation of rural and urban land rent and
due to the growing specialization of land uses which characterized urban
areas. In the case of rural land, given a certain fertility of the soil,
the landowner can, by investing more capital in the land, increase its
yield and thereby its value. In urban areas, however, the landowner has
minimal control over the value of his land. Rare is the occasion in which
he can, by his own industry, increase the value of his land, which funda-
[271
mentally depends on its place in the overall development of the city.
All he can do is to ensure that he gets the prevailing rent by developing
his land in a manner appropriate to its situation. Further, unlike rural
land, on which peasants lived and which they worked for their subsistence
and for the needs of their feudal landlords, urban land was increasingly
given over to specialized productive, financial or residential functions.
Thus it was not amenable to a system of payment in kind or alternately
working the land for one's own and the landlord's consumption as was rural
land. What were landlords to do with half a tailor's produce of workmen's
suits or half a ship? How could a financier pay in kind for his offices
or a clerk for his house? Clearly, the only common denominator which could
lubricate all these transactions was money. Attempts had been made to sell
land freehold but these were effectively prevented by legislation enacted
[28]
by Henry VIII in 1558. Some other mechanism had to be found which
would enable the landowner to assign the use of his land to others in
return for money.
The building lease was an ingenious answer to this dilemma. In the[29]
words of Michael Harrison:
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"The device of the building lease--which smacks more of the cunning
of the attorney than the self-protective ingenuity or the aristocrat
with his lands in tail--enabled the owner of entailed property to
evade not the provisions of the law but its disadvantages."
It allowed landlords to maintain ownership of their land and theoretically
to control the use of the land, thereby satisfying the Crown, while others
were granted rights to build on the land and to use the buildings for
agreed purposes in return for an annual ground rent. Landlords, who were
concerned with the distant future as well as the immediate present, had a
financial incentive to provide good layouts which meshed well into those of
surrounding estates. By means of covenants in the building agreements, they
could control the quality of both the design and construction of their
estates and maintain some degree of supervision over the period of the
lease. On the expiration of the lease, which could vary from 21 to, more
popularly, 99 years, the land, together with the improvements, reverted to
the ground landlord who was at liberty to begin a new lease on the existing
property,or to rebuild the estate. Thus, landlords were not required to
transgress their agreements not to sell the land, yet they received an
annual return for it; and what's more, they became the outright owners of
[30]
improved and more valuable land once the lease expired.
Leaseholders, on the other hand, received the use of space which 4aass
essential to their productive or residential requirements. Their initial
outlay was much smaller than would have been the case if they had purchased
the freehold of the property for a capital sum. No doubt they would have
preferred not to pay the ground rent. However, employers were especially
reticent to challenge this burden as it meant attacking the institution of
private ownership of land which might bring private property in general
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under fire, and that might have proved especially problematic at a time
when they were struggling for political and economic dominance. The
ground rent was a small price to pay for an essential item, and the leasehold
system did facilitate the institutionalization of a competitive market in
land, which prevented land from becoming communal property and enabled those
with financial power to outbid others for prime locations which suited
[31]
their requirements. Thus, the market in urban land, mediated by the
building lease, became an appropriate device for allocating space to
competing users, a necessary process which might otherwise have posed
thorny political problems.
The London building lease owes its origin to the fourth Earl of [32]
Southampton who first used it in the development of Bloomsbury Square.
After that freeholders increasingly applied to Parliament to pass Private
Acts enabling them to grant building leases. They employed surveyors to
plan the layout of the estate, often in conjunction with prospective
builders, and to supervise its construction. Their attorneys drew up
leases with appropriate covenants designed to regulate land use, costs,
density, aesthetic and constructional standards and/or maintenance in an
attempt to keep the value of the land high. But landlords had little
control over changing market forces. In those cases where the status of
potential leaseholders began to decline, freeholders found to their
[33]
dismay, in the words of Donald Olsen:
"that the forces which were undermining the integrity of their
original plans were too powerful to be stopped by restrictive
covenants... .The difficulty was that during the term of the
lease, apart from occasional expenditure on public services,
the ground landlord was limited to passive and defensive
measures....The building plan might have been a good one for its
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own time, but have grown outdated because of changing circumstances."
In west London, many of the estates which were developed for building
were very large indeed. In the inner districts of east London, the pattern
of land ownership was generally more fragmented,as was the case in south
London with the exception of larger estates in Lambeth and parts of
[34]
Camberwell.
Such was London's disposition and condition in the 1830's. We may
now proceed to examine the nature of, and the reasons behind, the impor-
tant changes and developments which occurred in the next half century.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. The early stages of the changing relationships between town and
country and of changing internal urban organization in England are
well analysed by Dobb [1963] pp.70-82,90-95.
2. Throughout the text, City, with the capital 'C', refers to the ancient
city of London, "the square mile from the Tower to the Temple Bar,"
Gomme [1898] p.2 . 'London' and city with a small 'c' refer to the
entire urban area, which has progressively grown to become the Greater
London of the present.
3. "It is probable that the suburbs were never occupied by completely
homogeneous social classes... .The poor generally lived cheek-by-jowl
with the rich to an extraordinary degree." Dyos [1954] p.76, and see
pp.61-62.
4. Dobb [1963] p.129.
5. Dyos [1954] p.75; and see Barker and Robbins (1963] pp.XXV-XXVI;
Sheppard [1971] p.109.
6. See Gomme [1898] pp.1-36, Metcalf [1972] pp.1-18, and Sheppard
[1971] pp.105-109 for more details.
7. Coppock [1964] p.28; Gomme [18981 pp.3-h; United Kingdom Newspaper[1832].
8. Martin [1966] p.1; Summerson [1946] p.45. For early examples of
merchants who lived in the suburbs and worked in the City, see
Dyos [1954] pp.64-65.
9. Sheppard [1971] pp.1 6 4-1 6 5.
10. Engels [1892] pp.30-39.
11. Dickens wrote in the 1830's: "...the early clerk population of Somers
and Camden Town, Islington and Pentonville are fast pouring into the
City, or directing their steps towards Chancery Lane and the Inns of
Court," quoted in Hall [1962] p.32. And see Cherry [1972] p.11.
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CHAPTER 3.
THE DIALECTICS OF LONDON'S GROWTH
Having set the stage showing London during the 1830's, we must now
attempt to answer the following general question: why did London's
social structure and spatial form develop in the ways which many historians
have observed, and not in others? And why, in particular, did slums prolif-
erate in some areas and attractive neighbourhoods in others? What pressures
caused transportation networks to assume certain forms and not others?
Why was so little done before the 1880's towards alleviating atrocious
housing conditions? The most popular answers to these questions attribute
causative powers to 'market forces' or to economic and/or technological
necessities. However, it is not my purpose to critique or evaluate these
explanations. Instead, I will offer a view of London's development which
incorporates such explanations within a broader economic, social, poli-
tical and legal framework, and which, in my view, presents a more accurate
picture.
In attempting to answer these and other questions, I will argue that
the nature and quality of urban living experienced in both its rewarding
and problematic forms by the various strata of London's population and the
spatial form of the city, was shaped by the broad fulfilment of five major
social and economic forces mediated by the forms of tenure whereby people
secured their housing; and further, that the frustration of a sixth
pressure constituted the essence of the Housing Crisis of which all
London was aware in the 1880's. These forces arose out of London's class
structure and the struggles between and within classes during this fifty
year period, as outlined in Chapter 1. They and the interactions between
them broadly determined the aspirations of the members of each class,
their differential abilities to participate in the land and housing
markets, and either directly or indirectly defined the structure of these
markets. With these parameters set, the autonomous actions of individuals
or corporate bodies in the land and housing markets, mediated by the tenure
relations, led to the observed social and spatial structure of the city. In
sum, I will attempt to show that London's development was shaped by the
acting out of the overall class struggle, in relation to the drive to
accumulate capital on the one hand, and to people's quest for shelter on
the other. Though I will deal with the city as a whole, my major focus
will be on the residential sector.
The following were the six forces: first, the striving on the part
of successful merchants, bankers and employers to emulate the lifestyle
of the aristocracy; second, the search on the part of members of the
middle stratum for an existence within their means which captured the
essence of their bosses' lifestyle; third, the efforts by the capitalist
class to improve London's 'capital accumulation potential' by increasing
the internal efficiency of the city, especially the anachronistic central
area,and by linking it to markets in other parts of the country and the
world; fourth, the separation of the capitalist class from the working
class; fifth, the impoverishment of the bulk of the working class such
that they constituted an abundant, cheap and adaptable labour force; and
sixth, the struggle on the part of the 'labour aristocracy' to separate
themselves from the remainder of the working class and to establish a
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place for themselves in capitalist society. I would stress that these
pressures are all interrelated in the complex web of everyday life. They
are all aspects of the general struggle by capitalists, on the one hand, to
increase the rate of capital accumulation subject to the maintenance of
social stability, and for improved working and living conditions by the
middle stratum and the working class, on the other hand. These six
forces were the major constituents of the whole. They have only been
abstracted in order to facilitate a clearer understanding of why London's
social and physical fabric evolved as it did. We may now proceed to examine
each in turn.
Integration at the Top
In the previous chapter, we saw that the rise of the British capital-
ist class was not predicated upon a corresponding decline inthe economic
and political power or the social status of the landed aristocracy. In-
stead, a process of integration occurred in which capitalists and aristo-
crats gradually combined to form a single essentially capitalist, dominant
class. An important aspect of this coming together is that successful
capitalists envied the aristocratic lifestyle and endeavoured to buy
their way into these upper circles or, at least, to achieve their own less
[1]
opulent versions of it.
During the latter part of the 18th century, and especially during
the period under consideration here, there was another pressure acting
upon merchants, bankers and employers who were still living above their
workplaces in the City and its surrounding parishes. As the productive,
distributive and exchange functions of London's economy grew, so did the
space which they occupied in these central areas. External economies
enticed new banks, offices, factories and warehouses to cluster in areas
where these activities had established a foothold. In their wake came
thousands of workers casual labourers and paupers who were forced to live
close to sources of employment. The combined effect of these pressures
on the central area land market was an increase in land values and conges-
tion and a reduction in the space available for residential land uses.
[2]
Thus it is not surprising that:
"During the reign of Victoria almost the whole of it, [the City] was
rebuilt, the vast majority of the seventeenth-century and eighteenth-
century merchants' houses giving place to warehouses and offices and
enlarged company halls."
The overriding importance of central locations for their businesses meant
that capitalists were unwilling to assert their power in the land market
in order to maintain their residences in central London. This would
have been expensive, and furthermore, the ancient, crowded buildings of the
City, together with the lack of open space and cultural institutions,which
enhance a residential area, must have made the City unattractive as a place
in which to live.
The combined effect of these pulls and shoves was that successful
merchants, bankers and employers migrated from the City and its surround-
ings. A small proportion might have made it into the attractive West End
neighbourhoods such as Marylebone, Mayfair and Belgravia which had long
[31
been the homes of the aristocracy. Many more planted roots in the
newly-built areas of west and north-west inner London adjacent to those
aristocratic havens, places like Bayswater, Paddington and Kensington in
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the west and St. John's Wood and Belsize Park in the north-west. Referring
to the westward migration of people in late-19th and early-20th century[41
America, Donald Olsen conjures up the following image:
"Standing at the Piazza Garden, Berkeley Square, and Queen's Gate
in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries one could
have seen an analogous procession: the nobleman, followed by the
wealthy merchant, the professional man, the charitable institution,
the solicitor's office, the shop-all moving inexorably westward."
As time passed, especially after the 1860's when train services improved,
many decided to move further out of town, leapfrogging over the new
middle-class suburbs to areas which their employees had not yet penetrated
such as Hampstead and Highgate in the north-west and Dulwich, Brixton and
[51
Clapham in the south. By the 1880's, this dual process of separation
of work and living and social integration within the upper rungs of the
socio-economic ladder, which had begun some time before the 1830's, was[61
virtually complete.
The lease was an appropriate legal instrument for mediating the
social and economic relationships between estate owners and wealthy capi-
talists in their quest for housing in these established or newly-built
neighbourhoods. Both parties were equally powerful and important in the
class structure and therefore opposed each other as equals on opposite
sides of the leasehold agreement. It was in their joint interests to
build and maintain socially exclusive and spatially attractive residential
areas: capitalists because they desired rewarding living environments,
estate owners because they sought increased ground rents. Money was not a
stumbling block. Tenants were able and willing to pay for high quality
houses, thus, there was little need for financial middlemen. Indeed,
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estate owners encouraged the exclusion of middlemen as this enabled them
171
to.control the development better. The estates were well planned, the
object being to attract fashionable or respectable residential tenants
8s]
and not necessarily financial gain. As Olsen has argued:
"Perhaps the fundamental aim of all the planning was to attract to the
estate tenants of fashion or at least of respectability.....Purely
economic motives cannot entirely explain the preference of landlords
for upper-class residential property. There was, for instance, a
feeling that, although shop property might produce higher rents, it
was better to accept lower rents from a resident private gentleman
than from a business concern. A street of single family houses was
regarded as better in itself than a street of business property."
The squares for which London is so famous are a good example. They were
consciously introduced by landowners as a means of attracing reputable
builders, such as Thomas Cubitt, and encouraging them to build larger and
more substantial houses than they might otherwise have done, with the hope
that big houses would entice tenants of high status. These houses were
soundly constructed and formed imposing architectural units whose general
uniformity of facade matched the social uniformity of their tenants. On
completion, ground leases were usually assigned to the occupants of the
houses the majority of whom bought the houses with their own funds or with
money borrowed from banks, insurance companies or solicitors who held
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money in trust. The leaseholders' high economic credibility meant that
they usually had few problems in these negotiations.
The equality and directness of the tenure relations between estate
owners and tenants in general meant that both parties observed their
obligations under the leasehold agreement. Landlords maintained much of
the physical infrastructure or saw to it that parish authorities or private
-70-
companies did so, while tenants kept their homes in good repair. Together
they prevented other homes in the neighbouthood from falling into disrepair
or being converted to undesirable uses, by means of social and/or legal
pressure on those who were responsible for those houses. All in all, the
estates' surveyors had little trouble enforcing the covenants contained
in the leases. Indeed, "there is no evidence that the Grosvenor estate
was especially active in enforcing repairing or occupation covenants in
[10]
Belgravia or Mayfair; there was no need to." Furthermore, the parish
councils, usually of the 'closed' variety, and composed of people from the
same walks of life as the majority of tenants, generally saw to it that the
tenants' interests were well served. As a result of these social and econo-
mic relationships, the residential neighbourhoods of the wealthy strata
of London's society were well built and remained in good repair as long as
[11]
their upper-crust tenants continued to live there.
Suburbanization for the Middle Stratum
The second pressure which shaped London's growth arose out of the
aspirations of the growing middle stratum of clerks, public employees, pro-
fessionals and petty capitalists for an existence which captured the essence
of the successful capitalist's lifestyle, but was appropriately depre-
ciated to something they could afford. This period was the heyday of the
'rags-to-riches' entrepreneur, the dream of most members of the middle
stratum. But it was easier to ape the manifestations of capitalist status
in the non-work environment than to achieve the reality in the workplace.
Consequently, this striving was stronger in the residential rather than
the productive sphere. It translated into a search for attracitve, sanitary
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residential environments which were accessible to their workplaces in the
centre.
The middle stratum was numerically larger than the capitalist class,
and the bulk of its members received only moderate though adequate earn-
ings. At the beginning of the period under consideration, probably only
a few owned the houses in which they lived. They simply could not afford
to pay the price themselves and generally lacked the contacts and credi-
bility which would enable them to borrow money from banks or attorneys.
The majority of the middle stratum were tenants who rented their accommo-
dation from leaseholding landlords. As they descended the earnings scale,
so the number of intermediaries between them and the estate owners in-
creased and the quality of their accommodation diminished. These factors,
combined with their lack of effective economic or political power, meant
that they were unable to resist the encroachment of non-residential land
uses into their inner-city neighbourhoods. They were essentially forced
out of the central area, though they were not unwilling to leave as newly
developed suburban areas came onto the market and as transportation systems
developed, making the journey to and from work feasible within their
limited budgets. A delightful poem of the day captured their suburbani-
[12]
zation sentiments:
"OUR SUBURB:
He leaned upon the narrow wall
That set the limit to his ground
And marvelled, thinking of it all,
That he such happiness had found.
He had no word for it but bliss
He smoked his pipe; he thanked his stars;
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And, what more wonderful than this?
He blessed the groaning, stinking cars.
That made it doubly sweet to win
The respite of the hours apart
From all the broil and sin and din
Of London's damned money-mart."
The development of outlying rural areas and of transportation systems, which
were predicated upon innovations in both the social and economic relation-
ships surrounding the housing process and in urban transportation technolo-
gies, were crucial in facilitating the massive (by Victorian standards)
outward migration of the middle stratum, which gathered momentum from the
1860's onwards. The result was the rapid growth of places like Camberwell,
Battersea and Deptford in the south, Hammersmith, Acton and Ealing, beyond
the exclusive districts in the west and Islington, Hornsey, Kilburn and[13]
Swiss Cottage in the north and north-west.
The major socio-economic innovations which facilitated 19th century
middle-stratum suburban development were the permanent building society and
the constant-repayment amortized loan. Before examining their characteris-
tics, we must establish why they were necessary and where their historical
origins lie. This will also explain why these innovations evolved and not
others.
Most of these prospective suburbanites could not afford to
own builders. Others had to build houses for them. Speculative(14]
and developers filled this slot. While large building firms
prevalent in the contruction of commercial and public buildings,
[151
firms predominated in the residential construction industry.
might comprise only a carpenter and bricklayer who had teamed up
engage their
builders
were
small
They
to build
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a few houses in their spare time, hoping thereby to make some money and[16]
escape the uncertainties of employment in the construction industry.
But the majority employed a small amount of people and relied heavily on
sub-contracting those tasks which the firm could not perform. These firms
had small capital resources; they relied on estate owners leasing land to
them at a peppercorn (i.e., token) rent and on selling the houses for cash
as they neared completion, assigning the ground leases either to their
[171
future occupants or to speculative landlords. The builders were inter-
ested in capital gains, not cash flow. How was this capital supplied?
Landlords probably borrowed from banks or attorneys, though many must have
received funds from the same source as future owner-occupiers--the perma-
nent building society.
Renting from landlords remained by far the most frequent means
whereby the middle stratum was housed. This was essentially a repetition
of the leasehold form of tenure which prevailed in the older inner-city
neighbourhoods. Under this arrangement, the small landlord drew together
the financial resources and needs of the freeholder, mortgagee and tenant
in the leasehold transaction and usually received the largest share of
any profits which were realized in the process. According to Adela Nevitt,
the capital structure of this sector of the 19th-century housing market was
[18]
as follows:
"Freeholder--As owner of the land he granted a ninety-nine year
building lease to the leaseholder. He retained land as a 'capital
asset' which yielded 'ground rents';
Mortgagee--As owner of capital he lent money to the leaseholder to
cover 66 per cent of the cost of buying the lease and building a
house;
Leaseholder (landlord)--As owner of a relatively small amount of
capital--33 per cent of cost of house--he invested his money and
made an income by managing the property;
Tenant--As a man with no capital (but an annual income) and a need
to occupy a house he paid a rent in return for both the capital
sunk in the house and the management undertaken by the leaseholder.
Owner-occupation was much less prevalent and generally meant owning the
house and leasing the land. Nevertheless, permanent building societies,
lending money directly to occupiers and to speculative builders and
[191
landlords, were an important form of home finance, and were destined
to dominate the home-building industry after the 1920's.
Permanent building societies evolved out of terminating building
societies. The latter were of working-class origin--an ingenious inven-
tion of skilled craft workers,who developed them as a means of maintaining
their historically cohesive economic and social ties under the pressure of
atomizing capitalist market relations; and of gaining security and indepen-
dence for themselves. They were based on togetherness and social respon-
sibility and perpetuated these values. The aim of these mutual organiza-
tions was to build each of their members a house which he could own. In
[20]
the words of Edward Cleary:
"They were essentially small groups with social as well as economic
ties, setting themselves a clear and limited objective. In some
ten years they would achieve their purpose of giving each member
the security that ownership of property brings: then they wound
up. "
Terminating building societies consisted of approximately 20 members
who met at least once a month in a pub, to pay their dues, attend to busi-
ness matters and socialize. Some money was set aside for the consumption
of beer which took the place of rental payments to publicans for the use
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of their premises. Responsibility for the operation of a terminating
building society was shared on a rotating basis by all its members. As
soon as sufficient money had been collected, the first house was built,
either by the society itself or by other builders, and was allocated to
one of the members by an agreed procedure, usually by balloting or bidding
for it. From then on, this member paid a rent to the building society for
his house, as well as his dues. This process was repeated for approximate-
ly ten years until all the members had a house. At that stage any excess
funds which the society possessed would be distributed equally among its
members, the society would dissolve and each member would own his house
outright, though the land was usually leased from an estate owner. Houses
were often built adjacent to each other, thus the social community which
revolved around the building society thrived in the residential neigh-
bourhood.
Terminating building societies were, however, inappropriate to the
needs of the middle stratum for a number of social and economic reasons.
The middle stratum was a product of capitalism. Its social and cultural
values were based on individualistic and competitive market relations--
that was how a clerk, an entrepreneur or a lawyer might advance in capital-
ist society. Clearly, the communally-organized, mutual terminating societies
violated these behavioural norms. Besides, there were five main economic
weaknesses inherent in the organizational structure of terminating societies,
[21]
especially from a middle-stratum point of view. First, the fact that
all members had to contribute equally made it difficult to attract new
members once the society had been in existence for a few years, as new
members would have to pay large sums of money to gain an equal footing.
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Second, if members had to depend on their own subscriptions to raise funds
on which the advances were made, then the progress of the society would
be slow and some members would have to wait a long time for their advance.
To obviate this difficulty, terminating societies began borrowing money
from individuals or corporations who had capital to invest and demanded
interest, as opposed to houses, in return. This created a third weakness.
If a sufficient fund to satisfy all demands for advances was built up in
the first few years, then for the remainder of the society's life, sub-
scriptions would be flowing in and there would be no use for them. In an
attempt to deal with the first and third weaknesses, the directors of the
first society would start a second society as soon as the first had
reached a stage where back subscriptions became a barrier to new members
and where it had surplus funds. The new members joined the second society
whose need to borrow money, to speed up the making of advances, was met
from the surplus funds of the first society. The process would be re-
peated and very soon the directors would be in charge of a series of
societies, interlocking by a chain of lending and borrowing. A further
development was an arrangement whereby the society could be permanent with
its membership terminating. A fourth weakness of the terminating system
was that members did not know how long the society would have to continue
in order to achieve its objective. This led to an organizational change
whereby the life of the society was fixed in terms of a period of time,
rather than of the value of each advance, which could vary depending on
each society's history. Finally, terminating societies were unsuitable
mechanisms for funding speculative builders and developers who were to
play a crucial role in orchestrating suburban development.
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The permanent building society, and the constant repayment, amortized
[22]
mortgage obviated these difficulties and supplied the capital require-
ments of many middle-stratum house occupants. Borrowing money was no
longer predicated upon investing with the society. Members would take
shares at any time. Under the constant repayment, amortized mortgage, the
size and duration of a borrower's payments was fixed and certain. Each
equal monthly installment repayed both interest and principal, the interest
portion being highest at the outset, when the amount of the mortgage still
outstanding was highest, but was progressively reduced as the loan was
amortized and the proportion of principal repayed in each installment in-
creased. The amount of the installments was calculated so that all the
principal and the interest owing to the building society would be repayed
at the end of the agreed period. It was quite straightforward to calculate
the amount owing to the society at a particular time, and this facilitated
redemptions or foreclosures. The money for these loans came not from
subscriptions but from investors to whom the society paid interest and who
could withdraw their investments at short notice.
Thus, permanent building societies performed two functions which
were discrete in the eyes of the public but integrated in the societies'
ledgers. They were organizations where one could make short-term invest-
ments of large or small sums of money and where one could borrow capital
on long-term mortgages for the purpose of buying a house. Borrowers re-
ceived their money as soon as their houses were completed. As a result
they were insulated from the success or failure of the society; the risks
were assumed by investors. It was no longer necessary for all the
members' obligations to be identical. Investing and borrowing terms
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could be varied to suit individual needs and capacities. Above all,
prospective middle-stratum homeowners could deal with 'an organization'
which was managed by members of the capitalist class and thus they did not
have to concern themselves with the trials and tribulations of operating
a collective society.
One further caveat for the capitalist class was that permanent build-
ing societies were an effective device for plowing small savings back into
the economy for productive purposes, thereby increasing the overall rate
of capital accumulation. They played a crucial role in Victorian suburban
development, providing a major form of finance to speculative builders and
developers until the 1870's when they began to concentrate on lending
directly to house occupiers. "The growth of the permanent system changed
the nature of the [building] societies: they became agencies for the in-
vestment of capital rather than for enabling the investors to provide
[231
dwellings for themselves." They linked housing finance to the general
capital investment market. As a result, suburban home construction was
either retarded when capital could be more profitably employed elsewhere,
or expanded far beyond current needs when idle capital was diverted to
the 'safe-as-houses' home-mortgage market. Thus the housing market gradu-
ally came to serve an important dual buffering function in stabilizing the
economy. When commercial investments were flagging, house building was a
means of absorbing surplus capital. On the other hand, house building slack-
ened when other sectors of the national or international economy provided
more profitable outlets, though this problem was not severe in 19th century[24]
London. In the words of H. J. Dyos:
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"The supply of capital for house-building certainly ebbed and flowed
but there is no clear evidence that it was ever checked in such a
way as to impede development at all seriously; there is on the con-
trary, rather more evidence of over-building in periods of easy
money than of under-building when money was tight."
The courts played an important guiding role in the change from
terminating to permanent building societies, because the 1836 Building
Societies Act had not foreseen the change and therefore provided an in-[251
adequate legal framework for permanent societies. The most important
cases related to the permanent societies' demand for powers to borrow
money from non-members, on which they obtained a favourable ruling in the
late 1860's. Permanent societies also exerted greater political influence
as they were managed by non-rotating professional managers of dominant class
origin. In fact, the joint action of these managers, who formed a powerful
lobbying organization which eventually evolved into the Building Societies
Association of today, played a crucial role of accelerating the decline of
terminating societies in the struggle around the 1874 Building Societies
[26]
Act. The Act gave the basic framework within which building societies
have operated ever since. Two of its important features at that stage were
the continuance of stamp duties, a transaction tax which raised the cost of
the mortgage, while terminating societies favoured exemption as an encour-
agement to working-class borrowers; and a borrowing limit of two-thirds of
the societies' mortgage assets, which in no way met the needs of terminating
societies to borrow money in their early years. Thus state action in both
the courts and in parliament served the interests of the dominant class and
to a lesser extent the white-collar working class, by promoting permanent
societies and gradually eliminated the possibility of working-class
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[27]
homeownership.
One further development in tenure relations, whose significance was [28]
only realized after the 1920's, was the growth of freehold land societies.
These societies became important in housing development during the 1850's,
both in their own right and in the spread of the permanent building society
principle. They had their legal basis in an Act of 1696 which gave the vote
to owners of freehold land of an annual value in excess of two pounds. The
number of freehold land societies was boosted by astute Liberal politicians
who saw in them a means for wresting political power from the landed interest
during the corn law and suffrage reform agitation of the 1840's. Freehold
Land societies bought tracts of land, subdivided them to meet the suffrage
qualification, put in roads and drains and then sold the freeholds, mainly
to members of the dominant class, under a gentlemanly agreement to 'vote
for the party.' The larger societies advanced mortgages to owner-occupiers
in the same way as permanent building societies, and they formed subsidi-
aries to develop houses and infrastructure on the estates.
Freehold land societies were political devices which directly shaped
the social and spatial form of some neighbourhoods. Their use in the
political arena diminished during the 1850's as both political parties
began to use them, thereby negating the original intention of gaining
differential voter support, and because there was no way of ensuring that
freeholders would vote for the correct party once the land was theirs.
As a shrewd American politician put it: "It's easy enough to buy votes;
[29]
the difficulty is seeing that they stay bought." But these societies
were important for the spread of permanent building societies for two
reasons. They gave influencial politicians first hand knowledge of the
permanent principle and gained their support for the 1874 Act. Possibly
of more significance, they made the concept of freehold owner-occupation
into a political issue and linked owner-occupation to social stability in
the public consciousness by basing it upon 'a stake in the system,' that
is, the right to vote.
What did these middle-stratum suburbs look like? They were specu-
lative ventures having much in common with modern 'spec-built' housing
[30]
developments. The virtual absence of building regulations and the
limited budget of future occupants meant that construction standards were
often low. Estate owners usually had problems enforcing higher standards
as too stringent conditions gave them a bad name with speculators and thus
might negate the prime purpose of covering the land with houses and secur-
ing the commercial ground rent. The crucial role played by speculators
in the realization of suburban development and their keen knowledge of the
housing market gave them much power in deciding the layout of an estate.
Their fundamentally short-term pecuniary orientation meant that estate
planning was usually unimaginative and sometimes inefficient. Architects
were seldom engaged. Design standards were low, and repetitive with small
modifications. Fashionability was the most important measure of aesthetic[31]
quality. Having secured the ground lease on a few acres of land, the
speculative builder had a strong economic incentive to pack as many houses
onto it as was socially and technically feasible. This enabled him to
spread the ground rent over a greater number of houses thereby increasing
his return. Leasehold covenants usually only stipulated the minimum
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number and value (or 'class') of houses which were to be built on the
estate. But the builder was constrained to a certain extent by his image
of the future occupants' social and physical requirements. They would only
walk up a certain number of stairs, they valued a certain amount of open
space adjacent to their houses for light, air and relaxation, they re-
quired a street frontage, and so on. These requirements were as much
determined by the sort of options which builders brought onto the market,
as they in turn determined the nature of these options. It was a complex,
two-way interaction. The speculators' answers were the mass-produced rows
of two or three storey houses built in long terraces, or for the slightly
more prosperous, in semi-detached units, situated on deep stands with[32]
narrow frontages which proliferate in London's Victorian suburbs.
[33]
In the words of Dyos and Reeder, the, stratum suburb:
"gave access to the cheapest land in the city to those having most
security of employment and leisure to afford the time and money
spent travelling up and down; it offered an arena for the manipu-
lation of social distinctions to those most conscious of their
possibilities and most adept at turning them into shapes on the
ground; it kept the threat of rapid social change beyond the
horizon of those least able to accept its negative as well as
its positive advantages."
Enhancing London's 'Capital Accumulation Potential'
The third pressure which shaped the social and spatial fabric of Lon-
don was a composite of the on-going efforts to increase what might be
called its 'capital accumulation potential'; to increase its economic
efficiency as a centre of production, exchange and distribution. Under
capitalist market institutions and in an era prior to the widespread
diffusion of electronic communications technologies, this drive was
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concretely realized in two broad dimensions. Firstly, by the growing
clustering of economic activities in the central area, especially the
exchange and service sectors. Secondly, by improving existing modes of
transportation and developing new ways of moving people and goods within
the city and between London and other national and international regions.
This can be divided into three parts: dock development; railway develop-
ment; and the development of modes of transportation which used existing
streets, together with street improvement. I will now examine these de-
velopments in more detail.
The growing centralization of economic activities in London was
based on the competitive market relations inherent in a capitalist economy.
Given these 'rules of the game,' a central London location was of paramount
importance for most commercial and even certain industrial concerns. The
external economies to be derived from a central area location were simply[34]
too attractive for any rational businessman to resist. Financial
houses and banks congregated together in the City to facilitate frequent
communications which depended on personal meetings and dealings on the
Exchange; offices located there to be close to associated activities and
to be able to draw on London's entire white-collar labour force which was
relatively evenly distributed about the centre; department stores located
in established West End shopping precincts which were accessible to fash-
ionable West End residents as well as London's middle stratum consumers;
wholesale warehouses took advantage of better central-area transportation
and interpersonal contacts; sweated trades gravitated towards the cheap
East End labour force; etcetera. As we have seen, the only businesses
which moved away from the central area were mostly industries which
required large-scale factory production. The consequence of these devel-
opments was a large increase in land values in the centre which only
businesses were able and willing to pay. The centre became the area where
Londoners worked, in shops, warehouses, banks and offices, and a few
specialized manufacturing industries. Through a gradual piecemeal process,
commercial and industrial development, which was largely responsible for
the huge increase in London's population, replaced residential land uses,
evicting thousands of people, mainly members of the working class. It is
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important to stress that:
"This transformation of the commercial centre did not result from the
harmonious adjustment of the forces of supply and demand. The vast
migration from central districts between 1851 and 1901 (for example,
in the twenty years from 1861 to 1881, the population of the city
fell from 113,387 to 51,439) was the consequence, not of workers
moving out in pursuit of better economic opportunities, but of
demolition, and the forcible eviction of a labour force whose work-
place remained located in the centre."
The transportation of goods, between London and other predominantly
international ports, was improved by the development of modern docks.
Between 1800 and 1888, ten major docks were built, mainly along the north
[36]
bank of the Thames river in the heart of the East End. Their construc-
tion displaced thousands of working-class families. But while they re-
duced the area available for working-class housing, once they were in
operation, the docks attracted enormous numbers of workers, especially
casual workers, to the East End. And the gradual decline of the labour
intensive dock and related industries, until they became relatively unim-
portant in London's economy by the 1890's, created even greater hardship
for the working class.
The Development of the Railways
Railway development was unsurpassed in the 19th century as a form
of investment which absorbed large amounts of surplus capital. As such,
the railway-building booms of the 1840's and 1850's played a crucial role
[371
in the process of capital accumulation at the national level. But rail-
way development also played an important role in improving London's
efficiency as an economic unit and thereby increasing the potential for
capital accumulation for businesses located within the city. In many
respects, the importance of the City as a commercial centre was respon-
sible for the birth of the railway network. On the other hand, in addition
to encouraging the decentralization of population, the development of rail-
ways in London also permitted an even greater concentration and speciali-
zation of economic activities in the central area. The importance of an
efficient railway network in promoting capital accumulation was stressed
[38]
by the Board of Trade in 1845. In a report, it stated:
"The possession of good railway communications...has now become
almost as much a matter of necessity as the adoption of the most
improved machinery to enable a manufacturing community to contend
on equal terms with its rivals and to maintain its footing."
Railway transport within London effectively began with the opening of
the London and Greenwich Railway in 1836 and continued until 1899 when[391
Marylebone Station was opened. Before the early 1860's, most railway
companies north of the Thames concentrated mainly on the transportation of
goods between London and other cities. Subsequently, they began to follow
their counterparts south of the river in catering increasingly to capitalist
and middle-stratum suburban commuters, who had the time and money to live
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away from the centre, especially when the railway companies realized how
lucrative this traffic could be. Thus the main-line railway system of
Victorian London came to perform a function "which it was never originally[40]
intended to perform, and which it did not perform very efficiently."
As a result the expansion of London beyond the 4-mile limit of the horse
omnibus began in the 1860's. By the middle of the 1870's, the railway map
of London, excluding the underground tube system, presents a remarkably
modern appearance. Thus it is clear that 19th century railway development
constituted a formative and lasting influence in both direct and indirect
ways on London's social and spatial geography.
This raises an important question in an exploration of the determi-
nants of urban form: what caused the railway companies to locate their
lines and terminals where they eventually did? Were these locations
based on necessities inherent in the technology or on calculations of econo-
mic efficiency? These are the usual arguments made in ahalysing the loca-
tional patterns of transportation modes, especially by modern urban
economists. However, while economic and technical considerations were
clearly important, I would argue that they were essentially subservient to
the power relations inherent in the land and housing markets of 19th cen-
-tury London, which were based on the class structure and the leasehold
system of tenure. Unlike horse omnibuses, cabs and tramcars, which could
operate cheaply on existing public thoroughfares, the railways could only
function if large areas of .London were exclusively set aside for their[41]
fixed routes and separate rights of way. In their quest for the land
necessary for lines, terminals and marshalling yards, railway companies
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had to contend with the differential rights and powers which the leasehold
system conferred on estate owners, leaseholders and occupants. The out-
comes of the railway companies' struggles for land were fundamentally
responsible for the ultimate location of railway lines and terminals.
Two important specifications which their land acquisitions had to
fulfill put railway companies at a distinct disadvantage as buyers in the
London land market of the 1830's. Firstly, the necessity for permanent
rights of way to be set aside for their exclusive use. This was based on
the size and durability of their investments. Here the leasehold system
posed problems for the railway companies and the estate owners. Besides
the administrative and legal headaches that the purchase and servicing of
hundreds of leases from as many estate owners would have entailed, a single
estate owner could halt the operation of large stretches of railway lines
by terminating the lease prematurely because certain covenants were ignored
or by refusing to enter into a new lease once the old one expired. These
were contingencies which no sound railway company could afford to risk. On
the other hand, the possibility of leasing their land to railway companies
could not have appealed to estate owners because they must have been uncer-
tain of the long-term fortunes of such novel enterprises and did not fancy
the possibility of being landed with railway lines or terminals which were
of no use to them. Thus the leasehold system had to be by-passed. Railway
companies who represented some of the most powerful sectors of the capital-
ist class and whose infrastructure was absolutely essential to economic
expansion (which included increasing ground rents), had to be permitted to
buy land on a freehold basis.
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This raises the second disadvantage with which railway companies
were burdened. Besides requiring vast acres of urban and rural land on
which to build their lines and terminals, all the necessary land had to be
contiguous. This put railway companies at the mercy of freeholders along
the railway's path. By holding out till the railway companies had completed
the bulk of their purchases, landowners could demand exorbitant prices for
their legal right to the land which was absolutely essential to the railway
companies. Consequently, for railway lines to be viable economic propositions
the companies had to change the power relations of the 'leasehold land
market.' They had to acquire compulsory purchase powers to enable them to
become freeholders of the necessary land at prices which they were able and
willing to pay.
The only way in which these changes could be accomplished was for each
railway company to apply to Parliament for the passage of a Private Act
which gave them compulsory powers to purchase land on a freehold basis.
This was a major reason why Parliament became a powerful controlling force
in the development of the railways in 19th century London. Even after the
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act and the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act
of 1845, which established a general legal basis for the compulsory acqui-
sition of the necessary land, prospective railway companies were required
to apply for Parliamentary approval of their proposals before any land
purchases or construction could begin. Parliament had the power, which it
frequently exercised, to change or veto the railway companies' proposals.
However, though powerful, this was essentially passive control and the
State's role with respect to the railway companies' impact and operation
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remained passive for most of the period under consideration. It made no
attempts to impose a planned network of lines and largely inconsequential
attempts from the 1860's onwards to regulate fares and to force the railway
(42]
companies to rehouse the working-class families which their lines displaced.
It seems as though Parliament was merely a venue for capitalists and landed
aristocrats to struggle for or against each proposal, depending on the
differential costs and benefits which each railway proposal conferred on
them and their friends. By the mid-1860's, the combination of both houses
reflected a relatively even balance between landed interests and industrial,
mercantile and financial interests, thus it could be said that the changing
fortunes of many railway entrepreneurs depended on the fluctuating patterns
of dominance and submission between the two major segments of the ruling
[431
class.
Parliamentary power was exercised with a vengeance against the rail-
way companies in 1846 when seventeen out of nineteen proposed urban lines
and termini were flatly rejected. Had they all been sanctioned, the topog-
raphy and character of the central area would have been completely altered,
probably for the worse. In the words of John Kellett, "The Metropolis would
[1414]
literally have been cut into pieces." Instead, Parliament prohibited
any incursions within an oval, four miles from east to west and one and a
half miles from north to south (bounded by the Circle Line of today). This
decision had far reaching consequences for further railway and transportation
developments and for the spatial form of the central area. In the words of
[45]
John Kellett, it
"...not merely distorted directly the pattern of railway building,
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but also exercised an arbitrary and indirect influence upon the
conditions of competition between companies. The central gov-
ernment's unique exercise of a legislative veto combined with
metropolitan central land values to erect a barrier around the
core of the city which was virtually impassable to surface
railways."
This position was re-affirmed in 1863 when ten out of thirteen proposals
were rejected. A major result of this legislative intervention was the
controversy surrounding, and the eventual construction of, a circular rail-
way linking all the central stations. And, on a more general level, it
snuffed out any competition which might have developed between large com-
panies serving London from the north and south.
The railway companies paid a high price for their compulsory purchase
privilege. Parliament had not accurately defined what constituted a 'fair
market price' for land acquired compulsorily. Arbitration cases ruled
generously in favour of landowners and quickly established the principle
that the price to be paid for such land by the railway companies should be
based on its value to the vendor, to which should be added compensations
for interruption of business, loss of good will, various damages to sur-
rounding property, and sometimes even for loss of possible future gain!
To this sum, a further 10% was added for the privilege of compulsory purchase.
As a result, railway companies probably paid twice the current market value
for land. Railway companies were prohibited from becoming land speculators
in their own right. They were required to sell surplus land on completion
of their scheme. Once again, this put them at a disadvantage in the land
market, this time as vendors. Buyers knew that the land had to be sold
and were therefore able to bid lower than its true market value. And if
at some future date the railway companies wanted to extend their lines,
II
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they would have to pay even higher prices than before, an increase for
which their earlier investments were largely responsible. In view of all
this, one railway company director's complaints of the high costs incurred
by the railways in these transactions is hardly surprising and probably[461
representative of railway capitalists in general:
"The Lands Clauses Act was passed at a time when landowners were
absolutely supreme in Parliament, in 1845, and did just whatever
they liked; and although we have to pay large sums by way of
severance, we do not get anything whatever for the increment in
value we give to the balance of the land."
Landowners, on the other hand, benefited in two ways. Firstly, rail-
way lines increased the accessibility of much of their land, making it ripe
for housing development and therby increasing its value. This fact was the
basis of a jingle which appeared in Tarbuck's Handbook of House Property in[471
1875:
"The richest crop for any field,
Is a crop of bricks for it to yield.
The richest crop that it can grow
Is a crop of houses in a row."
Though the railways did bring destruction, congestion and pollution in their
wake, they also enabled higher prices to be charged for urban and especially
suburban land, withough any effort or further investment on the landowners'
part. Secondly, landowners benefited even more as the inflated awards of
arbitration proceedings were translated into legitimate market prices. Thus,
railway development generated windfall gains for landowners. In 1861, [48]
Henry Davies wrote the following graphic 'description' of this process:
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"If the first railway engine had been laden and fed funnelwise,
with guineas, and if the wheels had been constructed with an
apparatus for whirling the gold by centrifugal action over the
land it traversed we should have an allegory in action which
would correctly describe the working of the railway system."
And the fundamental reason why the landowners benefited was, to put it
simply, because they owned the land, without which the railways could not
exist. In sum, then, railway development was beneficial to most landowners
while the railway companies were not permitted to gain from the increases
in land values which their investments facilitated.
However, we must return to our original question which has not yet
been answered: what caused the railway companies to locate their lines and
terminals where they ultimately did? We have seen that while Parliament
granted them the powers which were necessary to make them viable competi-
tors in the land market, it played an essentially passive role with respect
to the placement of lines and terminals. What was the active force which
determined the railways' locational patterns? I will argue that the rela-
tive power of the many actors in the land and housing markets, which was
based on their position in the class structure and on the leasehold system
of tenure, was the major determining factor; that technological necessities
and economic efficiency were of secondary importance and only became sig-
nificant once the struggle for land had been decided. A brief but closer
look at the power relations of the land and housing markets of London dur-
ing this period and of the railway companies responses to it should
clarify my argument.
We have seen that large landholdings predominated in inner London,
especially in the north-west. Though these great proprietors were very
powerful, it was obviously more advantageous for railway companies to deal
with them, in preference to a multiplicity of small owners, as the nego-
tiations were usually much quicker, simpler and cheaper. But the power
of both large and small estate owners in the land market and their will-
ingness to sell to the railway companies was in turn largely influenced
by three interrelated factors: the power and status of their tenants, the
use to which their land was put and the physical condition of their
property.
On the top of the power spectrum were the spacious, well-maintained
inner-north-west residential areas, where both leaseholders and estate
owners, whose joint interests the lease agreement protected, strongly
opposed the incursion of railways into their neighbourhoods. They had the
economic and political power to defeat the railway companies if they
attempted such 'invasions,' or to impose costly qualifications on the con-
struction of those few railways which they could not oust. H. G. Wells'
comment in Tono Bunday, "that the great railway termini had been kept as
far as possible from the 'Great House Region,'" was therefore hardly
surprising. In consequence, the North London Junction and Regent's Canal
railways, for example, failed to gain authorization because they would
have infringed on the Crown land surrounding Regent's park, whose imposing
terraces and villas housed 'the first class of society.' The Bloomsbury,
Portland, Grosvenor and Berkeley Estates were among the others which were
successfully protected from the incursion of the railways. The Great
Central's Marylebone station extension line was forced to skirt the
western flank of the Crown's estate and to comply with the Portman Estate's
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[50]
burdensome and expensive restrictions. Eton College's Charcot estate,
which was built for 'respectable but undiscerning clients,' successfully
insisted upon clauses in the London and Birmingham Railway Bill which re-
quired extensive tunnelling under the estate to reserve itsfuture amenity.
Thus, even at a relatively detailed level of spatial definition, the power
of wealthy landowners and tenants determined the physical form of the
railways. Within these parameters, railway companies were free to maximize
technical and economic efficiency.
Also at the top of the 'power-in-the-land-market league' were the
properties which made up the core of the central business district. The
City Corporation was aware that railway development was beneficial to the
City, as evidenced, for example, by their financial support which rescued
the almost moribund Metropolitan Railway because of the good communications
which it would provide. But they and the powerful interests at the finan-
cial heart of the world,were not prepared to allow the railway companies[511
to carve up the City. In the words of John Kellett:
"Residential areas, historic buildings, graveyards, hospitals, craft
workships, even, where necessary, factories, could be traversed or
swept away, but not the central Exchange area."
Thus, the Parliamentary legislation of 1846, which prohibited railway
building within the central and West End area, bounded by the Circle Line
of today, was essentially a recognition and ratification of the power and
interests of City businessmen and West End residents and landowners. The
virtually total exclusion of railways from this area was absurd on grounds
of technical or economic efficiency, even allowing for the high cost of
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land in this area. It interrupted national north-south rail communications,
increased the congestion of central-area streets and forced many northernand
western railway companies to incur large additional expenditures to reach
the City via circuitous routes. Their success is ample testimony to the
power and defiance of members of the dominant class when their interests
were threatened and of the broad and lasting impact which their actions had
on the railway network and on London's social and spatial geography.
It is difficult to generalize about the power relations of the land
market in areas inhabited by the middle-stratum or by less powerful commer-
cial or industrial concerns. In these cases, the outcomes of conflicts
between landowners, leaseholders and tenants and the railway companies were
not foregone conclusions. They depended on the details of each struggle
which could be decided either way and probably favoured the railway com-
panies more often than not. Nevertheless, the railway companies were
forced to settle these issues prior to others related to technical and
economic efficiency criteria.
This problem of generalization does not present itself at the bottom
of the power scale. The predominant pattern in working-class residential
districts was one of railway promoters deliberately choosing to smash their
way through these densely packed areas, irrespective of the grave social
consequences which this policy clearly incurred. The reason for these
actions had little to do with the railway companies' irresponsibility or
malice, as was the popular view. Instead, it was based on the power rela-
tions which existed under the leasehold system* in working-class neighbour-
hoods. Large estate owners, both lay and clerical, were generally resigned
to the fate of their landholdings and had pragmatically given up hope of
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resurrecting elegant neighbourhoods in the place of their working-class
slums. They had lost control of their properties and were only too willing
to sell out, as they saw the coming of the railways as a way of retreating
from a socially and economically problematic predicament and making wind-
fall profits to boot. These "less fortunately located [estate owners] came
to agree with Disraeli's Lord Marney that 'rail[ways] are very good things
[52]
with high compensation.'" Their propeties were riddled with middlemen
with sub-leases and house-jobbers with the fag-ends of leases who were
collecting exorbitant rack rents from their tenants. These intermediaries
had little power to prevent estate owners from selling out to the railways
as they were in flagrant violation of most leasehold covenants. The
tenants who were usually renting accommodation by the week, often by the
day, had no legal standing to object to the sale or to claim compensation.
Working-class people did not have the means, the connections or the know-
how to oppose Railway Bills. Most were usually thankful if the railway
companies paid their rent arrears or gave them between a sovereign or two
1531
pounds in cash. Finally, local authorities could not resist this
'shovelling out the poor' because the change of land use increased rate-[54]
able values and shed some of the burden of poor relief.
Thus it was not accidental nor conspiratorial that the railway com-
panies located most of their lines and termini through the working-class
districts of London instead of the homes of the wealthy or their places of
business. Indeed, The Times recognized the advantageousness to the capi-
talist class of railway development according to these conditions, stating
1551
bluntly,in 1861 that:
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"The special lure to capitalists offered by railway projectors is
that the line will pass only through inferior property, that is,
through a densely populated district and will destroy only the
abodes of the powerless and poor, whilst it will avoid the
properties of those whose opposition is to be dreaded--the great
employers of labour."
From the point of view of the engineers, surveyors and attorneys of the
railway companies, it was commonsense to follow the line of least resis-
tence, and the working-class neighbourhoods were the weak areas in the
land and housing markets. Even more attractive to the railway companies
were situations in which large areas of working-class housing were owned
by a few substantial proprietors, as the small number of landowners simpli-
fied legal proceedings. Nevertheless, it required a great deal of ingenuity
to find these fissures in the land market along which approach routes to
the fringe of the central area could be made. This often caused planning
problems and increased costs because many working-class areas abutted the
commercial centre where land values were highest. As one parliamentary
witness suggested in 1836, "the parties [railway companies] care very
little whether the line they have adopted is exactly the cheapest and[56]
best."
A number of historians argue that the main reason why railways were
located in working-class districts was because this was seen by the
propertied class as a means of slum clearance which would ultimately
benefit the working class, as low-quality housing was demolished and higher
quality housing for those displaced would automatically be provided by the
[57]
market. However, there is plenty of evidence in the proceedings and
reports of Royal Commissions related to railways from the 1840's onwards
which indicates that these classes were well aware that the contrary was
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the case:. that demolitions imposed even greater hardships on the working
class by forcing them to compete for reduced amounts of accommodation at
[581
higher cost in adjacent areas. As John Kellett has correctly observed:
"The fact that such conscientious investigations were carried out and
given a hearing should correct the widely-held impression that the
Victorians were entirely careless of the effects of the great works
of urban reconstruction they were executing."
Doubtless the mythical qualities of railway demolitions as slum improvers
played an important part in decisions to locate railways in working-class
districts, but this view was not a cause of these decisions. Rather, as
we will see in Chapter 5, it served the crucial function of providing
ideological legitimation for the drastic and blatantly cruel destruction of
working-class homes which was primarily necessitated by the power relations
of the land and housing markets and secondarily by economic market forces.
This policy of locating railways in working-class neighbourhoods
largely explains the location of lines and termini in north, south and
[591
east London. To the north, Marylebone station permanently displaced
thousands of working-class people from the slums of Lisson Grove while
the approach line had to tunnel under the well-to-do Portman Estate and
St. John's Wood neighbourhood, to avoid disturbing their 'respectable'
residents. Euston, St. Pancras and King's Cross stations, together with
their approach lines virtually demolished all of the slums of Agar, Camden
and Somers Towns, where the railway companies were allowed unrestricted
access by the aristocratic estate owners of these districts. The Holborn
Viaduct, the only surface railway to be built across London, marched
through the slums of Clerkenwell and Farringdon Street. In south London,
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especially Southwark, railway companies were fortunate in having to face
only a few large ecclesiastical estate owners who were usually only too
pleased to have the railway companies remove the poor for them as this was
not something the Church could legitimately do. Indeed, the powerlessness
of tenants in these districts was acknowledged by Parliament when it ex-
empted south railway schemes from the general restriction placed on inner
London in 1846. The approach lines to Victoria Station, and London Bridge,
Cannon Street, Charing Cross and Waterloo stations and their approaches,
were largely located in working-class areas owned by the Church. In the
working-class neighbourhoods of the East End, ownership was much more frag-
mented, the largest estate owners being the City Corporation and Companies.
Consequently, it was easier for railway companies to ignore unco-ordinated
opposition in building Bishopsgate, Fenchurch Street and later Liverpool and
Broad street stations, though legal costs and compensation awards to land-
owners were much higher. These costs did not, however, prevent the whole-
sale destruction of working-class homes by the maze of companies which[60]
sought to gain access to the City and the Docks.
In the process nearly 800 acres of central land, enough for a fair-
sized town, was taken for railway uses. H. J. Dyos has conservatively
estimated that the numbers of people displaced by a total of 69 separate
schemes came to at least 76,000 between 1853 and 1901, with 51 schemes[61]
displacing 56,000 people before 1885. Spread over the area involved,
an average of 95 persons per acre were displaced. John Kellett quotes the
estimates of Dr. Lethaby in 1861 that between 150 and 300 persons per acre
was nearer the true number of displacements. The lower figure would give a
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total of 120,000. evictions which represented 5 1/2% of the then central
[62]
area population.
The laissez faire ideology was used until 1874 to rationalize the
failure of Parliament to force railway companies to rehouse displaced
tenants, which it deemed an unjustifiable invasion of landlords' rights.
The subsequent requirement for them to provide alternative accommodation
was successfully evaded until 1885 when the Royal Commission on the Housing
of the Working Classes recommended sterner enforcement of these require-
ments. Even then, alternative accommodation was usually not available at
the time of demolition and was therefore occupied by families other than
those who were displaced, and the rents were usually too high for poorer[63]
tenants.
During the period under consideration, rail fares were beyond the
means of the majority of working-class people. There were two main reasons
for this. The first and most important was an outcome of the railway
companies' struggle for compulsory purchase powers. They were prohibited
from buying up large tracts of land, in excess of their essential require-
[64]
ments, and becoming speculators themselves. This approach which was
common in America was frequently suggested but never attained legislative
approval. If the American experience can be generalized, then allowing
railway companies to profit from land speculation would probably have[65]
caused fares to be much lower. One consequence of this prohibition was
that railway companies played an essentially passive role in London's sub-
urban development. More importantly, it meant that they had to reap the
bulk of their profits from the fares which they charged for the conveyance
of people and goods.
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This leads to the second reason for high fares which was based on the
peculiar economic characteristics of public goods like railways. Unlike
factories which produced relatively cheap, individualizable commodities,
railways could not benefit from economies of scale as they increased their
output. Beyond a certain point larger, unevenly distributed traffic in-
creased operating and administrative expenses and spelt diminishing returns.
The burden of a very high initial expenditure in fixed, indivisible capital
made it unrealistic to respond to lower demand by proportionately reducing
fares and 'output' until an equilibrium was reached. This classic market
response was inappropriate to railway companies who had to make the bulk
of their capital investments at the start of their operations and could not
vary these according to subsequent fluctuations of supply and demand.
The railway companies soon learned that price competition over fares
held little benefit for them. As a result, they agreed to maintain fares
at levels which were high enough to generate adequate profits and instead
began to compete over the relative attractiveness of their termini and
other urban facilities. In answer to the following question of Counsel
[66]
for the House of Commons in 1872:
"Is it not the fact that in places where two great companies compete
there is almost always an agreement as to what shall be the charges
made to the public?"
the General Manager of the Midland Railway replied:
"That is true, but still you will always find that the competition is
very keen. I do not mean competition by charge but competition by
accommodation, and you will find that the public are generally very
much better accommodated."
This policy suited the railway contractors, surveyors, architects and
attorneys whose interests were best served by new construction as opposed
to fare policy changes. It led to a duplication of termini and lines and
violent disputes in cases where facilities were shared.
The overall result was that passenger fares were relatively high and
generally beyond the reach of the majority of the working class. Cheaper
'workmen's fares' were provided by a few railway companies as a quid pro
quo for the hardship which their demolitions caused. From the 1860's on-
wards, clauses requiring workmen's fares were included in Railway Bills,
but their frequency and use only became significant and practicable after
[671
the 1880's. Thus, while railway development facilitated or actively
encouraged the exodus of members of the capitalist class and the middle
stratum to the airy suburbs, it was one of the powerful forces which com-
pressed the bulk of the working class into squalid and degrading inner-
London environments.
In summary, we have seen that while railway development played an
important part in London's growth from the 1830's to the 1880's, it was
essentially subordinate to the power relations of the leasehold land and
housing markets, which comprised the pre-eminent though not only force that
shaped London's social and spatial development. We must therefore agree
with one of John Kellett's conclusions to his excellent book on the impact[6B
of the railways on Victorian cities:
"In many ways urban landowners were the most important single agents
of change; more important than the railway managers, whose imagina-
tion and foresight could often be exercised only with very strict
limits. The landowners profited at all stages of railway building
and probably exercised the greatest single influence upon the
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selection of central sites, upon the location and character of
suburbs; and even exercised a lesser, though still considerable
influence, upon the costs of the service offered."
Street Improvements and an Underground Railway
It only remains to consider the development of other modes of trans-
portation which used existing public thoroughfares and where increased
efficiency was largely predicated upon the improvement of those thorough-
fares. As the separation of work and living progressed, so the volume of
traffic increased, partly because of increased travel by well-to-do mer-
chants, employers and civil servants, who generally used private carriages
or hackney cabs to travel to and from their homes in the West End and
north-west and their workplaces in Westminster and the City.
Horse-drawn omnibuses were a greater source of congestion. After their
inception in 1829, omnibuses were popular with the bulk of the middle-
stratum who could afford the fares and whose relatively short-hours of work
[69]
matched the operating times of the omnibus companies. Omnibuses were
the most widely used form of public transport until the 1850's and 1860's
when railway companies began to actively encourage suburban travel. From
then onwards, onmibuses tended to be more popular within an approximate
radius of four miles from the centre where their greater accessibility and
flexibility offset the trains' speed. Outside this area, railways were un-
70]
challanged as the predominant form of suburban transportation. As with
the railways, and for similar reasons, competition soon gave way to co-op-
eration between rival omnibus companies. In 1856,the London General Omnibus
Company, the brain-child of Parisian businessmen, was formed. By 1859,
it constituted a virtual monopoly, owning and controlling 75% of all omnibus
[71]
companies and tacitly agreeing to allow the rest to operate 'freely.'
A third major form of public transport in 19th century London was the
172]
horse-drawn tramway, which was successfully introduced in 1870. They
were predominantly used by the middle stratum, though their cheaper fares
did enable members of the 'labour aristocracy' to make use of tramways,
especially after the 1880's. Like their railway counterparts, tramway
companies had to gain Parliamentary approval before they could construct
their lines. The pattern of tramways and their operating conditions again[731
reflects the relative power of local landowning interests. Tramways
never penetrated the West End residential and shopping precincts as they
were not welcomed by the powerful interests in the area. Only after the
1890's were they allowed to operate in the central area. In fact, their
existence as private companies was limited to two decades, in an effort to
win the support of antagonistic local authorities. As a result, their wide-
spread use as a means of working-class transport occurred from the 1890's
onwards as tramway companies reverted to public ownership.
Lastly, walking was the predominant form of working-class transporta-
tion up to the 1880's. Public transportation was either too expensive or
travel times highly inconvenient. Many workers were forced to live close
to their workplaces due to the requirements of their work. The working
class constituted the bulk of the estimated 200,000 people who walked daily1741
to work in the City in 1851.
The volume of this road traffic increased as economic activity grew
and as the separation of work and living became more widespread. The
railway termini dotted about the circumference of the central area were
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major foci and generators of traffic and tended. to exacerbate the already
severe road congestion. In addition, as Peter Hall has pointed out, the
1751
'assembly line' of the sweated trades ran through the streets of London.
This enormous goods traffic further worsened the situation. Archaic turn-
pike trusts and tolls also slowed down road traffic. By the 1850's, the
combined effect of all these factors on the essentially medieval street
pattern of central London was one of utter chaos in which inefficiencies
proliferated. Streets had to be improved, or street traffic somehow reduced,
or else London's economic activity might slowly grind to a halt. In the
[76]
words of one contemporary businessman:
"It must be obvious that the constantly accumulating number of
omnibuses, wagons and conveyances of all sorts would, if it con-
tinued two or three years longer, render London almost insupport-
able for purposes of business."
In 1855, the Select Committe on Metropolitan Communications heard
proposals for a number of futuristic schemes aimed at solving London's
[771
traffic problems. These entailed elevated urban railways powered by
atmospheric pressure, elevated pedestrian crossings and/or elevated
shopping arcades. The grandest scheme was proposed by Sir Joseph Paxton,
who designed the Crystal Palace. He proposed a Great Victorian Way which
would encircle and bisect the central area, linking all important locations.
It would have consisted of a wide thoroughfare comprising elevated railways
with a pedestrian shopping arcade above them, covered by a steel-and-glass
vaulted roof. Similar schemes are still bandied around in avante garde
architectural and city-planning circles today. Had they been realized in
19th century London, the city's spatial form would be drastically different
today. But this was not to be.
Instead, the committee recommended a number of other proposals. These
included abolished bridge and turnpike trusts, whose gates and tolls slowed
vehicles down and abolishing the barriers which some estate owners had
erected to maintain the exclusiveness of their property and which forced
through traffic to take devious alternative routes. But, more importantly,
the committee members made two further recommendations which were to have
far reaching effects on London's social and spatial fabric..
Firstly, they advised that the fifteen railway termini, which were
located about the circumference of the central area, be linked to each
other and to other prominent activities by an "inner circuit of Railway"[78]
which was to built underground. This proposal for the world's first
underground urban railway was originated in 1837 by a far-sighted City
lawyer named Charles Pearson and became a pet project for which he lobbied
the rest of his life. It was hoped that the inner circle railway would
distribute passengers arriving at the main termini and also absorb much
of the omnibus and cab traffic, thereby relieving the crowded streets. The
first section, from Paddington to Farringdon Street, was opened by the
Metropolitan Railway in 1863. Again, property relations determined its
route. Property law obliged anyone who burrowed under buildings to buy[791
them outright, even if the buildings would not be damaged. Thus,
wherever possible, buildings had to be avoided. Consequently, most of the
line ran under the New (now Marylebone and Euston) Road and Farringdon Road
and along the Thames Embankment. The circle line was ultimately finished
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in 1884, with the aid of almost one million pounds of public money, when
the rival Metropolitan and Metropolitan District railways were linked
underneath the City and at Paddington. The line carried a lot a traffic
but did little to alieviate congestion on the surface, as its capacity was
insufficient to cope with London's vast traffic.
Street improvement was the Committee's second proposal. What this
really meant was a policy of building new thoroughfares, mainly through
already developed property and of widening existing roads, in an effort to
improve the efficiency of the overall street network. This was by far the
most drastic proposal in terms of the human suffering which its realization
caused.
Prior to the 1850's, unco-ordinated street improvements had been
carried out by the City Corporation and by the Commissioners of Woods, For-
ests and Land Revenues, a statutory body responsible for the administration
of Crown lands. But really major projects depended upon the formation of
an effective local government body responsible for the wider metropolitan
area. Parish councils did not have the resources to undertake large-scale
street improvements; nor did they have the motivation as it would have
imposed a heavy burden on local rates while benefiting the metropolis as a
whole. Local government reform was achieved with the foundation of the
Metropolitan Board of Works in 1855. Though street improvement, which
involved the aquisition of a large amount of property, was one of the main
reasons for the formation of the Board, it was only granted compulsory
purchase powers in 1862, and very limited powers at that. Thus, in practice,
the Board, like the railway companies, had to apply for Parliamentary
approval in almost every important case. Nevertheless, after a slow start,
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the Board completed a spectacular programme of new streets in the heart of
central London before it was superseded by the London County Council in[80]
1888.
Like the railway companies, the Metropolitan Board of Works' decision-
making with respect to the priorities for and location of street improve-
ments was subservient to the power relations of the land and housing markets.
Consequently, the outcomes were essentially similar to those discussed under
the development of railways. Large-scale street improvements, involving
the demolition of acres of buildings, were almost invariably located in
working-class neighbourhoods, displacing thousands. What little street im-
provement occurred in the residential areas of wealthier families or in
commercial zones usually involved only slight adjustments and thus minimal[81]
property damage and displacement.
The three main reasons for this course of action were the weakness of
working-class tenants in opposing the Board, the opportunity for estate
owners to sell property which had become more of a liability than an asset
while receiving handsome financial compensation, and the opportunity for
local authorities to reduce the rates by forcing many of those who burdened[82]
the rates to move to adjacent parishes. These material factors were
bolstered by powerful ideological justifications for the most destructive
aspects of street improvement. Slum clearance was deemed to be highly
beneficial for all--including working-class families who lost their homes
and were forced into already overcrowded surrounding dwellings. In some
instances, the opportunity to 'air the rookeries' was sufficient reason for[83]
driving new streets through working-class districts. These arguments
-111-
have previously been developed in detail, consequently I will proceed to
outline briefly their applicability to and influence on 19th century street
improvements.
The construction of Regent's Street (1817-23) was the most important[84]
street improvement prior to the 1830's. Its aim was to attract wealthy
residents to the speculative buildings around the newly formed Regent's
Park, by linking the park with St. James and the West End. Its delicate
twists and curves, which many attribute to solely aesthetic considerations,
"are so ingeniously managed that they conceal the fact that the route was [851
largely determined by the ownership of the land which the street traversed."
John Nash saved the Crown money by altering his initial, more direct pro-
posal to include the sweeping quadrant north of Piccadilly Circus as this
kept the street on Crown property, minimizing compensatory costs. Access
from the east was purposely restricted to a minimum so that Regents Street
would become an effective barrier between the slums of Soho and the
spacious streets of the wealthy to the west.
By 1856, New Oxford Street had been cut through St. Giles' rookery,
Victoria Street passed through Westminster on a line chosen solely for its[86]
effectiveness in demolishing the slums known as Devil's Acre, a scheme
which the 1845 Royal Commission on Metropolis Improvements justified on the[871
basis that:
"Its effect has been to divert the channel of communication in a
direction further south, into a more unperfectly drained, a more
densely peopled, and consequently a more objectionable portion of
the district."
Furthermore, Commercial Street punctured working-class Whitechapel and
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Farringdon, Cannon and Queen Victoria Streets had been driven through the
poorest and most densely populated areas of the City. After the mid-1850's,
the Metropolitan Board of Works and the City Corporation ruthlessly con-
tinued this policy of allying street improvement with working-class dis-
placement. Southwark street displaced poor people in Blackfriars who had
recently been ousted from the City by the Cannon and Queen Victoria Street
improvements. By the late 1880's, Charing Cross Road and Shaftsbury Avenue
had aerated the slums of St. Giles' and Seven Dials; and Clerkenwell and
Gray's Inn Roads had been cut through the densest districts of Holborn.
No re-housing obligation was placed on the Board until 1877 when they were
required to find alternative accommodation for a proportion of those evicted.
This obligation slowed progress on the Charing Cross-Shaftsbury Avenue[881
scheme and was thus eased to facilitate completion of the new roads.
Gareth Stedman Jones has estimated "that altogether street clearance
accounted for the displacement of not far short of 100,000 persons between[89]
1830 and 1880."
In summary, the overwhelming outcome of this drive to improve London's
efficiency as a base for economic enterprise was the eviction of approxi-
mately 10% of the entire population of the city, predominantly members of
the working class, with extremely meagre efforts to rehouse those dis-[90]
placed. In the words of Gareth Stedman Jones:
"In its arbitrary and unplanned way demolition and commercial trans-
formation in nineteenth-century London must have involved a greater
displacement of population than the rebuilding of Paris under
Haussman."
Indeed, slum clearance became the most powerful ideological justification
for an 'improvement' scheme. As most members of the working class were
forced to live relatively close to their work, this effectively caused a
reduction in the absolute amount of space available for working-class
housing, thereby increasing the overcrowding and rents. It is difficult
to imagine that any members of the working class could have benefited from
these schemes. On the other hand, estate owners prospered from the high
compensation settlements; and big employers and merchants benefited from
the improved communcations, which facilitated increased capital accumulation
and their escape, along with much of the middle stratum to salubrious
suburbs away from the degrading working-class environments of inner London.
In the majority of cases, the power structure of the land and housing
markets was the prime though not the only factor in the determination of
the spatial form and location of communcations channels and in the trans-
formation of London's social structure.
Residential Separation and Homogenization
The fourth pressure which shaped London's social and spatial character
was the effort by members of the capitalist class and,to a lesser extent,
members of the middle stratum to separate themselves from the working
class into socially homogeneous residential neighbourhoods. The greater
economic and political power of wealthy employers and merchants meant that
they were more successful than clerks, professionals and petty capitalists
in this endeavour.
The socio-economic rationale behind this drive has been outlined in
Chapter 1: the institutionalization of markets in labour and essential
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commodities, upon which the capitalist economic system is based, drove a
wedge between employers and workers. Old ties of social responsibility
between the two groups had to be severed so that the new socio-economic
institutions could operate effectively. It was logical for the sociological
expression of this division in the workplace to extend into the residential
sphere: for capitalists to want to live apart from the working class. As
John George Rhodes, a successful merchant, put it before the Select Committee
191]
on Town Holdings in 1887:
"I believe it is the view of the estate that houses for the class of
people that we have been speaking about (the lower orders), and
houses for the class of people to which, if you will allow me to
say so, I belong, should be kept very widely apart."
But in addition to this, there were similar economic reasons for this
class separation in the living environment. Each parish was responsible
for the relief of working-class poverty within its bounds. This was paid
for out of the rates. In parishes where wealthy residents were a majority,
and together paid close to the total rate bill, poor relief was tantamount
to a negation of the divisive principles of the markets in labour and
essential commodities, which were so important in the workplace. Thus,
the notorious insistence by propertied Victorian society on keeping the[921
rates low was not based solely on the prospect of pecuniary savings.
It was a necessary part of the establishment of the socio-economic insti-
tutions which defined 19th century British capitalist society. Furthermore,
the proximity of the 'respectable' neighbourhoods of the wealthy to work-
ing-class residential areas, especially slums, was seen to be undesirable
for two further reasons. Property values in 'respectable' neighbourhoods
were depressed below their assumed potential if the connnection could be
effectively severed. And local slums were a potential health hazard as
cholera epidemics usually originated in these unsanitary areas and sometimes
[931
spread into adjacent areas. Besides, slums were simply an eyesore, and
a constant reminder of the deprivation upon which dominant-class existence
was based: those who had the power to remove this assault on their senses
and consciences were unlikely to pass up any opportunity to do so.
This class division was achieved in three ways. The first, suburban
migration, has already been discussed under forces one and two above.
Employers and merchants, followed after the 1850's by the middle stratum,
simply moved away from the central area to the West End or the suburbs,
their higher incomes affording them a wider range of choices in the land
market. Most of the working class were confined within the central area,
primarily because their low wages and the nature of their jobs and of
public transportation made the central area virtually the only feasible
residential location for them during the period under consideration.
[91]
According to Lynn Lees:
"This centrifugal movement intensified the separation of social
classes in residential areas which, in London, was already well
advanced. The cost of transport into the city effectively
insulated the outer ring of suburbs from most working-class
residents until the 1870's, and thereafter the availability
of cheap trains directed them into certain areas."
The second means of achieving class separation in the residential
sphere has also been covered to some extent, under the development and
modification of modes of transportation. Working-class districts were
separated from more affluent neighbourhoods by the erection of barriers,
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which limited or completely curtailed access from one area to another and
which spatially defined the limits of each neighbourhood for their respec-
tive occupants. On the estates of the wealthy, this was achieved by means
of gates and bars which were guarded by gatekeepers whose job was to keep
out undesirable people and through traffic. On the Bedford estate, for
example, barriers were used on the northern and eastern boundaries to fend
off incursions from the working-class districts to the north and east of
the estate. Barriers were not erected, however, on the western boundary
1951
as contact with the respectable West End was deemed to be desirable.
Railway lines were powerful social and physical barriers. Railway
viaducts, which were widely used in an effort to avoid costly street
closures, were massive barriers. They carried trains noisily past working-
class houses at roof-top level, constricting neighbourhoods socially and
intersecting them physically. Such isolation tended to accelerate the
decline of many areas so that they rapidly became unwholesome slums. Cuts
and tunnels, which were also products of the power relations of the land
market, were equally powerful barriers. The criss-cross of supplementary
lines and sidings produced many neighbourhoods which had very few physical
[96]
connections with surrounding areas. The Parliamentary 'limits of
deviation' allowed the railway companies to buy more land than they needed.
This land was usually sold to non-residential users, thus increasing the
barrier effects of the lines. Segregation 'on the wrong side of the
tracks' often had disastrous effects on land values in 'bad' areas further
accelerating their decline.
Street improvement was another means of 'fencing off' working-class
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districts from well-to-do areas. Regent Street was a prime example, though
other street improvements achieved a similar purpose, besides improving
traffic circulation. It was explicitly though not exclusively designed as
a barrier between the slums of Soho and the estates of the nobility and
gentry in the West End. John Nash, the street's designer, stated that the
[971
line chosen sought to strengthen
"the line of separation between the habitations of the first class of
society and those of inferior classes....It will also be seen, by the
plan...that the whole communication from Charing Cross to Oxford
Street will be a boundary and complete separation between the streets
and squares occupied by the nobility and gentry, and the narrow
streets and meaner houses occupied by mechanics and the trading part
of the community."
The cumulative effect of these barriers at the metropolitan scale
was to divide London into a predominantly working-class eastern sector and
dominant-class western sector. To the north, railway lines and marshalling
yards and gasworks created a twilight zone which permanently divided Regent's
Park and Marylebone from Pentonville and Islington. The depopulated City
formed a buffer zone separating the overcrowded East End from the respec-
table West End. Though weaker than in the north, some degree of social
polarization between east and west, with railway lines as major barriers,
[98]
is discernible in south London. I do not mean to imply that widening
the social and spatial gulf between affluent residential areas and poor
districts was the only or the most important factor behind the locational
decisions of railway developers and street improvements. In fact, I have
argued that the power relations of the land and housing market were
primary. Nevertheless, social and spatial segregation was a significant
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consideration in the decision-making process and in obtaining Parliamentary
approval, and upon completion, these transportation channels did become
powerful barriers.
A third way in which class separation was accomplished in the resi-
dential sphere was by the homogenization of predominantly affluent or
respectable neighbourhoods. Not all of the working class were confined to
the East End. Sizeable working-class populations were still to be found
in the fashionable neighbourhoods of the West End and in the middle stratum
suburbs. The majority were domestic servants who slept in the attics and
lived in the basements of their wealthy employers homes. In these instances,
class separation was rarely problematic. The employment of servants con-
ferred respectability and enhanced the families' social status. Servants,
on the other hand, obtained food, shelter and,most importantly, security
at the price of the loss of a large measure of personal freedom. They knew
their place, and the threat of poverty and starvation on their own in the
world 'outside' was a constant reminder that subservience and humility was
'good' for them. Consequently, the majority observed the spoken and un-
spoken rules which their employers laid down, and segregation at the archi-
[991
tectural scale within each house was sufficient.
The real problem from the point of view of propertied and middle-
stratum society was the local concentrations of dens of extreme poverty
in back alleys and isolated courts close to their stately, or at least
adequate, homes. As Engels noted in 1844: "Right behind the most elegant
[100]
streets the dirtiest workers' quarters are to be found." These slums
were usually inhabited by workers and casual labourers employed in local
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service occupations, but they also housed beggars and possibly a few crimi-
nals. Whether employed or unemployed, these people constituted the riff-raff
whose removal was the focus of homogenization drives. It was not the exis-
tence of poverty that was seen to be problematic, but the
proximity of the working-class poor to the homes of the wealthy and, to a
lesser extent, the middle stratum. A leading article in The Times of 1843[101]
is worth quoting at some length to support this argument:
"Poor there must be everywhere. Indigence will find its way and set
up its hideous state in the heart of a great and luxurious city.
Amid the thousand narrow lanes and by-streets of a populous metropo-
lis there must always, we fear, be much suffering--much that offends
the eye--much that lurks unseen. But that within the precincts of
wealth, gaiety and fashion, nigh the regal grandeur of St. James's
close on the palatial splendour of Bayswater, on the confines of
the old and new aristocratic quarters in a district where the cautious
refinement of modern design has refrained from creating one single
tenement for poverty; which seems as it were dedicated to the
exclusive enjoyments of wealth--that there want and famine and disease
and vice should stalk in all their kindred horrors, consuming body
by body, soul by soul! It is, indeed, a monstrous state of things!
Enjoyment the most absolute, that bodily ease, intellectual excite-
ment, or the more innocent pleasures of sense can supply to man's
craving, brought in close contact with the most unmitigated misery!"
The ability to jegregate the various classes of society was one of
the virtues attributed to the large, leasehold estate by its defenders.
Social and architectural uniformity was one of the major goals in the con-(102]
ttruction andmanagement of estates. In fashionable areas like the
West End, where the power and preferences of landowners and tenants coin-
cided, the task was easier and the goal was often accomplished. A certain
class of houses was built for certain class of people--it was as blatant
as that. The architecture of an estate became the physical embodiment of
the class of its inhabitants and of their relative power in the land and
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housing market. Often, housing at the edge of an estate was specifically
designed as a barrier to less attractive surroundings. Nash's terraces, on
the eastern boundary of Regent's Park, are prime examples which have sur-
vived to the present. They were specifically built to separate the Crown's
estate from the predominantly working-class Camden Town area. Viewed from
the park, one sees the stately, cream painted and elegantly proportioned
facades which tourists and students of architectural history are taught to
love, usually without being made aware of the other side--the dull, scruffy[1031
brick frontage onto Albany Street and Camden Town.
The management of estates during the life of the leases was oriented
towards maintaining such uniformity of social status and land use as had
been established when the estates were initially developed. Estate sur-
veyors had to prevent houses from being downgraded or inhabited by families
of lower social status. Obnoxious trades and shops had to be kept out or at
least hidden in unobtrusive locations. If all else failed, landowners
could resort to redevelopment once the leases expired. Slums were often
demolished and more wholesome accommodations were built by speculators for
the middle stratum or by model dwelling companies for the 'respectable'
'labour aristocracy.' Later in the 19th century some estates were sold for
high compensation to the Metropolitan Board of Works who then evicted the
tenants, demolished the buildings and sold the land to model dwelling com-
panies, mainly the Peabody Trust, for much less than they paid for it.
Model dwelling companies invariably built housing which was beyond the[104]
means of the old slum's inhabitants.
In those parishes where the power of estate owners was not enough to
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accomplish socially homogeneous neighbourhoods; or where landownership was
fragmented, the central government stepped in with new legislation to
facilitate the removal of the human riff-raff who were seen as undesir-
able elements within otherwise attractive residential areas. The legisla-
tion to which I am referring was a composite of the early Building Bye-
Laws, the Sanitary Laws, the Public Health Acts (1848, 1875), the Metropolis
Local Management Act (1855) and the early Housing Acts, particularly the
Torrens (1868) and Cross (1875) Acts. I do not mean to imply that the
homogenization of classes within residential areas was the main reason
behind this legislation, but it was an important pressure which determined
[1051
the ultimate form of these laws. If one looks beyond their expressed
intent, that they were aimed at ameliorating unsanitary and dilapidated
working-class environments and thereby improving the lives of working-
class people, to the nature of the laws which were eventually written into
the statute books, and to the outcomes which these laws facilitated, then
one begins to understand their significance to the needs of the ruling
class (class segregation in this case) and their virtual irrelevance in
improving the lot of the working class.
The legislation allowed Medical Officers of Health to enter and in-
spect unsanitary or overcrowded property, predominantly working-class
housing and to instruct the owner or leaseholder to make good those elements
which were deemed harmful to the health of the inhabitants or the surround-
ing community. If no action was forthcoming, then the property could be
condemned and demolished. Up to the mid-1880's, no effective re-housing
(106]
requirements existed. The legislation was permissive and could there-
fore be applied at the discretion of the Medical Officers of Health or of
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their employers, the vestrymen. It was applied differentially in affluent
and working-class districts.
In the neighbourhoods of the wealthy and to a lesser extent of the
middle stratum, the vestries generally acted in the interests of most local
residents. Sanitary regulations were easier to enforce because the goals
of the Medical Officers of Health, the vestries and the majority of resi-
dents coincided, and they had enough political clout to enforce the laws.[107]
The Select Committee onTown Holdings pointed out in 1889 that it was
"easier to enforce sanitary regulations...when there are special
advantages attaching to a particular neighbourhood, and marking
it off for the residence of a certain class."
As a result, many isolated slum alleys and courts were demolished without
new housing being built for their evicted inhabitants, who were gradually
forced into predominantly working-class districts.
On the other hand, the enforcement of sanitary and housing legisla-
tion in working-class areas was much more problematic. Vestrymen usually
acted in the interests of local property owners and businessmen. The
Metropolis Local Management Act specifically placed the medical officers'
tenure and removal at the pleasure of the vestrymen, many of whom had
property interests in the slums. Thus, friction was bound to arise between
medical officers determined to improve the slums and their slumlord politi-
[108]
cal superiors. In addition, the cruelty and deprivation which the
application of the sanitary and housing laws imposed on the working-class
slum dwellers soon became blatantly apparent to the medical officers.
Their everyday experience made them aware that evicted tenants, because
-124-
they were forced to live in a certain area, merely moved to adjacent streets,
increasing overcrowding and rents in the remaining houses which soon came
to pose health hazards as well. Without effective re-housing obligations
and actions, the legislation did little to remove health hazards, and gen-[109]
erally made life worse for the working class.
In sum, then, the early public health and housing legislation was
most useful in the attractive and generally sanitary environments of
the dominant class because, among other things, it facilitated the removal
from their neighbourhoods of undesirable concentrations of working-class
slums. The legislation did little to improve the quality of working-class
districts, which was the ostensible reason behind it. Indeed, it probably
made matters worse for the working class. The application of sanitary
regulations was another example of the dominant-class bias of the state.
This was highlighted by Marx in 1867 in comparing the treatment of landowners
'evicted' from their land by railways and street improvements, and workers,
[110]
evicted from unsanitary housing:
"Admire this capitalistic justice! The owner of land, of houses, the
businessman, when expropriated by 'improvements' such as rail[ways],
the building of new streets &c., not only receives full indemnity.
He must, according to law, human and divine, be comforted for his
inforced 'abstinence' over and above this by a thumping profit. The
labourer, with his wife and child and chattels, is thrown into the
street, and--if he crowds in too large numbers towards quarters of the
town where the vestries insist on decency, he is prosecuted in the
name of sanitation!"
Thus it seems that the sanitary problems of working-class districts became
a means of justifying and legitimizing increased state intervention to
accomplish other goals (class segregation in this instance, and others
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stated below under the fifth pressure) which served the interests of the
dominant class and to a less extent of the middle stratum. As a result,
the spatial segregation of social classes in London became more and more
sharply defined during the 19th century; and this outcome of the class
struggle was directly reflected in the form of the city--the architectural
uniformity of various areas being a direct expression of the broad uniformity
of needs and socio-economic status of their inhabitants. In the words of
[111]
Steen Eiler Rasmussen:
"There is hardly any other city where the local features are as marked
as in London. To cross a street separating two quarters may mean
coming from one world into another. It is the boundary of two civ-
ilizations, two languages, two standards of life. A person who knows
London well will be able to place his man as soon as he hears in
what part of London he lives, a fact that is often alluded to by
authors. The first act of Bernard Shaw's Pygmation is always sure
to be a success with a London audience when Professor Higgins
phonetically determines in which quarter the persons live: Lisson
Grove, Hoxton, Earl's Court and so on. The fact that the inhabitants
are distributed in quarters according to their class and income has
make it possible to standardize the domestic houses: as people
living in the same street have the same requirements all the houses
can be absolutely uniform."
The Impoverishment of the Working Class
The fifth pressure which shaped London's growth arose out of the
impoverishment of the bulk of the working class so that they formed a cheap,
abundant and docile labour force, thereby enabling London's employers and
merchants to compete on favourable terms against provincial factory produc-
tion. The social and economic reasons behind this aspect of the struggle
between classes and the ways in which production relations changed in the
process have been outlined in Chapter 1. The scope of that exploration
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was limited to the impoverishment of the working class in the workplace.
Here we are concerned with the counterpart of this process as it unfolded
in the workers' struggle for adequate housing--with the impoverishment of
the bulk of the working class in the residential sphere. This latter
process was both an outcome of the former and an integral part of the
overall process of working-class impoverishment.
Compared to the stately homes of the West End or even the suburban
terraces, working-class slums were the concrete expression of the exploita-
tion and degradation on which this process of impoverishment was based.
Slums were not a novelty in the 19th century. What was new, however, was
the intensification of overcrowding in the central area which was the
product of the structural characteristics and tenure relations of the
working-class housing sub-market. This structure was gradually defined,
during the period under consideration, by the nature and necessities of
the workers' position in the production process and by the changing mode
of urban organization based on the realization of the first four pressures.
However, the resultant environments found spatial expression via what
may be called the 'sweated' leasehold system which mediated relations
between landlords and working-class tenants in the latter's quest for
housing. Given this framework, the operation of this segment of the
housing market almost inevitably led to the proliferation of overcrowded,
dilapidated and unsanitary slum neighbourhoods. A brief look at the nature
of the working-class housing market will show why.
The nature and necessities of the workers' position in the productive
process shaped the working-class housing market in two important ways: it
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determined their lack of economic, social and political power as 'actors'
in the land and housing markets, and it confined feasible residential
locations for the working class to a limited spatial area adjacent to their
workplaces. Their powerlessness in society, being a major factor in the
formation of working-class slum environments, permeates the whole of my
argument and its central importance will become apparent as the explanation
unfolds.
The necessities of their jobs meant that most workers, including
skilled artisans, had very little effective choice of residential locality.
Casual labourers were crucially dependent on hearsay and personal contacts
for information on possible employment. In the days before the widespread
diffusion of telephones and newspapers, this meant being in the right place
at the right time. The irregularity of their employment meant that job-
hunting was as vital and continual an aspect of their employment as was
the work itself. As a result, commuting usually involved journeys for,
rather than to, work. All in all, they were effectively forced to live
within short walking distances, often less than a mile, of potential em-
ployment sources, the bulk of which were located in central London and
particularly in the East End. Though housing reformers may have preached
otherwise, most workers were depressingly aware of their spatial fixity,
as evidenced by the following statement of a 'respectable' shoemaker, a
[112]
teetotaller what is more, justifying why he lived in a slum in 1869:
"In London...generally speaking, poor people cannot select their
lodgings, being obliged in a great manner to accomodate themselves
to the circumstances in which they are placed through their employ-
ment and other contingencies."
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At a Parliamentary inquiry in 1846, another worker stated that it was
the docks
"which have brought the labour there. The labourer will not go away
from where the manufactory is, however bad the occupancy of the
dwelling may be; he still will be near his work."
Similar centripetal locational imperatives characterized the 'sweated'
trades. Here the necessity for constant personal contact during work hours
between 'sweated' out-workers and the wholesale houses which were the origin
[113]
and end of the productive process, was paramount. Equipment might have
to be borrowed a few times a day; raw materials had to be fetched and fin-
ished orders returned. As we have already seen, the assembly line in the
'sweated' trades ran through the streets. Thus, increasing the proximity
between workers and wholesale houses was akin to increasing the efficiency
of the productive process. So much so that many employers demanded guar-
antees from workers not to live more than a certain distance from their
employment in the central area. For example, Lord Shaftsbury told the
[114
Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, 1884-5, that:
"in some cases men are under an engagement to their employers not to
live more than a certain distance from the warehouses."
Other factors also confined the working class, especially the poor
[115]
to the centre, and conversely played an important role in perpetuating
the functioning of this stratum of the labour market and in sustaining
the overall process of impoverishment. Food was considerably cheaper and
could be bought in much smaller quantities there than in the suburbs due
to the existence of street markets. Credit was easier to obtain from
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local shops and pawnbrokers and so was second-hand clothing; and the oppor-
tunities for wives to work part-time was an added attraction. Furthermore,
the feeling of community in the slums, of living with equals, sustained
familiar elements of working-class culture--pubs, cheap theatres, rat-
baiting, boxing--and must have been another significant factor that pre-
vented any rapid dispersion from the central area slums. In fact, prior
to the 1880's, most of the working class vigorously and logically resisted
any encouragement to move from their homes in the centre, as this would
involve the loss of tangible benefits and would threaten their precarious
livelihoods as well. As one worker told the Select Committe on Artisans'
[116]
Dwellings in 1882: "I might as well go to America as go to the suburbs."
[117]
And the 1884-5 Royal Commissioners reported:
"If regular work was tobe had by all who want it without any
uncertainty, the poor might pick and choose the locality for
their dwellings, but as it is, it has been noticed that when
they [the working class] have made an attempt to leave an
overcrowded neighbourhood for some better locality at a little
distance away, after a short sojourn many of them have often
been compelled to come back to be near their work."
The changes in London's social and spatial structure, arising out
of the realization of the first four pressures, affected the central area
working-class housing market in two major ways. They led to drastic
reductions in both the absolute space available for working-class housing
and in the availability of financial resources needed to sustain an adequate
network of urban social and physical infrastructure in working-class
districts.
The imperatives of the process of capital accumulation and the
residential needs of the working class came into direct conflict in the
-130-
centre-city land market. As we have seen, the increasing profitability
of commerical and productive facilities was strongly dependent on central
locations, on the construction of docks and railways and on the improvement
of major thoroughfares. These productive and service land uses consumed
large proportions of central area land, which was, on the other hand, vir-
tually the only feasible location for the working-class housing. This con-
flict was the concrete expression of an aspect of the more general power
struggle between the capitalist class, whose interests were served by the
process of capital accumulation, and the working class; an aspect which
directly affected the form of the city. In the majority of interactions,
the outcomes were repetitious of those in the overall struggle between these
classes: capital accumulation came before working-class needs: As
Karl Marx argued in 1867, this outcome was far more blatant than its coun-
[118]
terpart in the workplace:
"The intimate connexion between the pangs of hunger of the most in-
dustrious layers of the working-class, and the extravagant consump-
tion, coarse or refined, of the rich, for which capitalist accumu-
lation is the basis, reveals itself only when the economic laws are
known. It is otherwise with the 'housing of the poor.' Every
unprejudiced observer sees that the greater the centralisation of
the means of production, the greater is the corresponding heaping
together of the labourers, within a given space: that therefore
the swifter capitalistic accwumulation, the more miserable are the
dwellings of the working-people. 'Improvements' of towns, accom-
panying the increase of wealth, by the demolition of badly built
quarters, the erection of palaces for banks, warehouses, &c., the
widening of streets for business traffic, for the carriages of
luxury, and for the introduction of tramways, &c., drive away the
poor into even worse and more crowded hiding places. On the other
hand, every one knows that the dearness of dwellings is in inverse
ratio to their excellence, and that the mines of misery are exploited
by house speculators with more profit or less cost than ever were
the mines of Potosi." (emphasis added)
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Thousands of acres of central land were taken over for productive and
service uses. This 'take-over' process was both economic, the result of
market forces and the distribution of income, and political in nature.
Commercial and productive enterprises were usually able to obtain the nec-
essary land by outbidding owners of working-class housing, whose rents
could not compete with the capitalists' profits. Businessmen bought sites,
evicted the tenants, and converted the buildings to meet their needs, or
demolished them and built new and more appropriate ones. Politics, in the
form of the early sanitary and housing legislation, sometines entered this
cycle in cases where landlords were unwilling to sell or where tenants
proved unusually tenacious. A businessman's subtle influence or even out-
right bribery must have worked wonders with local vestrymen in these in-
stances; demolition and eviction orders, sanctioned by the legislation,
clinching the deal where 'free' market relations had failed. We have al-
ready seen that political power played a central role in the aquisition of
land for docks, railways and street improvements. Without parliamentary
and metropolitan government intervention, most of these schemes may never
have materialized, though money and the pressures of the land market were
important motivators of landowners in these instances as well.
Land which supported working-class housing, being economically and
politically the weak point in the land market, most frequently fell victim
to the encroachment of productive and service activities. Because practi-
cal spatial locations for working-class housing were quite strictly limited
to the central area, these 'takeovers' were tantamount to a drastic reduc-
tion in the absolute amount of space available for working-class residence.
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The central land market was carved up in the process, often leaving dislo-
cated and uninviting parcels for working-class housing because no one else
[119]
wanted this reject space. As John Kellett has argued, these land takeovers:
"...cramped and confined the inner districts...and, as it were,
suggested areas where, because residential values had been
frozen, the overflow might accumulate. Unlike other areas, for
which the process of gradual improvement and residential replace-
ment was always a possibility, however remote, the inner dis-
tricts intersected by the railways were fixed in dereliction."
Thus, approximately 100,000 skilled and unskilled workers were not
only displaced from their homes, in the interests of capital accumulation,
but were forced to crowd into less and less space. Some were able to take
advantage of workmen's fares on trains to escape to the suburbs. Others
accepted what little alternative accommodation was provided by philanthropic
organizations. But these forms of relief were either impractical for or
unavailable to the bulk of the working class, especially those with lower
wages and less security of employment, before the mid-1880's. Consequently,
overcrowding and the potential for exploitation increased enormously in the
remaining inner-city working-class residential districts. The resultant
spatial inequalities, which had their basis in the unequal social relations
of capitalism, were noted by William Ashworth in his book on the origins
[120]
of modern British town planning:
"Although towns occupied more space in proportion to their
population there was no relief of congestion at their heart,
whether that was indicated by the proportion of land under
buildings or by the density of population. It was observed
in London in the seventies that despite the extension of the
built-up area some of the older districts were becoming more
closely packed than ever as a result of railway and warehouse
construction."
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The flight of the capitalist class and the middle stratum from the
centre and the growing homogenization of social classes within relatively
discrete residential areas, was obviously accompanied by the corresponding
flight of the financial resources necessary to establish and sustain ade-
quate levels of urban social and physical infrastructure in working-class
districts. Often money extracted from slum dwellers went to pay for sub-
urban development. Schools, water, sewage disposal, gas and other services
which were provided through private, frequently monopolistic, markets were
offered in greater quantity and quality in the suburbs and the West End
where consumer spending power was relatively high. Investments in other
services, such as street-paving and drainage, which were funded out of the
rates, likewise favoured the neighbourhoods of financially better-off resi-
dents. Even though the rates were much lower in these areas than those
where the working class resided, the absolute amount available for invest-
ment per family was greater in wealthier areas. In effect, the poor footed
[121]
a large proportion of the poor relief bill themselves. Working-class
districts, which needed the greatest infrastructure investments, received
the least. Class separation also eased the consciences of those who
could not do most to alleviate slum conditions by eliminating slum environ-
[122]
ments from their daily experiences. Thus, the spatial environment of
the city gradually came to replicate the social and economic disequilibria
of the production relations. In the same way that capitalist prosperity
and middle-stratum financial security rested on working-class impoverish-
ment in the workplace, so the spatious and elitist West End, and the sani-
tary middle-stratum suburbs were buttressed by the overcrowded and degrading
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(123]
working-class slums of central London.
The 'Sweated' Leasehold System
However, the consequences of the workers' positions in the production
relations and of the changing urban structure are not sufficient as causal
explanations for the proliferation of working-class slums or of the spatial
structure of these districts. These factors are like the equipment neces-
sary for a game of Monopoly--the structural features of the game. But with-
out rules the game cannot be played; and different rules will produce dif-
ferent outcomes because the relationships between the various players and
between players and equipment will not be the same. The equivalent rules
of the 'housing game' are the forms of tenure which mediate the relation-
ship between those who own bricks and mortar and want rent and those who
have money and need houses. Significantly different tenure relations will
lead to significantly different physical environments within the same struc-
tural framework. By attributing primacy in the determination of urban
socio-spatial structure to tenure relations, I do not mean to imply that
these are independent of the structural framework. Clearly, these two as-
pects of the housing and land markets are intimately intertwined, the one
growing logically out of the other and in turn sustaining it. Carrying the
metaphor one stage further, while it is possible to significantly change
the rules of Monopoly and arrive at different end results, it would be im-
possible to play a game using the Monopoly equipment according to the rules
of Contract Bridge. Similarly, while different forms of tenure were pre-
valent in the working-class housing market of 19th century London, a system
of tenure which, for example, guaranteed palatial West End residences for
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workers, would have been completely out of phase with the structural frame-
work of the market, and would therefore have been untenable.[124]
The most prevalent form of tenure relations in working-class
districts was in fact a mutation of the leasehold system which, as has been
shown, was so appropriate and effective in the development and maintenance
of the attractive West End residences of the wealthy. The 'sweated' lease-
hold system is an apt label for this set of socio-economic relations between
estate owners or small freeholders and the occupants of the houses. The
term 'sweated' is borrowed directly from its more familiar usage in connec-
tion with that segment of the London labour market charatterized by a high
degree of sub-contracting--the 'sweated' labour system described in Chapter
1. The similarities between the socio-economic relations and outcomes of
both systems are striking.
The crucial element of the 'sweated' leasehold system was the prolif-
eration of middlemen--the original leaseholder plus a chain of sub-lessees
--between landowner and house occupants. Large estate owners, who were in-
terested in reliable, long-term, low-yield investments, were unwilling to
enter into direct leases with working-class house occupants whose wages were
low and irregular. Most owners of large amounts of capital preferred to
invest their funds in other sectors of the local and foreign capital markets
either because these were considered to be more lucrative and less risky
capital outlets than the working-class residential sector, at least until[125]
1875, or to avoid the administrative complexities and unfavourable
public image which being a large slumlord involved. This left the small
investors for whom house property in inner London was the most popular,
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accessible and lucrative means of capital gain. The proliferation of mid-
dlemen was a response to the relatively meagre resources which these inves-
tors possessed as it allowed the capital costs to be spread among as many
people as possible. Each middleman was both a tenant and a landlord. As
tenant he leased part of the prior middleman's lease and as landlord he
expected a return on his equity investment from the tenant below him. As
one descended the leasehold ladder so the length of the tenancies dimin-
ished, usually from the 99 year ground leaseto the weekly-tenancy
arrangement with the house occupants, the rent increased, as it had to[1261
provide a return to all the prior investments.
In effect, the 'sweated' leasehold system was a means of sub-contracting[127]
management of residential property and exploitation of tenants. As
the duration of a middleman's control of the property decreased, so the
level of exploitation increased. This exploitation was justified on the
basis that as the duration of the leases decreased, so the risks of
defaults, or of demand fluctuations, and the administrative burdens in-
creased; and this was probably true. But it is important to realize that
exploitation was built into the 'sweated' leasehold system, it was not an
aberration of the system--even if each party was 'honourable' and demanded
a 'fair' return (that is, played by the rules) the house occupants ended
up paying higher rents than would have been the case in the absense of
middlemen, as was the case in the wealthy West End and in many suburbs.
The advantages of this tenure system were that it facilitated the construc-
tion or conversion of housing for the working class without necessitating
[128]
the raising of unmanageably-large amounts of circulating capital;
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it provided incentives for rapid economic advancement (seldom achieved in
actuality) to thousands of middle-stratum small investors thereby ensuring
their cooperation in a social system which exploited them as well; and it
insulated estate owners and ground leaseholders from the demand fluctuations
and administrative headaches of the working-class housing market, whilst
allowing their property to be developed and produce a return.
However, the 'sweated' leasehold system was problematic in a number
of important respects--economic, environmental and social, and physiologi-
cal. Each was disastrous for the bulk of the working class, while the first
was very advantageous for the mainly middle-stratum slum landlords, the
second was worrisome for the estate owners, and the third gave capitalist
employers and merchants some anxiety. A brief outline of the nature and
outcomes of these three broad dysfunctionalities is instructive for analyti-
cal purposes, but it must be borne in mind that they were intimately
connected in reality.
The rents which working-class tenants paid in the degrading inner
city environments were exhorbitant in relation to their wages, in relation
to rents in other sectors of the housing market, and when measured against
the quality and quantity of the commodity 'housing' which they received in
return. As Lickcheese, a rent collector, confides to Trench, in[129]
George Bernard Shaw's Widowers Houses:
"Tenement houses, let from week to week by the room or half room
--aye, or quarter room. It pays when you know how to work it,
sir. Nothing like it. It's been calculated on the cubic foot
of space, sir, that you can get higher rents letting by the room
than you can for a mansion in Park Lane."
The 1884-5 Royal Commission found that over 85% of the working class paid
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more than one-fifth of their income in rent, and nearly 50% paid between[130]
one quarter and one half. And this rent generally only paid for a
single room, which was all that even many skilled workers could afford;
two rooms were often beyond the means of regularly employed workers. Al-
though most slunlandlords were 'little men' scraping a living from their
few houses and hardly able to afford necessary repairs, it was often
possible to make large profits from slum property. These overcrowded
'dwellings' were in effect machines for manufacturing rent for their
leaseholders, indeed many streets were called ... RENTS, e.g., Colliers[131]
Rents. As William Howitt wrote in 1846:
"There are courts and alleys innumerable called by the significant
name of RENTS....they are not human habitations....They are merely
so many man-traps to catch the paying animal in; they are
machines for manufacturing rent."
Much of the blame for these high rents was then, as it is today,
mistakenly heaped on the shoulders of speculative landlords, of either
the living-on-the-premises or the absentee variety. Some landlords were
probably corrupt but the majority 'played by the rules' of the 'sweated'
leasehold system, with its built-in exploitation and nothing about profit
limits or 'fair rents,' a highly ambiguous concept in any case. Nor were
high slum rents caused by the fact that they were adjacent to expensive
commercial land. Commercial land values could only be realized if and when
the land was developed and used for commercial purposes. The potential for
realizing commercial values which central working-class residential land
enjoyed could hardly cause high rents; rather it provided powerful justi-
fication for the rents which landlords charged.
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The real basis of high rents in the slums was the utter powerlessness
of most members of the working class in 19th century British capitalist
society. Rents were set in the weekly struggles between tenants and rent
collectors, whose job was to extract as much of the workers' wages as
possible on behalf of the landlords. The workers' social, economic and
political powerlessness, and the fact that their locational choices were
restricted to the totally inadequate central area, meant that they usually
came off worst in these interactions, almost irrespective of the quality or
quantity of housing which they rented. This fact largely explains why rent
increases bore such a close relationship to increases in money wages and
proved to be the great exception to the general trend of falling prices,
especially in the late 19th century. As workers' ability to pay increased,
so the rent collectors sapped more money from them, thereby virtually ne-
gating improvements in real wages or general living conditions. Rents went
up while the quality of the accommodation remained much the same, or even[132]
declined. It was stated in Parliament in 1884:
"Since 1844, wages had risen, the taxes in necessaries had been
lowered, and the ability of working men to obtain better accom-
modation had increased. But while that ability had increased, the
the rents of houses had also risen. Since 1844, house rent had
increased by 150 per cent, and consequently, while the condition
of the working classes had improved in all other respects, the
state of their dwellings had not undergone a corresponding
improvement."
In some instances virgin land was developed so badly that it became
[133]
a slum from the start. The lack of public controls to govern the
width of streets, height of buildings or lighting and ventilation of rooms,
facilitated this process. But new building was primarily oriented towards
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the needs of the growing numbers of suburbanites. And most estate
owners, being concerned with the long term value of their property, encour-
aged building for members of the classes which moved to the suburbs rather
than the working class. In consequence, most of the working class received
hand-me-down-housing as houses which had been vacated by wealthier occu-
pants were converted downwards to more intensively occupied, lower quality
[135]
accommodation. "No slum was worse than property transferred in this way."
Often this process got completely out of control, producing very dense
structures occupying as much space as possible with little regard for light,
ventilation or sanitation.
The 'sweated' leasehold system was most appropriate as a vehicle
through which this process of environmental and social degradation was
realized. Each lease or sub-leaseholder had every incentive to exploit
the property to the fullest over the period during which he was in control.
This was especially important at the bottom rung of the leasehold ladder
where the leaseholder's activities were only minimally restricted as he
was only accountable to the house occupants who had but a week's 'security'
of tenure. Overcrowding was thus an inevitable result of this tenure
system in working-class districts. If tenants fell slightly behind in
their rent payments, landlords would seize this opportunity to intensify
occupancy by forcing them to occupy one room instead of two in return for[136]
a stay of eviction or a waiver of rent arrears. This pressure to in-
crease returns by overcrowding houses was ruthlessly intensified during the
last decade or so of the ground lease--called the 'fag end' of the lease.
These fag ends were exploited by 'house jobbers' or 'farmers' whose only
object was to make as much money as possible before the lease expired. In
the words of Henry Trelawny Boodle, the agent for the Westminster and North-
[137]
hamption estates, in 1887:
"I have heard it stated over and over again, and I belive it to be
true, that if a man hardens his heart and treats his fellow crea-
tures like brute beasts, and crowds them in like pigs, this system
of farming houses is the most remunerative thing possible...all
(the middlemen) care about in the matter of 'interest' is merely
to screw as much as they possibly can out of their tenants."
However, it is important to stress that house farmers, absentee landlords,
etc., cannot be blamed for excessive rents and dilapidated housing as was,
and still is today, popular among housing reformers. Rather, the 'sweated'
leasehold system of tenure, which all but forced the middlemen to behave
in this way, must be seen as the culprit. In the words of an artisan of
[138]
the day:
"Regarding excessive rents, it is no doubt very easy to indulge in
violent diatribes against landlord greed and selfishness; but after
all, property owners are not wholly to blame in this matter. The
system of short leases and high ground rents,...is far more re-
sponsible for the existing state of things."
House occupants were neither financially capable of nor legally
responsible for maintaining their houses in decent condition. And they had
little incentive to pester their landlords' agents to undertake repairs as
these demands usually went unheeded, or sometimes resulted in rent increases
in anticipation of future repairs which were only carried out much later.
Furthermore, the covenants contained in the ground lease became unenforce-
able due to the multiplicity of middlemen, which facilitated the evasion of[139]
responsibility for maintenance. Absentee landlords were insulated from
any contact with their slum properties. If tenants agreed to pay the rents
for substandard accommodation, landlords had little incentive to improve the
standard. Small landlords who lived on the premises usually did not have
the capital to keep their property in decent repair, often because they
themselves were being exploited by more powerful prior leaseholders. Estate
owners did not benefit from slum formation on their land as it reduced its
reversionary value--the buildings became a liability upon expiration of the
ground lease, not an asset as was originally intended. But they were powerless
to enforce the covenants as that might frighten leaseholders off and as the
courts generally supported the middlemen's right to do essentially as they
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pleased. The seeming attraction of improved and more valuable property
reverting to the estate owner at the end of the lease, with only minimal
effort and investment on his part, was increasingly negated in working-class
slums. In sum, then, the 'sweated' leasehold system led to extreme over-
crowding, the lack of sanitary precautions, an almost total absence of main-
tenance and exhorbitant rents; and these outcomes were intensified as the
ground lease drew to a close.
Up to this point, I have made little reference to one of the most
popular explanations for the growth of slums (and suburbs for that matter)
[141]
in 19th century London--the urban population explosion. I have pur-
posely done so, not because I regard this factor as insignificant, but
rather to counteract the weight usually given it, as I believe that it is of
decidedly secondary importance in the determination of urban form, and
definitely has no causal power. I have argued instead, and I hope convin-
cingly, that the slums and the suburbs (and urban form in general) were
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(and are) a product of the aspirations and relative power of various classes,
arising out of the production relations of London's economy, and of the
drive to accumulate capital, as these were realized through the systems of
tenure which governed relations between the owners of controllers and the
users of (residential) property. I have stressed tenure relations as in[142]
my view these hold the key to the process of urban development.
A comparison between 19th century London and Paris illustrates my
point. Both cities had similar economic and class structures, similar modes
of transportation and similar rates of population growth, though London's
population was numerically larger than that of Paris. The major difference
lay in the tenure relations; in London the essentially uncontrolled lease-
hold system dominated whereas in Paris the law restricted development, both
vertically and over horizontal space, until 1861, in order to preserve the
18th century boundary of the commune. As a result, 19th century Paris was
much denser than London, with four to five storey blocks of flats (apart-
ments) predominating, as opposed to London's dense centre and sparce suburbs[143]
and its much greater superficial spread in relation to its population.
Population growth merely exacerbated or intensified outcomes which were de-
termined by the tenure relations and the relationships between classes.
In fact, urban population growth was itself largely the result of changing
social and economic circumstances. Thus, the stress on population pressure
as a primary cause of urban structure and problems hides the fundamental
causal forces and merely serves as false justification for the shape and[144]
dysfunctionalities of capitalist cities,
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The Functions and Dysfunctions of the Slwns
Returning to the slums of 19th century London, it is clear that most
workers paid disproportionately high rents, in relation to their wages, to
the quality of their accommodation and to the rest of the housing market.
Most working-class districts were overcrowded, poorly maintained and unsani-
tary, in varying degrees depending on the inhabitants' position in the
general structure of the labour market. H. J. Dyos has convincingly related
overcrowded living conditions directly to low money wages and insecurity of
(1451
employment.
Indeed, I would argue that the economic, social and political milieu
of the slums was both an outcome and an important active ingredient in the
broader process of working-class impoverishment which was in turn an impor-
tant aspect of the development of 19th century British capitalism. As
workers descended the job ladder, so the oversupply of labour increased,
generating fierce competition for the scarce jobs which led to increasing
insecurity of employment and diminishing wages. On the other hand, the
abundance of these workers competing for scarce accommodation facilitated
and legitimized increased rents and/or overcrowding. The quality of housing
tended to deteriorate in relation to diminishing wages and employment security.
While the exploitation of workers in their residential environments was
qualitatively different from that which occurred in the workplace, it served
to complete the cycle of working-class impoverishment. The majority of
workers were trapped within this cycle. The meagreness and irregularity
of their wages precluded any sort of saving. They were forced to live from
hand to mouth, day by day--their bellies full when they had worked and
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had money to spend; starvation, sickness and debts when jobs and money
was scarce. Landlords charged higher rents to provide for the high possi-
bility of bad debts. When the work situation improved, potential savings
were devoured in repaying debts with interest. Each debt which they were
forced to incur added another stone to the wall which made escape from the
slums, and the social status and lifestyle which they epitomized, increas-
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ingly remote.
Thus, working-class slums were functional, from the point of view of
the dominant class, in two senses. In the direct economic sense of
absorbing less capital than more adequate environments might have required,
and thereby enabling more capital to be "ploughed heavily back into the
commercial machine instead of being distributed in higher wages," and
allowing the more prosperous classes to use "the wealth that was created in
this process...quite literally to put a distance between themselves and the
[1471
workers." And the slums served the purpose of a 'stick' in the economic
incentive system which workers, especially rural immigrants, had to be
socialized to accept for the economy to operate smoothly. Workers had to
be 'taught' to give their all to their bosses and to look after themselves
with the wages they received in return. Evidently, the constant threat to
their continued subsistence was necessary to motivate workers during this
early period of capitalism, and it was also a powerful means of maintaining
discipline in the workplace.
On the ideological level, the proliferation of slums, which were much
more potent symbols of exploitation than degrading working conditions,served to
shift the focus of blame for working-class impoverishment from its primary
and causative locus in the workplaces to its secondary manifestations--the
slums. Consequently, slum landlords had to bear the brunt of much 19th
century social criticism, which should more accurately have been heaped on
the shoulders of the capitalist employers and merchants. It was hardly an
accident that working-class slums were the targets of extensive public
investigations forty years before the 'sweated' labour system came under the[118]
Parliamentary microscope.
However, slums were seen to be dysfunctional by the employing class,
in terms of posing a threat to the maintenance and control of London's
cheap, overstocked, yet industrious semi-skilled and unskilled labour
force upon which their prosperity depended. Their problem was succinctly
stated by Jack London in his excellent sociological study of the East End[1491
slums at the turn of the century:
"Class supremacy can rest on class degradation, and when the workers
are segregated in the ghetto they cannot escape the consequent
degradation. A short and stunted people is created--a breed strik-
ingly differentiated from their master's breed."
High disease and mortality rates in the slums tended to reduce the absolute
number of workers in the labour market by absenteeism or death, as well as
to reduce the efficiency of those who managed to continue working. This
imposed costs on employers in terms of lost productivity in their labour in-
tensive plants, and to a lesser extent on the community as a whole in terms
of increased poor relief bills. The slums were unfortunately not 'automati-
cally productive' of healthy, stable employees. The concern was quite wide-
spread that slums fostered unrest and defiance of the laws, which threatened[150]
the existence of the social structure. William Ashworth has noted that:
"The propertied classes were not likely to ignore a factor threatening
social stability when they had seen and remembered rioting at home...
and had noted with apprehension revolutionary outbreaks in half the
capitals of Europe. The possibility of an uprising remained as a
shadow on the British [capitalist] class mind and a persuasion
towards some measure of reform until in 1848 Chartism petered out in
the face of advancing prosperity."
And with the onset of a long depression in the early 1870's, social unrest
began to rise once again, bringing employers' apprehension in its wake.
Something had to be done, not to improve the lot of the working class
per se, but to ensure that the numbers of the labour force were not drasti-
cally depleted and to step up social control. In my view, the early sanitary
and housing legislation already referred to was mainly oriented towards ful-
filling this dual goal. The expressed intent of much of this legisislation
to 'improve the condition of the labouring classes,' was a fiction. Rather
it invariably exacerbated overcrowding in neighbouring dwellings. In 1867,[151]
Marx wrote that it was:
"...self-understood that every sanitary measure, which, as has been
the case hitheto in London, hunts the labourers from one quarter,
by demolishing uninhabitable houses, serves only to crowd them to-
gether yet more closely in another."
However, it did enable Medical Officers of Health to mitigate the
worst consequences of unsanitary slums. For instance, cholera, a disease
which put tens of thousands of workers out of action, was gradually brought
under control, though the slum remained. The legislation also enabled the
Metropolitan Board of Works and the local vestries to step up their direct
control of the working class, an important facility in view of the fact that
maintaining control over much of the working class in their workplaces was
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very difficult due to their highly irregular employment. What is more,
Richard L. Schoenwald has offered a provocative socio-psychological hypothesis
about the connection between the sanitary movement and working-class disci-
pline and control. He argues that the sanitary movement was in effect a
gigantic societal toilet training exercise. Interpreted in Freudian terms
he sees the state symbolizing the parental disciplinarian administering
'training' aimed at teaching society to use the water closet (potty), thereby
gaining their submission to and energy in the cause of production for a
distribution system which they could neither control nor see, symbolized by
the sewer system. He makes a convincing case that the sanitary movement
played a powerful role in socializing the working class (many of whom were
still 'cursed' with pre-capitalist behaviour) to accept the behavioural norms
and controls which were so central to the efficient functioning of a capital-[1531
ist economy.
In sum, then, the working-class slums of 19th century London vere
essentially the product of the 'sweated' leasehold system, which defined
the social and economic relations of the working-class housing process, oper-
ating within the structural framework of the working-class housing market,
the main features of which were determined by the production relations and
by the changing mode of urban organization based on the drive to accumulate
capital and the aspirations of more powerful classes. The formation and
perpetuation of these degrading and unhealthy environments was absolutely
beyond the control of their inhabitants. In fact, the extreme powerlessness
of the bulk of the working class in 19th century British capitalist society
was arguably the most important contributory factor to the existence of
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working-class slums. In the words of H. J. Dyos:
"... the making of the slums of Victorian London, like the grooming of
jallopies for the American Deep South, was a process that began far
beyond the reach of the slummers who packed into them. It is impor-
tant to recognise that these unfortunates were more than anything
else merely the residuary legatees of a kind of house-processing
operation which was started by another social class....the condition of the
houses of the poor, far from being a quaint expression of their own
debased tastes--a view widely held among the ruling classes of Vic-
torian England--was a reflex of the allocation of political power and
economic resources in society at large."
They were both an outcome of the process of working-class impoverish-
ment which was rooted in the workplace and played a significant active role
in the process as well. The slums were the physical and social infrastructure
and the concretization of London's labour market. Most of the working class
could not have survived elsewhere in the city, away from the intricate web
of social and economic relations which sustained them in the slums. Yet,
day by day the struggle of living in slums made life itself less and less
worthwhile. Furthermore, the slums formed an essential part of the founda-
tion of ruling-class prosperity and middle-class decency. But the continued
reproduction of this outcome depended on slum conditions being kept under
control, to a limited degree, to prevent any drastic depletion of the over-
stocked labour force and to maintain social stability. This control function
gradually came to be exercised by the state and the early public health and
housing legislation formed an important part of the state's amunition in this
endeavour. The overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of the slums, which
this legislation was ostensibly aimed at mitigating, instead played an impor-
tant role in justifying and legitimizing this increased state intervention in
an era when the Zaissez fdire ideology was still extremely powerful and
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challenges to the laws of private property were stongly resisted.
A Brief Conclusion
In this rather lengthy chapter we have seen how the broad, and some
detailed, features of London's social and spatial geography were fundamentally
the product of the realization of five pressures--the flight of both the
capitalist class and the middle stratum from the centre; the improvement of
London's efficiency as a locus of capital accummulation; the social-class
homogenization of residential districts; and the impoverishment of the bulk
of the working class--mediated by various forms of tenure relations, mainly
variants of the leasehold system. These forces originated in the workplace
--they were logical outcomes of London's class structure and the struggles
between and within classes during this half century, as outlined in Chapter 1.
As such, each complex pressure was but an aspect of the on-going macro-struggle
between the capitalist class, bent on increasing the rate of capital accumu-
lation subject to the maintenance of social stability and the status quo,
on the one hand, and the middle stratum and the working class, on the other
hand, striving to improve or maintain the standard of their living and
working conditions. The totality of these interactions, and the objective
and subjective ways in which individuals or corporate bodies plugged into
them, broadly determined their motivations and aspirations, their differ-
ential abilities to satisfy these goals in the land and housing markets, and
either directly or indirectly determined the structure of these markets.
With these parameters set, though constantly evolving, the 'rules of the
game' defined as it were the autonomous economic and political actions of
these individuals and corporate bodies in the land and housing markets,
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mediated by the various forms of tenure relations, gave London its social and
spatial structure.
Thus, at the most fundamental level, London 's development was deter-
[1551
mined by the acting out of the class struggle in relation to two contra-
dictory tendencies--the drive to accumulate capital, on the one hand, and
people's quest for socially and biologically adequate shelter, on the other.
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And see Dyos [195Tb] passim.
84. Sheppard [1971] pp.113-116.
85. Sheppard [1971] p.l14..
86. Dyos [1967] p.36 .
87. Quoted in Dyos [195Tb] p.264.
88. Edwards [1898] p.20.
89. Jones [1971] p.169. And see pp.166-169 of which the above paragraph
is a summary.
90. Jones [1971] p.159. And see Dyos [1967] p.38; Kellett [1969] pp.330-
331,33-39,342.
91. Quoted in Olsen [1964] p.21. "All this meant growing apart from the
common herd, with its gross manners and dull wits; it made it natural
for a gentleman to want to expand his park and his privacy by removing
cottages from within sight of his windows, as the laird of Cramond near
Edinburgh and many others did; and for the genteel to want a separate
city quarter of their own, out of sight of Lazarus and his sores."
Kiernan [1972] p.85.
92. "The wealthiest parishes of London had the lowest munipical rates,
and their residents fought hard to keep things that way." Dyos and
Reeder [1973] p.381. A glance at the annual volumes of London Stat-
istics, published by the London County Council, from 1890 onwards,
is testimony to their success.
93. "In 1850, one writer in the Quarterly Review expressed a typical view
when he said that 'Nothing perhaps has so much contributed to drive
away the opulent from the dwellings of the poor as the dread of their
unwholesomeness and dirt.'" Dyos [1954] pp.76-77.
94. Lees [1973] pp.418-419. "By this time [1840's], the working people
were virtually segregated in their stinking enclaves, and the middle-
classes demonstrated their real opinions of the industrial towns by
getting as far out of them as equestrian transport made convenient."
Thompson [19631 p.321.
95. Dyos [1961] p.97; Olsen [1964] p.145.
96. Dyos [1961] p.112; Kellett [1969] pp.16-17; Prince [1964a] p.107;
Lees [1969] p.362.
97. Quoted in Prince [1964a] p.101. And see Dyos [1957b] p.261.
98. . Prince [1964b] pp.121-125; Sheppard [1971] pp.9-10..
99. "In 1851, there were nearly a quarter of a million domestic servants
working in London." Sheppard [1971] p.368 , and see PP-368-373.
Rasmussen [19431 pp.294-296. The social and architectural aspects of
the separation and interraction between master and servants during the
Edwardian age is superbly portrayed in London Weekend Television's
recent serial called "Upstairs, Downstairs."
100. Engels [1872] p.56 . And see Ashworth [1954] p.51; Engels [1892]
pp.33-34; Dyos [1967] p.29.
101. Quoted in Engels [1892] pp.38-39.
102,. "Probably the very excellence of the town planning on the great estates
was indirectly responsible for aggravating the overcrowding of the
poor. By insisting on high standards of construction and maintenance,
by encouraging the building of first and second-rate houses rather than
smaller dwellings, by prohibiting subletting and the conversion of town
houses into tenements, as well as by demolishing slums and redeveloping
their sites,for commercial purposes, the well-managed estates forced
the lower classes to live elsewhere, on poorly managed estates or on
freehold land where conditions might be even worse." Olsen [1964] p.209.
And see pp.21-22; Olsen [1973] pp.339-340. Indeed, the fragmentary pat-
tern of landownership in the East End was probably an important reason
why this area became the predominant working-class residential quarter
in London.
103. "Nash was not the first to recognize these [spatial class] divisions,
but he was the first to make them an object of planning, to design
methods of effectively separating one class of residents from another."
Prince [1964a] p.100.
104. "In both Bloomsbury and Covent Garden, the Bedford estate came to much
the same conclusion as had the Foundling Hospital: that slum property
could be dealt with effectively only by demolition or complete rebuild-
ing. The enforcement of leasehold covenants helped the situation some-
what, but could not in itself solve the problem of substandard housing.
Improvement schemes, while not solving the problem for the poor as a
whole, did at least raise the standard of decency within the boundaries
of the estate." Olsen [1964] p.143. For details of this process on each
estate, see pp.130-139,1 8 5-195. The intervention of the Metropolitan
Board of Works, as a government agency which handled the troublesome
process of land aquisition and preparation on behalf of, and which di-
rectly subsidized, the future private developersis surprisingly simi-
lar to the role of United States urban local government agencies in
administering the Urban Renewal Program so widely used during the
1950's and 60's as a strategy to 'improve' downtown slums. And the
-162-
outcomes were much the same too: the slums were torn down, sparkling
new buildings for much wealthier families or for business arose in
their place, and the slum-dwellers were forced to move on to the re-
maining slums, while property developers made exhorbitant profits.
See Anderson [1965] for his analysis and not his anachronistic pre-
scriptions which belong in the 19th century world of Zaissez-faire.
For a more perceptive class analysis, see Beagle, Haber and Wellman
[19711.
105. Other important reasons for the early Public Health and Housing Acts
are discussed under pressure number five below. The traditional
argument for the origins of the Public Health Acts has been succinctly
stated by R.A. Lewis, the prominent historian of the public health move-
ment: "The comma bacillus [cholera] was a social climber; excreted by
some lowly sufferer in Fore Street, Lambeth or Hairbrain Court, it might
penetrate the half-hearted filter defenses of the water companies to
poison his betters in the broad squares of the West End." Quoted in
Cherry [1972] p.37. And see Tarn [1971] p.1. Thus the threat that
cholera would infect the wealthy led to the enactment of public health
legislation. I have omitted this argument because I feel that it was
causally peripheral--that the reasons I have given under pressures
four and five were the real basis for this legislation. Cholera
visitations began in, and were prominently confined to, working class
districts, especially the East End. Cholera spread in two ways: by
direct contact or via a contaminated water supply. The former presented
few problems for the wealthy as they seldom came into direct contact with
the working class. Contaminated water was more problematic. However,
the problem was localized within the area served by each of the nine
private water companies, and the spatial separation of social classes
meant that most water companies mainly served one class. The greater
economic and political power of the ruling class probably enabled its
members to 'keep the water companies honest' and maintain high levels
of sanitation in their neighbourhoods. Further, in the late 1840's,
Dr. John Snow largely explained how cholera could be spatially diffused
via a contaminated water supply. Thus the wealthy merely had to control
the quality of their own water supply in order to largely exclude cholera
from their neighbourhoods. Without detailed statistics as to the spatial
distribution and diffusion of cholera during each epidemic (an inter-
esting question, beyond the scope of this thesis), it is difficult to
prove the above argument definitively. But it does raise doubts that
the spread of cholera was the primary reason for public health legisla-
tion, especially during the age of Laissez faire, as the new legislation
represented an affront to private property and necessitated a marked
increase in government intervention. For a brief history of nineteenth
century public health development in London, see Sheppard [1971] pp.247-
296.
106. Dyos [19551 pp.17-18.
107. Quoted in Olsen [1973] p.345.
108., Wohl [1973] p.607. "The most notorious house farmers in Clerkenwell
not only sat on the vestry, but often on the sanitary committee as
well." Jones [1971] p.213.
109. "Under the Nuisance Removal, Sanitary, Torrens and Cross Acts, they
found themselves operating under legislation which harmed rather than
helped the poor; for while the legislation enabled them to recommend
and initiate the demolition of houses and the eviction of the inhabi-
tants, or the prosecution of overcrowded tenants, they knew that the
poor could not wait for, or afford, the model dwellings which were
provided under the rehousing clauses of the Cross Act. Thus, the
medical officers found themselves in an anomalous position--and many
of them preferred inactivity to negative solutions of 'pull down and
push out' which could only aggravate overcrowding." Wohl [1973] p.613.
And see pp.610-618.
110. Marx [1867] p.66 0. It should be remembered that many street improve-
ment ventures served similar purposes of working-class removal and land
use change to higher quality residential or to commercial activities.
Victoria Street, Shaftesbury Avenue and Charing Cross Road were good
examples of this phenomenon. Sheppard [1971] p.47; Wohl [1968] p.199.
111. Rasmussen [1934] p.293.
112. Both are quoted in Hobsbawm [1964] p.9. And see p.8 ; Dyos [1967] p.34;
Kellett [1969] p.293.
113. Hall [1962] p.56.
114. Quoted in Jones [1971] p.172.
115. Jones [1971] p.173; Wohl [1971] p.17; Dyos [1955] p.15.
116. Quoted in Wohl [1971] p.17.
117. Quoted in Barker and Robbins [1963] pp.xxvii,xxx.
118. Marx [1867] pp.657-658.
119. Kellett [1969] p.343.
120. Ashworth [1954] p.19. "The combined effect of these four forms of
displacement was profound, and in the short run at least, disastrous.
The un-housing of a large section of the working class in Central
London was not accompanied by any concurrent decentralization of
industry. Nor before the end of the 1870's, was cheap transportation
sufficient to account for any significant easing of the pressure on
the housing of central London." Jones [1971] pp.169-170. And see
Wohl [1971] pp.17-19; Barker and Robbins [1963] p.xxvii.
121. In 1871, "there were enormous variations in the incidence of the poor
rates, ranging from over four shillings in the pound in parts of the
East End down to fourteen pence in the pound in Kensington and Hamp-
stead, and eighteen pence in the City. Yet despite the high rates in
east London the vast extent of destitution there meant that the aver-
age outdoor relief paid there was only eight pence or ninepence per
head per week, much less than half the amount paid in many less poverty
stricken districts. A large part of the total cost of poor relief in
London was in fact being paid for by the poor themselves." Sheppard
[1971] p.382.
122. "The physical separation of social classes...meant that most of the
problems of town growth, which pressed hardest on the poorest sections
of the community, became chronic before serious attempts were made to
solve them." Dyos [1954] p.78.
123. "The slums were part of this argument for the economy of low wages,
and one of their practical functions was therefore to underpin
Victorian prosperity....The movements of capital in the making of the
metropolis determined the social space available to its different users,
and hence the relative wealth or poverty of its different districts....
the poor were quite literally starved of [public] finance." Dyos and
Reeder [1973] pp.361,381. And see pp.360-363.
124. Other forms of working-class house tenure were numerically minute in
relation to the 'sweated' leasehold system. Briefly, these were the
following. For the 'labour aristocracy': Starr-Bowkett Building
Societies--a last-ditch attempt to promote working-class home owner-
ship, see Cleary [1965] pp.101-102,104-108,114-115; and philanthropic
housing associations. For the poorest workers: the Octavia Hill sys-
tem; lodging houses featuring eight hours security of tenure to one-
third of a bed; the workhouse; and literal homelessness for those who
were out of work and excluded from workhouses. Some of these will be
further explored in Chapters 4 and 5.
125. Jones [1971] p.209.
126. Nevitt [1966] pp.21-22.
127. Subcontracting management and exploitation characterized many sectors
of the nineteenth century British economy, even the large factories.
See Hobsbawm [1954] pp.297-306 .
128. Olsen [1964] p.31.
129. Quoted in Dyos and Reeder [19731 pp.380-381.
130. Wohl [1968] p.239.
131. Quoted in Dyos and Reeder [1973] p.380.
132. Quoted in Wohl [1968] p.240. Wohl quotes figures for the period 1880-
1900. Taking wages and rents in the base year 1900 as 100, money wages
in 1880 were 77 while rents were 87. Wohl [1971] p.26 ,n.54 .
133. "Not only Agar Town but part of Somers Town were slums from the day
they were first occupied." Prince [19 64a] p.112. Furthermore, in those
cases in which working-class accommodation was built, extensive sub-
contracting was the norm and low quality environments the result.
134. Olsen [1973] p.338 . On the inadequacy of bye-laws, see Olsen [1964]
p.127; Sheppard [1971] p.95; Ashworth [1954] p.24 .
135. Dyos [1967] p.26 . And see Dyos [1961] pp.105-113; Sheppard [1971]
p.94 ; Ashworth [1954] p.19.
136. Jones [1971] p.210-211.
137. Quoted in Olsen [1964] p.105.
138. Glazier [18831 p.955.
139. "The great number of people having leasehold interests in a single house
often 'causes the greatest doubt as to who is the person...to execute
repairs or to look after the conditions of the premises."' Olsen [1964]
p.105. And see pp.104-106 ,126-127,177-17 8 ; Sheppard [1971] p.95.
140.. The powerlessness of working-class tenants was recognized and exploited
by the courts and justified on the basis of changes in the nature of the
housing market. "Charles Harrison referred to cases in which the court
of chancery refused to enforce a covenant against a particular lessee
because it considered that the neighbourhood had so changed in character
as to make such enforcement unreasonable." Olsen [1964] p.107.
141. The most extensive and influential work based on this view is Weber
(1899]. And see Ashworth [1954] pp.7-14 who states in his opening
sentence: "The most fundamental influence on the condition of towns
and town life in the last century and a half has been the enormous
and rapid increase in their population." And Dyos [1961] pp.53-56 ;
Wohl [1971] pp.16-17.
142. This argument is developed in more detail in Chapter 6.
143. Lees [1973] pp. 4 17, 4 20- 4 21. On the other end of the scale, Los Angeles,
where freehold tenure dominates, is vastly larger in area than twen-
tieth-century London as the tenure system has led to very low density
housing and encouraged the development of automobile transportation
which sustains it. For a graphic representation, in support of my
argument, showing the area of Paris, London and Los Angeles in 1869
and 1969, see New York City Planning Commission [1969] P.37. In 1969,
the density (people per square mile) of 'selected high density
-165-
districts' in Paris and London was 69,368 and 34,315 respectively, while
it was 6,051 for the entire city of Los Angeles. Unfortunately, I have
not come across commensurable figures, but even if the Paris and London
densities are halved to reflect an average density of the whole area,
the disparities are striking. (Such a calculation is roughly accurate
according to Greater London Council [1969].)
144. Thompson [1963] pp.321-322. The tenuous connection between population
pressures and slum conditions is illustrated by the fact that while
the seriousness of working-class housing problems in the central area
increased from the 1860's to the 1880's, as will be argued in Chapter 4,
the central-area population was in fact diminishing, as evidenced by
the following table taken from Weber [1899] p.463.
Population of Central Area
Year Aggregate % of London Per acre
1801 588,264 61.3 60.9
1851 1,129,599 48.0 116.9
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his energy, he could be pressed into modernity.... The water-closet
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entire article.
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CHAPTER h
THE HOUSING CRISIS OF THE 1880's
In the previous chapter, the overall outcomes of London's develop-
mental process were seen to be basically functional from the point of view
of the capitalist class. It was even argued that the extreme hardship which
the working class had to endure as a result of these developments was a nec-
essary, if unfortunate, aspect of this stage of capitalist economic develop-
ment. Overcrowded and unsanitary working-class slums might have comprised
a housing problem in the minds and consciences of the middle-stratum reformers,
but it cannot be argued that these slum conditions per se were problematic
from the point of view of the capitalist class and the socio-economic system
which served their class interest. It was quite the opposite: the slums,
if kept under control, were part of the foundation of their prosperity.
But societies and cities do not develop in such a smooth progression.
Contradictions and conflicts, which are the nuts and bolts of the evolu-
tionary process, eventually reach a point of climax whence continued devel-
opment along traditional lines becomes highly problematic, if not impossible.
London's growth in the 19th century was no exception. A crisis point was
reached in the 1880's when it became obvious that the existing laws and rules
which governed the process of urban development and the attitudes towards
that process had to be changed in order to maintain the social stability
upon which continued economic development was based.
At the heart of this crisis of London's development was the fact that
the evolutionary process of the preceeding fifty years increasingly frus-
trated the realization in the residential sphere, of a sixth pressure, which
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was a central feature of the relationship between classes generally satisfied
in the workplace. I am referring to the struggle, outlined in Chapter 1,
by members of the 'labour aristocracy' to separate themselves from the
remainder of the working class and to establish a legitimate place for them-
selves in capitalist society.
In this chapter I will attempt to show that this contradiction consti-
tuted the basis of the housing crisis in the 1880's and was qualitatively
different from the everpresent housing problerns of overcrowding, supply and
demand mismatches, lack of maintenance and poor sanitation, which character-
ized the working-class slums of the period. These problems were variously
blamed on the 'demoralized' slum dwellers, greedy absentee landlords, 'market
forces,' and/or inefficient local government administrations. Few people
saw them as structural outcomes of the capitalist economic system. Conse-
quently, while they may have represented 'thorns in the side' of the system,
they did not constitute a crisis. At least not until the 1880's, when the
system's failure to satisfy the residential aspirations of the relatively
well-organized skilled workers brought the perpetual housing problems of
the working class into political focus as outcomes of the struggle between
the capitalist and working classes and as such began to pose a threat to
continued social stability.
In the previous chapter we saw that a large proportion of skilled
workers, who comprised the 'labour aristocracy,' were forced, by the neces-
sities of their occupations and the lack of cheap, convenient suburban
transportation, to live close to their workplaces in central London. Con-
sequently, members of this 'privileged' stratum of the working class
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were forced to compete for housing in the same spatially confined central-
area housing market as the rest of the working class. The pressure for
accommodation constantly rose as the area available for residential use
diminished under the onslaught of commercial, railway and street improvement
schemes. The constantly rising rents imposed considerable hardship on the
artisans and skilled workers. Though they maintained a wage differential
from unskilled workers, most had to pay much higher rents for the larger
2 or 3-room flats (apartments) which were important symbols of their higher
status. However, in times of depression the majority were forced to move to
smaller flats or to sublet space to lower-status workers. This was especi-
ally so during the 1880's, the mid-point of the 'great depression' of the
late 19th century. In consequence, an increasingly large proportion of the
'labour aristocracy' was forced to forego the prospect of living in a flat
of their own and/or of renting two or more rooms. As George Godwin wrote in
[1]
1859:
"not from poverty, but from sheer want of any dwelling within reach
of their work; respectable artisans...have been forced into the
same dwellings with some of the worst class."
Contrary to the conscience-salving beliefs of the middle-stratum public,
the slums were not only inhabited by disreputable or dangerous elements of
the working class, and the 'respectable' workers had not been able to escape
to the suburbs. All strata of the working class were forced to live in the
central-area slums. These facts were brought home by the Royal Commission on[2]
the Housing of the Working Classes in 1884-5. In the words of Anthony Wohl,
the Commission
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"brought to light for the first time for the general public the extent
of one-roomed living.... [It publicised the fact that] the miserable and
dangerous sanitary condition of working-class tenements was not confined
to the homes of the casually employed or poorer type of labourer, but
applied also to the dwellings of thousands of skilled artisans, who,
despite regular employment, sober habits and adherence to the precepts
of Smilesian self-help, were forced by the housing shortage to live,
more often than not, in just one room in wretchedly unsanitary
surroundings."
Though the wages of skilled workers rose steadily, their standard of[31
living declined. More importantly, the progressively intensified resi-
dential integration of all strata of the working class contradicted the
social aspirations and expectations of the 'labour aristocracy' which were
generated and largely fulfilled in the workplace. Their desire for separate
neighbourhoods close to their workplaces within the central area or, at the
minimum, for status differentials between themselves and the remainder of
the working class (for example, two rooms instead of one, a home of their
own, higher quality housing, greater security of tenure) were generally not
fulfilled. Capitalist society had not accorded them the recognition and
respect which they felt was due; their dreams had been shattered. The every-
day experiences of members ofthe 'labour aristocracy' in their residential
areas were out of phase with those of their workplaces.
This contradiction had been growing more apparent and widespread since
the 1860's. The demolition of working-class housing during the 1870's, for
street improvement and under the Torrens and Cross Acts, had exacerbated the
already serious situation. But the mere lack of realization of some of the
artisans' and skilled workers' aspirations could not, in and of itself, have
promoted a crisis. Similar frustrations were continually experienced by the
working class. What transformed the 'labour aristocracy's' housing problem
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into a housing crisis was the fact that it became a concrete symbol of the
broader social crisis which beset capitalist and middle-stratum London in
the 1880's
Under-employment and unemployment had become endemic conditions of the
inner-London labour market due to the structural decline of many central
industries, outlined in Chapter 1. But the severe cyclical depression of
1884-7, occurring in the middle of the so-called 'great depression' of the
late 19th century and affecting a much wider range of occupations than pre- 14]
vious trade slumps, intensified working-class hardship to chronic proportions.
As a result, members of the working class, especially the skilled stratum,
began to loose faith in their automatic advancement under British capitalism
and became less inclined to accept their fate passively.
London's dominant class had been alarmed by the brief period of
working-class unrest in connection with franchise reform during the mid-
1860's. However, due to the absence of a unifying ideology among the working
class, the challenge was not serious and the demonstrations petered out after
the passage of the Second Reform Bill in 1867. In the words of Gareth[5]
Stedman Jones:
"Parliament hastened to pass a sweeping Reform Bill which would
forestall the dangers of an incipient alliance between the casual
'residuum' and the 'respectable working class.' The political
crisis quickly passed and wealthy London as a whole was not slow
to regain self-confidence."
Though the Trade Union Congtess was formed during the 1870's in an attempt to
unite the working class, the decade was essentially calm, and wealthy London
remained confident.
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But the political complexion of the city changed markedly in the
1880's; indeed London became the national focus of the resurgence of working-
class protest which was at the heart of this transformation. The
institutionalization of universal manhood suffrage in 1884 gave the working
class increased political leverage on the existing parties who were anxious
to capture the working-class vote. In this context, the reappearance of
Socialism and various brands of 'collectivism,' which served to unite the
working class behind demands for fundamental structural changes in the
economy and in opposition to the dominant ideology was particulary worrisome.
The socialist movement began in the East End and was most potent from
1886-8. During these years, the resoluteness and militancy of the working
class strikes and demonstrations soon exposed the real extent of propertied[6]
London's fears of this new force. The socialist-led strikes of the
Bryant and May Match factory workers, the gas-workers and the dockers won
important victories for the working class in general and, possibly of greater
importance, they showed that the thousands of unskilled workers were no
longer unorganizable. These events prompted Engels to write in 1892 that he
was "glad and proud" to have lived to see the revival of Socialism in the[71
East End, a place for which he had previously held only.despair:
"That immense haunt of misery is no longer the stagnant pool it
was six years ago. It has shaken off its torpid despair, has
returned to life, and has become the home of what is called the
'New Unionism,' that is to say, of the organisation of the great
mass of 'unskilled' workers."
He stressed that the most important feature of these new unions was their
revolutionary character. Unlike the old unions of the skilled workers,
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they were not interested in getting a better deal for their members within
capitalist society; rather, they were after structural changes towards some
form of Socialism and, as such, formed the avante garde of the labour
movement.
The riots in Trafalgar Square in 1886 and 1887 displayed the vehemence
of the animosities between the working class and the propertied and privileged
people of London and the extent of the latter group's fears. Much of the
violence of these years came from the over-reaction of the Establishment to
[8]
these mass demonstrations. Finally, the efforts of social reformers to
paint a less sensational picture of the East End, as a mean and monotonous
environment rather than a hot-bed of poverty, vice and violence, were de-
stroyed in 1888 when the widespread publicity which was accorded the savage
murders of five prostitutes in Whitechapel by 'Jack the Ripper' abruptly
"thrust into the public mind an image of East London as somewhere violent
[91
and outcast, rather than monotonous and outcast."
What made matters infinitely more serious for the dominant class was
the spatial separation of social classes and the consequent erosion of
traditional methods of social control. It was during this decade that
the overcrowded and haphazardly-planned East End and the spacious and
orderly West End, began to crystallize as images of the poverty and power-
lessness of the urban working class in opposition to the wealth and dominance[10]
of the ruling class. As P. J. Keating has put it:
"By the mid-eighties the East End of London had become as potent a
symbol of urban poverty (the natural, virtually inevitable point of
reference for anyone wishing to place the urban working classes) as
Manchester had been of industrial conditions in the 1840's ....Gone
[was] the idea that the East End was merely one slum area among
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many; it [was] now regarded....as a complete city in its own right;
a city of poverty and meanness in the east, set against a city of
wealth and culture in the west....The east-west contrast (two classes
facing each other, en masse, across the capital city of the Empire)
reflected all of these attitudes, though also much more besides."
Thus, while the East End and the West End had separate and opposite identi-
ties, they were no longer seen as two separate entities; they were parts of
a whole, and the degradation of the one part came to be seen in the public
consciousness as both the cause and effect of the prosperity of the other
Ill]
part. In the words of Lord Salisbury:
"The housing of the poor in our great towns, especially in London, is
a much more difficult and much more urgent question, for the increase
of prosperity tends rather to aggravate the existing evil than to
lighten it. It is, in fact, directly caused by our prosperity."
Thus, the class boundaries of capitalist society had become geographical
boundaries, expressed in terms of a whole range of social and spatial dif-
ferences between the two major parts of the whole. As William Glazier, an
artisan put it: "the opulance and luxury of one section of the community
[12]
has been built upon the moral and social ruins of the other." The no-
man's land of commercial, governmental and service activities which formed
a gulf between the East End and the West End came to epitomize the gulf
between labour and capital in economy and society.
In the context of the economic uncertainty and political unrest of the
1880's, the anonymous East End came to be feared by the West End Establish-
ment. Old methods of social control, based on paternalistic, face-to-face
relations between rulers and ruled, were no longer adequate or appropriate
in the homogeneous working-class environment of the East End, which was
"virtually bereft of any contact with authority except in the form of the
-176-
[131
policeman or bailiff." The Poor Law was no longer adequate, either as a
means of poor relief or as an instrument of social control. And the separa-
tion of classes had depersonalized and deformed charitable gifts thereby
depreciating their power as methods of social control. In fact, Gareth[(14]
Stedman Jones has convincingly argued that:
"At the most fundamental level, the separation of classes had led to
a breakdown of social relationships and traditional methods of social
control....The ensuing deformation of the gift had led some of the
rich to feel that the whole traditional fabric of social control was
being threatened by the metropolitan environment."
The indiscriminate alms-giving and careless poor relief which followed
each outbreak of working-class protest during the mid-1880's showed that
charity and other transfer payments from rich to poor had become the payment
of money in fear and guilt; the prestige, subordination and obligation which
these payments had previously implied and commanded were no longer valid.
The seething mass of human misery which 'Outcast London' was, had been
transformed in the consciousness of dominant-class London into a monster
which threatened the very foundations of their dominance and prosperity.
Writing in 1884, George Sims, a prominant journalist, conveyed the urgency
1151
of these fears:
"It has now got into a condition in which it cannot be left. This
mighty mob of famished, diseased and filthy helots is getting
dangerous, physically, morally, politically dangerous. The barriers
which have kept it back are rotten and giving way, and it may do the
state a mischief if it be not looked to in time. Its fevers and its
filth may spread to the homes of the wealthy; its lawless armies
may sally forth and give us the taste of the lesson the mob has
tried to teach now and again in Paris when long years of neglect
have done their work."
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The overcrowded residential environment of the East End was at the
basis of these fears. But it was not the fact of overcrowding itself that
aroused the social anxiety of the 1880's. Viewed objectively, overcrowding
was far worse in the rookeries of the 1840's than those of the 1880's, though
the proportion of the working-class population living under overcrowded con-
[16]
ditions in the centre had considerably increased. The real problem was
that the pressure for accommodation in the central area was forcing members
of the 'labour aristocracy' and other sections of the 'respectable' working
class (that is, those who were undesirous of achieving structural social
change) into cohabitation with the 'destructive,' 'disreputable' or 'crimi-
nal' remainder of the working class--the 'residuum!'
As we have seen, prior to the 1880's, it was thought that the 'labour
aristocracy' had been getting better off and better housed, and that there
was therefore little danger that this stratum, despite the radicalism of
some of its constituents, would identify with the remainder of the working
class. But the proliferation of literature on working-class housing condi-
tions in the early part of the decade revealed that unsanitary, overcrowded
housing and high rents afflicted the entire working class. Set in the con-
text of a severe economic depression and growing working-class agitation,
the forced co-habitation of all strata of the working class in slum districts
generated the strong fear that the entire working class might combine
behind demands for structural socio-economic changes and that therefore
overcrowding posed a serious threat to the continued social stability upon [171
which capitalist prosperity was based. In the words of Gareth Stedman Jones:
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"While the geographical separation of rich and poor was becoming ever
more complete, the poor [that is, the working class] themselves were
becoming more closely crammed together regardless of status or char-
acter. In.this situation, the onset of cyclical depression was particu-
larly disturbing. For, as the depression deepened, signs of distress
began to appear in the ranks of the respectable working class. 'Agi-
tators' were already beginning to blur the distinction between the
respectable working class and the 'residuum' by appealing to both
under the slogan of 'relief to the unemployed.' The dangerous possi-
bility existed that the respectable working class, under the stress
of prolonged unemployment, might throw in its lot with the casual poor."
Thus, it was in the 1880's that the perpetual housing problems of the
working class were transformed into a housing crisis for the dominant class,
as they potentially provoked a working-class challenge to the basis of their
existence. On the one hand, the frustration in the residential sphere of
the artisans' and skilled workers' aspirations for separation from the rest
of the working class and for recognition and respect by capitalist society
combined with the high unemployment of the depression years, made these workers
increasingly aware that their lot was inextricably linked with that of the
working class as a whole, and that it was therefore fundamentalZZy opposed
to the interests of the capitalist class and the reward systems of capitalist
society. The fulfillment of their aspirations in the workplace had created
an illusion that their dreams were reality; the degradation and suffering
which they were.forced to undergo in their residential areas, along with the
remainder of the working class, awoke them from their slumbers to an opposite
reality. When the chips were down, as was the case in the 1880's, they were
Just plain workers; they belonged in the slums of the East End, with the rest
of the working class. On the other hand, as we have already seen, the forced
cohabitation of all strata of the working class in the East End raised
the spectre of revolution in the minds of members of the dominant class.
A
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Working-class residential overcrowding had evolved to a stage where it com-
prised a direct threat to social stability.
At the root of this qualitative shift, from housing problems to housing
crisis, was the fact that the working class was increasingly becoming con-
scious that the housing process was an integral aspect of the overall class
struggle between labour and capital, and therefore that radical changes were
necessary if the quality of working-class housing was to be improved. In the
words of a representative of the capitalist class, Sir J. P. Dickson-Poynder,
soon to become the chairman of the London County Council's Housing of the[181
Working Classes Committee:
"The Housing problem indeed may be said to be the sum and total of all
the social and economic problems which await solution, for it pro-
vokes the vexed question of the relation between rent and wages,
which easily slides into that of capital and labour."
As a result, by the mid-1880's, the housing crisis had, for the first
time, become the major social question of the day. In 1883, the Pall Mall
Gazette wrote that "the Housing of the Poor takes its place in the front[191
rank of the political questions of the day," and the Lancet that "the
[20]
housing of the poor is the burning question of the hour." Working-class
housing problems had surfaced in the social conscience as problems in their
own right, no longer submerged under the broader banner of public health
or sanitation. This attitudinal change will be explored further in Chapter 5.
However, I would like to stress that this 'newly-discovered' housing
crisis, and the growing sympathy for housing reform, was centred around the
fear of unified working-class rebellion which the frustration of the 'labour
-- m
aristocracy's' aspirations was seen to portend, and it was only concerned
with the atrocious living conditions of the.working class as a whole in so[21]
far as these related to this fear. As Anthony Wohl has argued:
"Mearns' pamphlet [The Bitter Cry of Outcast London, 18831, appearing
at a time of increasing public violence thus aggravated the fear that
the overcrowded rooms of the poor were breeding grounds for malcon-
tents and revolutionaries. In an age of unemployment, of increas-
ingly organised labour and international socialism, the political dan-
gers of the slums could not be ignored. When Cardinal Manning asked
Mearns in one of the sessions of the Royal Commission on the Housing
of the Working Classes if social discontent took a political form
among the more educated of the slum dwellers, he was merely expressing
an anxiety about revolution or socialism (and to many they were syn-
onymous) which was widespread and which created a public sympathetic
towards advocates of housing reforms."
In sum, then, the housing crisis of the 1880's was the product of the
resolution of the conflicting demands to which the land and housing markets
of 19th century London were subjected by the drive to accumulate capital
and the residential aspirations of various classes, and it was the product
of the normal workings of the leasehold system of tenure which had evolved
to mediate these conflicting demands for space. In more general terms, the
housing crisis was an outcome of the broad spectrum of social relations
which were defined in the process of struggle between classes in capitalist
society.
The fact that working-class housing problems had reached crisis pro-
portions was an indication that the legal and quasi-legal structure of the
leasehold system, which defined the power relations between the various
participants in the land and housing markets, was no longer adequate to its
task of mediating the contradictory pressures generated in the process of
London's development--no longer adequate, that is, if social stability and
the status quo were.to be maintained and that was imperative from the capi-
talist point of view. Under the old medication, the disease was killing the
patient: new medications had to be developed and applied to retard the
progress of the disease. The contradictions which were embedded in the lease-
hold system had led to its negation, new forms of tenure had to be found
which might lead to more appropriate, socially acceptable outcomes, thereby
dampening the threat of revolution posed by the working class and rein-
forcing capitalist-class control. By this, I do not mean to imply that the
transformation of tenure relations was the only or the most important method
of averting social revolution, but rather that the struggle for new forms
of tenure and new modes of urban development was a significant part of the
[22]
overall changes which the social crisis of the 1880's necessitated.
In this context, it is hardly surprising that tenure relations came
under the parliamentary microscope and developed into a key social question
[23]
for public debate during this period. Tenure relations, especially
the 'sweated' leasehold system, figured prominantly in the proceedings of
the Select Committe on Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Improvements in
1881-2, and of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes
in 1884-5. They were the primary focus of the Select Committee on Town
[241
Holdings which sat from 1886-1891. The Land Enquiry Committee reported
on urban land tenure in 1914. The many organizations and actions developed
[25] [26]
to promote or attack the leasehold system , 'leasehold enfranchisement'
(i.e., owner occupation), public housing or 'municipal socialism,' the
[271
nationalization of land and general housing reform, all had the modifi-
cation of tenure relations as their common thread. Whether the proponents
and opponents of these schemes were conscious of it or not, what their
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haggling and political manoeuvring was about was a redefinition of the power
relation between individual participants in the housing process which would
lead to more socially acceptable outcomes.
The housing crisis of the 1880's was the origin of all these struggles,
and it defined their direction. It was both the reason for the existence
of the land and housing reform movements of the following decades, and it
patterned their responses by serving as a historical and real-life reference
point for their actions. As a direct result of the housing crisis, a period
of experimentation ensued, a search for new and more appropriate forms of
tenure. Old forms of urban development continued to occur, but they began to
mesh imperceptibly, to become subsumed by the new forms of the future. These
struggles were given a new urgency during the First World War, and they
culminated in the early 1920's with the institutionalization of home-owner-
ship for the middle stratum and council housing for the working class--new
forms of tenure which led to new forms of urban development...and to new
problems. But that is altogether another story!
Right now, we must proceed to develop the third thread of this thesis.
It concerns the theories which were developed to understand and explain the
housing problems of the working class and to propose solutions to them.
And it examines the ideological transformation which the housing crisis of
the 1880's necessitated and generated.
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CHAPTER 5
IDEOLOGY AND WORKING-CLASS HOUSING PROBLEMS
'Palliatives for 19th century London's working-class housing problems
were not explicitly dealt with in the previous chapters, as these made an
insignificant impact on the social and spatial geography of the city. However,
these attempts to mitigate the problems offer important lessons for present-
day practice in relation to contemporary housing problems. Consequently,
this chapter will focus on official and philanthropic definitions of the
nature of working-class housing problems from the 1830's to the 1880's, on
the theories or assumptions upon which these problem definitions were based,
and on the consequent proposals for the solution or mitigation of the prob-
lems. The purpose is not to delve into the details of the application of
each approach: these are peripheral to the main argument and have been well[1]
covered by other writers. Furthermore, their overall effect--that they
did not solve or even mitigate working-class housing problems but rather
reinforced the developmental processes described in the previous two chapters
and thereby further exacerbated the working-class predicament--which is im-
portant to my argument, is obvious and incontrovertible. Instead, I will
explore certain overriding, unifying features of each approach which have
received far less attention: namely, the material and especially the
ideological functions of approaching housing problems as they did.
I will attempt to show that status-quo maintenance was the main thrust
of each approach to working-class housing problems, either consciously or,
more often than not, unconsciously. By viewing working-class housing
problems as essentially separable from the social, economic and political
structure of society, and by uncritically acquiescing to the prevailing
ideology of 19th century British capitalism, these approaches offered problem
definitions, theories and policies which merely extended this ideology into
the housing field. As a result, housing reformers served the changing needs
of the capitalist system, as opposed to the needs of the working class who
lacked adequate housing and whom they purported to serve. In other words,[2]
each approach was but an aspect of the prevailing ideological paradigm
by means of which the dominant class understood and explained working-class
housing problems. Furthermore, this paradigm served the important functions
of reinforcing certain aspects of London's development, described in the pre-
vious chapters, and of legitimating the oppression and hardship which was a
necessary, if unfortunate, part of this developmental process. But the crisis
of the 1880's was as much a material crisis as it was an ideological one.
The paradigm was no longer adequate as a device for maintaining the status
quo. It had to change if it was to continue performing its reinforcing and
legitimation functions. And change it did, as we shall see.
In the final chapter of this thesis I will argue that similar ideological
processes are prevalent today. Consequently, this argument is very relevant to
the role of modern city planners and housing policy-makers who, like their
predecessors, are the people charged with performing these status quo main-
tenance functions in relation to housing and urban development. I do not
mean to imply a conscious conspiracy on their part. Most of these profes-
sionals are unaware of performing this function; they go about their work
in the sincere conviction that their actions will alleviate housing and
other urban problems. But few pause to reflect on the paradigm through
which they view the problems. And this paradigm is the force which
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constrains them in the direction of status quo maintenance and the cons ent
perpetuation, not solution, of housing problems in one form or another.
The aim of this thread of the thesis is to make city planners and housing
policy makers aware of the pitfalls of uncritically accepting an ideological
paradigm.
Demoralization
One canon of classical political economy dominated the ideological
climate of Britain during the period under consideration. This was the firm
belief in the efficacy of an idealized notion of freely competitive, self-
regulating markets, as a mode of organizing the economic functions of
society. Laissez faire reigned supreme. According to the Ricardian economic
[4]
doctrine, the interference of government, or organized collectivities such
as unions, in the economy, particularly the labour and essential-commodity
markets, was at best pointless and at worst counterproductive, in both an
economic and a humanitarian sense. The less government intervened in the
economy, the better.
Government intervention in economy and society had played a vital
role in the previous era of capitalism. During this phase, which Karl Marx
characterized as a period of "primitive accumulation," a high level of gov-
ernment involvement in the economy was necessary in order to separate the
actual producers from the means of production and subsistence and to trans-
form these into capital, under the control of a small capitalist class, and[51
the actual producers into wage-earners. In other words, government inter-
vention was vital to promote capital accumulation in the infancy of capitalism.
At the same time, social policy was shaped by the essentially feudal
-188-
assumption that "government had a duty to maintain a stable society in which
every man had a right to live in the (generally low) station to which the
[6]
Almighty had called him." But, by the early 19th century, industrial
capitalism had reached a stage where it could stand on its own two feet. The
capitalist class had achieved sufficient economic power to accumulate capital
without the assistance of government legislation. Indeed, most existing
forms of government interference had become hindrances--they contradicted their
original purpose of promoting capital accumulation--and therefore had to be
171
eliminated. Thus the laissez faire ideology, which came closest to per-
fection in the 1850's, evolved to serve the interests of the increasingly
dominant capitalist class.
Total government abstention from economic and social affairs was, and
is, a contradiction in terms. The mere existence of government, charged
with public expenditures, currency regulation and the protection and admin-
istration of a certain structure of laws must influence economic and social
life to some extent. Thus, the practical application of the idealized
notion of laissez faire was really more concerned with the character of gov-
ernment intervention, and not the fact of it. And the role of government,
according to classical political economy, was to create and maintain the
best conditions for capitalism, under which the process of capital accumulation,[81
then regarded as basically self-regulating, could flourish. In this con-
text, it is hardly surprising that the most important function of the state
seldom came under fire in the public debate surrounding the institutionalization
of 'practical laissez faire.' This function was the maintenance and fine-
[91
tuning of capitalist property relations, which layed down the rules of
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the capitalist economic system, and the maintenance of social stability in
terms of these property relations. In most of the discussions regarding
the abolition of old legislation or the introduction of new laws, this
function of the state was not subject to question--indeed, it formed a
datum against which the advisability of existing and proposed laws were
judged. The state's role as guardian of capitalist property relations, that
[10]
is, of private property and the basic socio-economic institutions which
defined people's places in the economy and society, was not challenged.
There were instances, however, in which more direct government
intervention into the economy was called for and/or achieved. In these
cases, the laissez faire doctrine was selectively upheld or compromised in
favour of the dominant class and to the detriment of the working class.
Indeed, Lord Salisbury alluded to this state of affairs when in 1883 he
wrote: "Laissez faire is an admirable doctrine; but it must be applied on
[ll]
both sides." A detailed analysis of 19th century economic and social
policy in these terms is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, two
examples, which directly affected London's development and its working-class
housing problems, will be instructive in gaining an understanding of the
prevailing ideological paradigm in terms of which housing problems were
understood.
[12]
The development of London's railway network provides an example
of how Zaissez faire ideology was severely compromised in the interests of
the dominant class as a whole. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, rail-
way development was vital to the expansion of capital accumulation, and it
necessitated a high level of government intervention, both for its very
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realization, and subsequently, for its rational organization. Without com-
pulsory purchase powers, it is doubtful that many railway companies would
have been able to acquire the necessary land; and without some government
control over the placement of lines and termini, the overall network would
have been chaotic, if not counterproductive. In these matters the State
essentially acted as an arbitrator between the various sectors of the domi-
nant class--in particular, the landed aristocracy, the railway promoters and
the big capitalists. It did not give railway companies a free hand to go
about their operations, which were so important to the capitalists in general,
nor did it outrightly reject the challenge to existing property relations,
and to the power of the landed aristocrats, which compulsory purchase posed.
Instead, the state took somewhat of a middle road by facilitating relatively
organized railway development, which enhanced the potential for capital
accumulation, in ways which respected the power of the landowners, by strict
regulation and by granting high levels of compensation, regardless of the
devastating effects of the schemes on the working class. Thus, in this
struggle to improve the economic efficiency of the city, the laws defining
property relations in the land market were slightly modified, usually to the
detriment of the working class, and government control over private economic
activity was increased; but the changes did not seriously threaten the fun-
damental basis of these property relations, namely private property and
market determination of compensation to landowners. These compromises altered
the relative power of, and had direct economic consequences for, certain
social groups, but they essentially reflected the subservience of government
to economy.
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On the other hand, the laissez faire dogma was usually upheld in
reaction to demands for governmental or philanthropic intervention into the
housing market to provide adequate accommodation for all members of the
working class. Gareth Stedman Jones has succinctly labelled the dominant
ideological paradigm which shaped official and philanthropic responses to
working-class housing problems up to the 1880's, with the word "demoraliza-
[131
tion." This paradigm was a relatively faithful extension of the prin-
ciples of Zaissez faire into the field of housing. According to this theory,
the basis of most working-class housing problems was moral, not structural.
Slums were caused by their demoralized inhabitants who had failed to inter-
nalize and act upon socially-accepted capitalist values, such as disciplined
[14]
labour, thrift, self help and temperance. The structural characteris-
tics of the labour and housing markets and of the 'sweated' leasehold system,
which I have argued trapped the working class in the centre and were the
causes of slums, were seen by contemporary reformers as the outcomes of
working-class demoralization. It was assumed that the working class had
effective control over the quality of their living environment. Thus the
social and environmental evils of the slums were attributed to the personal
psychological inadequacies of the victims, rather than to circumstances
beyond their control. It was even argued the working-class poor chose to
live in the congested, unsanitary slums of inner London because they pre-
ferred to spend their wages unwisely, on drinking or gambling instead of
better housing, or because they shrewdly migrated to these areas to benefit
[151
from charitable handouts rather than subject themselves to painful labour.
In this context, it is understandable that public health problems in slum
districts, being more difficult to blame convincingly on individual slum
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dwellers and therefore more difficult to explain within the demoralization
paradigm, were seen to be more legitimate and urgent areas of public concern
than housing problems--that the exterior environment was seen to be more
important than the interior.
Furthermore, seen through the distorting lens of the demoralization
paradigm it was inevitable for housing reformers to argue that the only
practical solution to working-class housing problems lay in educating the
workers to inculcate the canons of capitalist morality, to learn the value
of hard work, careful spending, thrift and self help. As Samuel Smiles[16]
put it in his celebrated book, Self Help (1859):
"No Laws, however stringent, can make the idle industrious, the
thriftless provident, or the drunken sober. Such reforms can only
be effected by means of individual action, economy and self denial,
by better habits, rather than by greater rights."
There was little to be gained by the application of charitable or state aid
to better house the working class. This would merely lead to an automatic
rise in rents or fall in wages and would encourage mendicancy and further
demoralization thereby exacerbating the problems rather than solving.them.
Indeed, indiscriminate public and private alms-giving was seen as an impor-[171
tant cause of demoralization in the first place. What this amounted to
was an argument that the state or the charities had no right to interfere
with the essentially unproblematic operation of markets in essential commodi-
ties, such as housing, as this would subvert the effective operation of the
land and labour markets thereby diminishing the rate of capital accumulation.
Where such intervention was deemed to be absolutely necessary, usually be-
cause of the fear of working-class insurrection, it should be accomplished
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in ways which did not threaten the operation of these basic socio-economic
institutions. Indeed, it should operate according to the rules of these
institutions; in particular, it should produce a 'fair' return to the
capital invested, not 'give the workers something for nothing,' and it should
be permissive rather than mandatory. For example, Octavia Hill, one of the
[18]
foremost housing reformers of the day, told the 1882 Select Committee:
"It is far better to prove that you can provide a tolerable tenement
which will pay, than a perfect one which will not.... Give him by all
means as much as you can for his money, but do not house him by
charity, or you will house few but him, and discourage instead of
stimulating others to build for the poor."
And in 1883, she wrote that her approach, which is analysed in the following
[191
section of this chapter, did not
"...contemplate for a moment the disastrous policy of attempting to
supply by the aid of the community a necessary of life (such as
lodging is) for the working classes... .Let working people fit them-
selves for better wages....never let them accept a rate in aid of
wages, whether in the form of houses, or of anything else."
Though the attitude of wealthy London to chronic poverty changed during
the 1870's, from one which saw poverty as the inevitable lot of the working
class to a view that poverty only affected the unregenerate 'residuum' and
would be eradicated by progress, demoralization was consistently evoked to
explain why certain individuals and not others were poor or lived in slums.
In fact, their acceptance of the demoralization thesis increased during the
early 1870's due to the persistence of poverty and slums in the growing[20].
prosperity and stability of the period.
In sum, then, under the demoralization paradigm which dominated the
housing reform movement of the day, the victim was blamed for the housing
problems which he/she suffered. If environment played a part in creating
housing problems, then it was a decidedly minor one. The paradigm funda-
mentally upheld the efficacy of capitalist market institutions, which I have
argued were the real cause of working-class housing problems. The basically
wrong assumption that the working class was in a position to control the
quality of its residential environment led to 'solutions' which prescribed
self-help and education. Where public or private aid was deemed unavoidable,
an adequate return on the money invested was imperative as charity generated
further demoralization as it ran counter to the precepts of the immutable
market institutions.
The considerable ideological power of the demoralization paradigm of
working-class housing problems needs to be emphasized. It was like a filter
through which housing reformers and policy-makers saw the reality of working-
class housing problems. Its action was similar to that of a coloured filter
through which a beam of white light is passed. If the filter is blue, then
only blue light passes through it; the other six colours (wavelenghts) of
the spectrum are absorbed by the filter. Change the filter to a red one and
only the red light passes through it. Thus the beam of white light, repre-
senting reality in this metaphor, can seem radically different depending
through which colour filter (the paradigm) it is viewed. Furthermore, the
filtering effect of the paradigm coloured not only the theoretical explanation
and policy proposals, but the definition of the problems themselves. The
notion that the definition of the problem was, or can be, objectively true,
and was therefore indisputable, could only be upheld when viewed through the
paradigmatic filter. The imposition of an alternative paradigm, as is the
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case in this chapter, rapidly exposes the myth of such objectivity--the biased,
subjective dimension of the demoralization thesis becomes obvious.
As we shall see in the following section, the demoralization paradigm
was an appropriate device for maintaining the status quo in relation to the
housing plight of the working class. By covering up the structural causes of
slums, it supported the interests of the dominant class which benefited
directly or indirectly, from the impoverishment of the working class, for
whom the situation worsened. Thus, this differential application of the
laissez faire ideology in matters of public policy, consistently to the
detriment of the working class, was a clear example of the subservience of
the state to basic socio-economic institutions of the capitalist system,
and to the dominant class whose interests the system served. Far from im-
proving the lot of the working class, the demoralization paradigm, by blam-
ing structural contradictions on the psychological inadequacies of the
victims, served the purpose of legitimating working-class suffering and
exonerating the system which caused it.
The Five Main Approaches
Attempts to improve working class housing conditions from the 1830's
to the 1880's took five main forms: street clearance, sanitary regulation
and slum clearance were the official responses; model dwellings and the
Octavia Hill system were the 'philanthropic' responses. Each of the approaches
adhered to the laws of classical political economy as embodied in the demor-
alization paradigm, but in varying degrees.
Other proposals were made, and implemented, but on such a small scale
that they made an insignificant impression on working-class housing problems
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during this period. Workmen's fares were advocated as a solution to central-
area congestion as early as 1846. They were increasingly provided from the
mid-1860's onwards, but their use by the working class, as a means of escape
to more spacious suburbs, remained negligible until the 1880's, for reasons[21]
previously cited. New towns or ideal communities had an even older
history but only began to make an impact towards the turn of the 19th cen-
[22]
tury. Starr-Bowkett building societies, which were established in the
1860's in an attempt to extend homeownership to the working class by providing
low-repayment, interest-free loans to the full value of a property, were
popular but hardly made an impression on the housing problem and petered out
[231
in the 1890's. Thus, the main thrust, which the five approaches repre-
sented, was directed towards the amelioration of slum conditions in the cen-
tral area. We may now consider each approach in chronological order.
Street Clearance
Street clearance, or street 'improvement' as it was condescendingly
known, was the earliest attempt to remove central-area slums. It was aimed
at the relatively self-contained, crowded clusters of mean streets and delapi-
dated tenements, called 'rookeries,' which conjured up images as dens of
crime and immorality in the dominant-class mind. The slum problem was de-
fined in terms of the isolation of slum dwellers from the watchful eye and
moral behaviour of the 'respectable' sections of society, and, obversely,
in terms of the moral contamination of honest members of the working class
by the criminals and beggars who infested the rookeries. This inevitably led
to mass demoralization which was responsible for the formation of unsanitary
slums. This view was based on the widely-held beliefs that crime and
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demoralized behaviour were a function of inadequate social and spatial envi-
ronments, which were isolated from the 'public gaze,' and, in turn, that
demoralized people caused slums. In the words of Octavia Hill before the
[241.
1882 Select Committee:
"A great deal of the degradation of these courts is because no public
opinion reaches them; if you hear anybody talk about a cul de sac,
and contrast it with any place that is a thoroughfare, you feel at once
that it is the public opinion that affects the character of a court
more than police or anything else."
The circuitous and self-fulfilling nature of this theory is obvious. Given
this way of defining and understanding the problem, the demolition of slums
to make way for new thoroughfares and to expose them to the 'public gaze,'
was an equally obvious solution, which was implemented with a vengeance, as
we have seen in Chapter 3. As Percy Edwards put the official line in his[251
book on 19th century London's street improvements: -
"The Select Committee[on London] of 1838...called attention in its re-
port to the fact that there were districts in London through which no
great thoroughfares passed, and which were wholly occupied by a dense
population composed of the lowest class of persons who being entirely
secluded from the observation and influence of better educated neigh-
bours, exhibited a state of moral degradation deeply to be deplored.
It was suggested that this lamentable state of affairs would be remedied
whenever the great streams of public intercourse could be made to pass
through the districts in question. It was also justly contended that
the moral condition of these poorer occupants would necessarily be
improved by communication with more respectable inhabitants, and that
the introduction at the same time of improved habits and a freer cir-
culation of air would tend materially to extirpate those prevalent
diseases which not only ravaged the poorer districts in question, but
were also dangerous to the adjacent localities."
It soon became clear that street clearance substantially increased over-
crowding and rents, and generated new slum districts elsewhere, rather than
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(26]
clearing away the slums. For example, William Farr stated in 1841:
"You take down the dwellings of the poor, build houses in their places
for which only the middle classes can afford to pay the rent, and
thus by diminishing the amount of cheap house accommodation, increase
the rents and aggravate the evil you attempt to cure."
However, in spite of this knowledge, no provisions were made for rehousing
the displaced until 1877. The Metropolitan Board of Works, which was respon-
sible for most of London's street clearances, persisted in the patently
false belief that the displaced working class dispersed into the suburbs.
When, in 1877, the Board was forced to find alternative accommodation for
those evicted, it resented the order, arguing that rehousing was uneconomical
and impractical and that in any case the displaced preferred cash compensa-
tion. It generally did everything in itspower to evade or lessen its
rehousing responsibilities. The Board was far more interested in traffic[27]
efficiency and increased rateable value. The housing of the working
class was left to the operation of the working-class housing market, which
as we have seen was the structural cause of slum formation.
The connection between street clearance and the drive to enhance
London's potential as a setting for capital accumulation by improving the
efficiency of its street system, is obvious. It has been argued that the
power relations of the land and housing markets were such that the new
thoroughfares had to be located in working-class districts. There was an
urgent need to alleviate the dominant-class conscience by making the wholesale
destruction and displacement, and the resultant hardship, seem legitimate in
their eyes. And the fact that the area did look better from the new streets
made it seem to their generally superficial gaze that the street clearance
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approach was viable, and therefore justifiable. Furthermore, under the demor-
alization paradigm "the absence of state intervention could be justified not
only on grounds of present expediency, but on those of the ultimate welfare
[28]
of the very classes who appeared to be most threatened" by street
and railway clearance schemes. There was a unity between the ideas of hous-
ing reformers and the expansionary needs of London's economy. In view of
all this, it is understandable why the fallacy of street clearance as a solu-[29]
tion to working-class housing problems prompted Engels to write in 1872:
"In reality the bourgeoisie has only one method of settling the housing
question after its fashion--that is to say, of settling it in such a
way that the solution continually poses the question anew. This method
is called 'Haussmann.' By the term 'Haussmann' I do not mean merely
the specifically Bonapartist manner of the Parisian Haussmann....I mean
the practice, which has now become general, of making breaches in the
working-class quarters of our big cities...the most scandalous alleys
and lanes disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self glorification
by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but--they
appear again at once somewhere else, and often in the immediate
neighbourhood."
Model Dwellings
The construction of 'model dwellings' was the earliest private philan-
thropic response to the problem of housing the poor. The model dwelling
societies saw the slum problem as one of badly planned, designed, built and/
or managed housing which perpetuated demoralization, rather than as a problem
of overcrowding per se. They argued that this was caused by the fact that
commercial builders and landlords felt that well-built and managed housing
for the working class would not produce an adequate return to the invested
capital, and therefore they had no incentive to provide decent accommodation.
The model dwelling societies also assumed that good, well-managed housing
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improved the occupants by raising their morale and giving them an incentive[301
to better themselves. Thus, their solution was to set examples for pri-
vate enterprize, to show that adequate and sanitary high-density working-
class housing was practical and compatible with a fair return on capital and
that, in the words of the Earl of Shaftsbury, "the moral were almost equal
[31]1
to the physical benefits." For example, the earliest model dwelling
society--the Metropolitan Association for Improving the Dwellings of the
[32]
Industrious Classes--resolved at its inauguration in 1841:
"That an association be formed for the purpose of providing the
labouring man with an increase of the comforts and conveniences
of life, with full compensation to the capitalist."
The maintenance of an exemplary posture was paramount; there was never -any
question of ousting commercial builders and landlords from their rightful
place as housers of the working class. There was also never any question of
subsidizing the working class by providing housing at such low cost that it
did not produce a fair return, thereby representing a dysfunctional rate-in-
aid of wages. This 'five-per-cent philanthropy' was only "philanthropic in
the sense of ensuring certain minimum standards and of not raising rents to
[33]
the maximum which market conditions permitted."
[34]
Model dwelling companies were usually unable to provide decent
accommodation at rents within the range of the poorer segments of the
working class for whom they were supposed to provide. This was due to the
fact that they were almost as much constrained by the structure of the
[35]
housing market as were commercial builders. Their rents had to rise if
they were to maintain their profitability under the pressure of the rising
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prices of land and building materials. Except for the Peabody Trust, only
the better-off skilled workers could afford to rent model dwellings. Be-
sides the high rents, stringent regulations demanding regular advance-payment
of rent, prohibiting sub-letting and controlling the usage of flats, put
model dwellings (including Peabody) beyond the scope of the bulk of the
working class. And many of those who could afford to live in model dwellings
understandably preferred to remain in overcrowded commercial housing than to
suffer the degradation of the paternalistic supervision and hostile archi-
tecture of most model dwelling companies. In the words of John Tarn, the
[361
model dwellings
"...were designed as isolated buildings, railed off from the surrounding
streets, with gated entrances, locked at nights....There was a resident
superintendent responsible for the general maintenance of the estate
and to ensure that the various rules were observed. Peabody tenants
were expected to be respectable, but there were many who preferred the
easy ways of the slums outside to the restriction upon life inside."
Consequently, these companies only catered for a small proportion of the
[37]
working class who were relatively well paid and regularly employed, and
after the 1860's this became a matter of policy, justified on grounds of
practicality and profitability. The poorer workers were merely displaced
into surrounding areas by model dwelling company demolitions, thereby
exacerbating overcrowding.
Thus, the most important contribution of the model-dwelling approach
to working-class housing problems lay not in their solution, but rather in
the fact that their well-publicized efforts salved the public conscience.
"Something was being done, and the fact that the full extent of their efforts
[381
only touched the fringe of the problem passed largely unnoticed."
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By making it seem as though the problems were temporary malfunctions of their
way to solution, while reinforcing the structural forces which perpetuated
them, the model dwelling companies inadvertently served the purpose of
legitimating the continued existence of working-class housing problems, at
least until the crisis of the 1880's. Furthermore, model dwellings were an
effective means of extending dominant-class control over the working class.
Not only were they controlled in their workplaces but in their homes as well.
Thus, it was not surprising that propertied London heaped praise on the
paternalistic management of these model dwellings. In the words of a
[39]
surveyor for one of the large landed estates:
"It is found that the working classes can be better housed in large
blocks of buildings where they can be broughttogether, and be under
control and care, and management, and looked after. The very essence
of it is their being looked after, and cared for, which secures for
them the better dwellings."
Sanitary Regulation
Sanitary regulation was the second official response to the housing
t40]
problems of the working class, prominent from the mid-century until 1875.
This legislation, which was a composite of the early Housing (Shaftesbury and
Torrens Acts), Nuisance Removal and Sanitary legislation, has largely been
dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4; only a brief treatment is necessary here.
Implicit in this legislation was the view that the demoralization-slum-forma-
tion cycle could be reversed, or at least checked by regulating overcrowding
and the sanitary condition of individual houses, on the assumption that
environmental improvement would inculcate moral behaviour among slum dwellers.
Most of these laws gave the police or the vestries powers to inspect houses
and abate overcrowding. The Torrens Act of 1868 was the most radical. The
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original terms of the bill not only empowered the vestries to demolish unsani-
tary property upon the recommendation of medical officers, but also to rehouse
those displaced--a significant departure from the prevailing trend. Even more
significant was the fact that this rehousing provision was eliminated in the
bill's passage through the House of Lords--it was before its time. The com-
pensation clauses were also removed.
Thus, the act which was eventually passed was purely destructive. It
[41]
became a device for 'shovelling out the poor' and created more overcrowd-
ing than it removed. Its disastrous effects were not the result of the in-
effectiveness or obstructiveness of the local vestries, though this exacer-
bated the situation, but rather of the structure of the legislation, the
strict enforcement of which would have made the crisis of the 1880's much
more severe than it actually was. Indeed, many compassionate medical offi-
cers refused to apply the act for this very reason. In consequence, as I
have already argued, the most significant function of this legislation was the
provision of legal instruments which facilitated central-area land use changes
from residential to commercial, and the homogenization of more attractive
neighbourhoods by the removal of the undesirable poor. And it helped to
legitimate these socially oppressive actions by making it seem as though the
solution of working-class housing problems were the sole purpose of the
legislation.
The Octavia Hill System
Octavia Hill's system of property management was the second major
philanthropic approach to the housing problem. Begun in 1864, it was almost
universally believed to be an effective panacea, at least until the inquiries
[12]
of the mid-1880's. Octavia Hill was the most faithful adherent to the
demoralization paradigm. She placed the blame for working-class housing
problems squarely on the demoralized character of the victims. In the words
of Anthony S. Wohl, she believed: "that character was, even more than envi-
ronment and certainly more than economic and social factors, responsible for
poverty, uncleanliness and overcrowding..... it was the pig that was blamed[43]
for the sty and not the sty the pig." Indeed, she argued that model
dwellings were pointless if the demoralized character of their inhabitants[44]
was not improved:
"Supposing we could so arrange all outward things as to re-house them,
the people themselves are not fit to be so moved, and can only very
gradually become so.... for in the long run it will be found...that,
without training these poorest people, no improvement in their houses
will be of much avail."
Her solution was to take over the management of existing slum dwellings[451
and to train the inhabitants in energy, punctuality, thrift and self-help.
This task was entrusted to the landlords or to her corps of lady rent collec-
tors. Her aim was to show that even the housing of the very poor could be
made to pay if they could be made to live according to bourgeois morals.
Rents, which were calculated on the five-per-cent philanthropy principle, had
to be paid punctually; arrears were punished by eviction. If tenants were
thrifty and obeyed the rules, they were rewarded by having some money spent
on improvement. Eventually they were encouraged to expand to two rooms, and
pay higher rents of course. Thus, the improvement of the buildings would
follow the moral improvement of their inhabitants, which the rent collectors
made it their business to supervise.
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Though Octavia Hill's scheme was the only one in this era which reached
the poorer segments of the working class, it is doubtful that its impact was
widespread; "that her scheme only worked successfully in the case of a
[46]
specially hand-picked stratum of the London poor." The incessant fluc-
tuations and low wages in the casual labour market made thrift and punctuality
impossible--irrespective of character. But the scheme was important in two
ways. It was a means of directly controlling and socializing workers who had
not yet inculcated capitalist values and behavioural norms and who were never
employed long enough by the same employer to have this function performed in
the workplace. For instance, one commentator praised an application of her[47]
scheme in 1875 on the grounds that:
"No pauperizing fallacies destructive to their self-respect were
tolerated; no rent allowed to run unpaid even for a week....how
by degrees, the little community became laborious and thrifty,
where they had been idle and thriftless, orderly and docile where
they had been violent and outrageous."
This function became less necessary after the 1880's as the structure of the
labour market began to change and more regular employment became available.
Furthermore, the scheme helped to alleviate the dominant-class conscience by
directly involving some of its members in the attempt to improve working-class
housing. Something was being done, and they were doing it.
Slumwn Clearance
Finally, slum clearance was the third official response to working-class
housing problems, predominating after the passage of the Artisans' Dwelling
(Cross) Act in 1875. By the early 1870's it was beginning to be realized.that
the existing palliatives were not proving adequate to the task. However, the
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Cross Act was not a radical departure from the established approaches, but
rather a more systematic restatement of them. This contradictory response
becomes understandable in the light of a nuance which became popular in the
interpretation of the working-class housing problems.
Under this approach, the crux of these housing problems lay in the
existence of vast areas of substandard dwellings, which formed an obstacle
[48]
to the erection of better housing, and not in the insufficiency of houses.
The poor were seen to be unable or unwilling to pay the increased rents
which new or more spacious, accommodation would necessitate. Since slum
dwellings continued to yield handsome profits to landlords, there vas no
incentive for improvement or new construction. Thus, the solution was to
give the Metropolitan Board of Works and the City Corporation compulsory
purchase powers and to charge them with the tasks of acquiring slum property,
compensating the owners, demolishing it and selling it to private or 'phil-
anthropic' developers on condition that they erect working-class housing on[49]
the sites. There was never any intention of state subsidies, either in
the form of selling the cleared land at reduced cost, or by the Board doing
the rebuilding itself. Under the demoralization paradigm, slum clearance
had to pay or else a threat to private enterprise might be involved. Five-
per-cent philanthropy had to be upheld. The influential Charity Organization
Society, whose political pressure was largely responsible for the Cross Act,
[50]
stated in 1873:
"The destructive part of the duty of the authorities is of more impor-
tance, if possible, than the constructive; the first and more essential
step is to get rid of the existing haunts of moral and physical degra-
dation and the next is to watch carefully over constructing and recon-
struction leaving however, the initiation of these usually to the law
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of supply and demand....Philanthropic agency in building dwellings
for the poor, means the supply of one of the chief necessaries, viz.
lodging, below its market value. Were such a practice to be exten-
sively or indiscriminately sanctioned, not only would the profits
of commercial investment be impaired, but the principle of self
dependence would be attacked, habits of self-indulgence would be en-
couraged, and even the wages of unskilled labour might be reduced."
One theoretical assumption, a new addition to the accepted wisdom on
how to deal with working-class housing problems, seemed to justify the slum
clearance approach in the minds of contemporary reformers, even though this
approach hardly differed from the existing palliatives which were making
[51]
matters worse. It was known as the levelling up' theory. According to
this theory, better-off workers would move into the more expensive new hous-
ing erected on the cleared land, and the displaced poor would occupy the
houses that they had vacated, which were assumed to be in better condition
than the demolished housing. In this way, the physical condition of the
housing stock would gradually improve, and with it, the moral condition of
the inhabitants. But the theory was untenable because its assumptions were
[52]
wrong. It assumed that better-paid workers would indeed move into the
newly-constructed housing, or at least migrate to the suburbs; that the
central-area working-class population would remain almost constant; and that
a unified housing market existed, with housing quality being a function of
the physical condition of the housing stock and independent of the social
and economic relations between landlord and tenant.
However, significant working-class suburban migration did not occur
until the late 1880's, In any case, as we have seen, there were powerful
forces which constrained much of the working class in the centre and made
suburbanization unrealistic for them. Furthermore, central London was a
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magnet which attracted multitudes of workers, especially casual workers.
As has been shown, the pressure of this vast population increase was made
worse by the diminishing supply of central land caused by railway, street
and commercial development. But even if the artisans had vacated their houses
for the poor, and the central population remained static, it is doubtful that
much improvement would have resulted because the third crucial assumption
was false. If the argument stated in Chapter 3 is correct--that the degrading,
unsanitary and overcrowded condition of central working-class housing was
the result of the social relations between landlord and tenant defined by the
'sweated' leasehold system and conditioned by the structural characteristics
of the working-class housing market--then there is no reason to believe that
the new accommodation would not rapidly deteriorate to the level of its
surroundings. The persistence of 5% or more vacancies in the suburbs during
this period while used in support of the 'levelling up' theory, was purely
academic from the point of view of the central poor. These vacancies existed
in a housing sub-market which was beyond their reach and therefore irrelevant
to their needs. Indeed, surpluses in the suburbs and crowding in the centre
are testimony to the centrality of social relations in the determination of
housing quality and distribution. The Cross Act did nothing to alter these
fundamental characteristics of the working-class housing process and thus
could have little positive impact on their housing problems.
The fact that the implementation of the Act proved to be disastrous
for the working class was bitter proof of the fallaciousness of the 'levelling
up' theory. Under the Act, large areas in which the casual poor were con-
centrated were the consistent targets for demolition. In most cases, this
was tantamount to eviction. One woman, whose family had been displaced a
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number of times under this Act and other legislation, understood these facts
1531
only too well:
"I came to London twenty-five years ago... and I have never lived in
any room more than two years yet. They always say they want to pull
the house down to build dwellings for poor people, but...I've never
got into one yet."
Most workers could not afford the high rents of the new accommodation and
even if they could, the time lag between demolition and rebuilding was often
so long as to make the new housing irrelevant to the needs of the displaced.
They were forced into even more overcrowded dwellings in the surrounding
areas, and the increased pressure on the diminished supply of housing forced
them to pay higher rents or settle for lower standard houses.
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Cross Act entailed
financial loss for the authorities charged with implementing it, and there-
fore for the ratepayers. The power relations of the land market were such
that generous compensation clauses were written into the Act, and the
Metropolitan Board of Works soon found itself paying far more to buy land
[54]
than it received when it resold the land. Compensation was based on
rental receipts. This was a direct incentive to landlords to herd as many
people into their dwellings as possible, to charge high rents, and to allow
their property to deteriorate in the hope of receiving high compensation for
an extremely small 'investment.' It also encouraged racketeering and fake
sales at high prices. Further, the fact that central land had commercial
potential, and that the Board had to compensate every interest which might
conceivably be injured, increased land acquisition costs. On the other hand,
once the building had been demolished and the land was put up for sale, on
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condition that as much working-class housing as had previously existed be
erected on the site, there were few takers, low offers, and the Board was
unable to obtain payment from any interest which had gained in the process.
Model dwelling companies were usually the only takers. As a result of the
considerable losses sustained by the Board in what amounts to a process of
subsidizing property owners, there were long delays between demolition and
reconstruction and the Board initiated a political struggle to have its housing
1551
responsibilities reduced. In 1879, they were permitted to rehouse people
elsewhere than in the immediate vicinity, and in 1882 the housing obligation
was halved and they were allowed to sell part of the development for commer-
cial purposes. Thus, almost the only people who benefited from the Cross
Act were the owners of slum property. As the Royal Commission on the Housing[56]
of the Working Classes put it in 1885:
"Rookeries are destroyed, greatly to the sanitary and social benefit
of the neighbourhood, but no kind of habitation for the poor has been
substituted. This is the extreme instance of everything being
sacrificed to the improvement of the property." (Emphasis added.)
As a result, working-class overcrowding was made appreciably worse
and rents rose significantly. In the words of Reverend Andrew Mearns in
1571
1883:
"It is notorious that the Artisans' Dwellings Act has, in some respects,
made matters worse for them. Large spaces have been cleared of fever-
breeding rookeries to make way for the building of decent habitations,
but the rents of these are far beyond the means of the abject poor.
They are driven to crowd more closely together in the few stifling
places still left to them; and so Dives makes a richer harvest out of
their misery, buying up property condemned as unfit for human habita-
tion, and turning it into a gold mine because the poor must have
shelter somewhere, even though it be the shelter of a living tomb."
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Indeed, the Act was an important contributory factor to the housing crisis
of the 1880's. Like the earlier palliatives, it served to legitimate, not
alleviate working-class housing problems by making it seem as though they were
on the way to solution. The optimism surrounding the passage of the Bill, the
shifting of responsibility from corrupt vestries to the energetic Metropolitan
Board of Works, the improved appearance of the new dwellings and the belief
in the validity of the 'levelling up' theory, all contributed to the feeling
that 'something was being done' and therefore the problems would soon be
solved.
In sum, then, it is clear that the effect of the five major attempts
to alleviate working class housing conditions, especially those of the
casual poor, from the 1830's to the 1880's, was exactly the opposite. The
intensity of overcrowding in the centre was increased. It is possible that
the housing conditions of some members of the 'labour aristocracy' improved
slightly. But the situation worsened appreciable for those who needed
[58]
improved accommodation most. In 1883, Lord Salisbury observed that:
"Nothing has been done for the housing of this poorest class, whose
need is the greatest, and who furnish most of the terrible cases of
overcrowding of which we read such deplorable descriptions."
Far from counteracting the developmental process outlines in Chapter 3, which
was the fundamental cause of the atrocious working-class housing conditions
in general and of the housing crisis of the 1880's in particular, the five
palliatives added appreciably to the pressures on working-class living.
On the ideological level, the five approaches, in different ways and
to varying degrees, served an important purpose of maintaining the status quo
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and legitimating the inherent inequities and oppression which they. sought
to mitigate. Their blind adherence to the tenets of classical political
economy, in the form of the demoralization paradigm, upheld the efficacy of
the basic socio-economic institutions of capitalist society, which were at
the root of the problems, and put the blame on the victims instead. Domi-
nant-class London was exonerated from blame. The paradigm eased their minds
by reconciling individual freedom, that most cherished of bourgeois values,
with the reality of the lack of freedom and control over their lives which [591
was the lot of the working class and accounted for most of their difficulties.
The notion that the poor were free to improve their lives if only they would
improve their character was patently false. To borrow a Watergate phrase,
the problem definitions, theories and solutions put forward by contemporary
housing reformers and legislators--their ideology--represented one big
'cover-up' of the underlying causes of working-class housing problems; a
'cover-up' which was, however, far more successful than the Watergate caper.
The Crisis of the Old Paradigm and the Germs of the New
In the context of the East End housing crisis of the 1880's, the demor-
alization paradigm became increasingly untenable as a basis for understanding
and dealing with working-class housing problems. Indeed, the mere fact that
these problems had reached crisis proportions in the public consciousness
was a nail in the coffin of the demoralization thesis. It had begun to
fail in the fulfillment of its major task--the legitimization of the existence
of working-class housing problems. The paradigm, and the 'solutions' which
it spawned, had done little to change the outcomes of the working-class housing
market which were at the root of the crisis. In fact, the five main palliatives
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had been significantly instrumental in exacerbating the problems--they were
partly to blame for the housing crisis. By the latter part of the 1880's,
dominant-class London came to feel that there was an urgent need to change
the outcomes of the working-class housing market to avert the threat on
the maintenance of social stability and the status quo which the crisis
represented. The view which blamed housing problems on the demoralized
character of the victims was no longer adequate to this crucial task. There
was a cogent need for new ideas, new views--for a new paradigm.
In Chapter 4, it was argued that the essence of the housing crisis was
the fact that the pressures of the working-class housing market were forcing
the 'respectable,' better-paid workers into co-habitation in the overcrowded
slums of central London with the dangerous, demoralized 'residuum' of
casual labourers, chronically poor and criminals. Fears arose that the
'residuum' might corrupt the 'respectable' stratum of the working class
and/or that the latter, who were relatively well-organized in trade unions,
might combine with the relatively disorganized segments of the working class
and pose a unified threat to the status quo. These themes filled the popu-
lar literature of the housing problem during the early 1880's and were more
systematically aired before the Royal Commission on the Housing of the
[60]
Working Classes in 1884-5. Far from being a dwindling enclave, as the
Marshallian view would have it, the 'residuum' in fact comprised a substan-
tial proportion of the working class. Packed into overcrowded slums, their
demoralized character almost became understandable. Under these conditions,
religion, thrift, temperance, if not civilization, were impossible.
Reverend Andrew Mearns' revelation in The Bitter Cry of Outcast London
that, as a result of overcrowding, incest was common brought an even greater
[61]
sense of urgency to the housing reform movement. The discovery that,
contrary to the widely-held beliefs of the 1860's and 1870's, industrious,
'respectable,' regularly-employed workers and their families "were being
forced by the housing shortage and high rents into the tainted physical[62]
and moral atmosphere of the one-roomed system," was the last straw.
The 'residuum' if not checked might retard progress; overcrowding might
provoke poverty to make common cause against wealth. In the context of the
increasing unrest and economic depression of the decade, bad housing came to
be viewed as a possible cause of revolution.
On the other hand, this view of the social crisis which besieged London
during the 1880's holds the key to the understanding of the solution which
became increasingly common currency in contemporary intellectual and business
circles. A clearer distinction had to be drawn between the 'respectable'
working class and the casual 'residuum.' The threat of social upheaval could
be allayed by winning the adherence of the basically good 'respectable'
workers and by imposing coercive controls on the dangerous 'residuum.' "In
a period when the 'residuum' was becoming increasingly threatening, it was
urgent that the 'respectable' working class should be enabled to participate
more actively within the political system, and that their 'legitimate' griev-[631
ances should be met."
The belief in the viability of this policy of broad working-class
segmentation was enormously enhanced by the researches of Charles Booth in
the late 1880's and by the 1889 Dock Strike. Booth's work once and for all
destroyed the myth that the working class was morally debased. Most were
decent people whose poverty was the cause of their degrading existence.
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Financial assistance, far from demoralizing them, would uplift them and make
them more productive and devoted workers. The real problem was the nature
and condition of the casual 'residuum' who were incapable of improvement and
hard work, and whose competition prevented the 'respectable' working class
from breaking the shackles of poverty. Separation of these two strata, and
substantial concessions to the 'respectable' working class was the answer [64]
to the social crisis which besieged London. In the words of Charles Booth:
"To the rich the very poor are a sentimental interest: To the poor
they are a crushing load. The poverty of the poor is mainly the
result of the competition of the very poor. The entire removal of
this very poor class out of the daily struggle for existence I
believe to be the only solution to the problem."
Furthermore, the discipline and self-restraint (that is, the non-revolutionary
character) of the strikers, both skilled and unskilled, in the great dock
strike of 1889 confirmed this thesis; it "came as cathartic release from the[651
social tension of the mid-1880's." Trade unions no longer needed to be
feared as opposition to the status quo. According to Sidney Buxton, the
[66]
dock strike
"proved that the average docker himself was by no means the 'failure,'
the ne'er-do-well, the hopeless wreck of humanity, of popular fancy.
And it proved, too, I think, that the hordes of East End ruffians who
have been supposed (did they but know their power) to hold the West
in the hollows of their hands were a fantastic myth: for this Great
Strike would have been their opportunity."
Trade Unions were thus viewed positively as agents of the moral and material
improvement of most of the working class. They had accomplished what the
dominant class had failed to achieve through charity. As such, trade unions
came to be seen as an effective means of incorporating the 'respectable'
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working class within the social system, and of widening the gap between them
and the hopeless 'residuum.' Dominant-class London breathed a sigh of relief.[67]
In the words of Gareth Stedman Jones:
"Once disentangled from the respectable working-class, the residuum
could not on its own overturn London. Once detailed social inves-
tigation and the activity of the strikers themselves had established
a clear distinction between the 'legitimate' claims of labour and the
ugly symptom of 'social disease,' fears of revolution could be turned
aside. The casual residuum was not longer a political threat---only
a social problem."
When these developments are borne in mind, the shift in focus of the
emerging housing-problem paradigm becomes comprehensible. The problems were
no longer seen to be the fault of demoralized victims, but were blamed on
the degenerative pressures of urban existence, beyond the control of the
victims. Overcrowding, not poor sanitation, was the culprit of the forced
integration of 'respectable' workers and 'residuumn'; overcrowding was the
cause of the demoralized behaviour of all but a small segment of the working
population; therefore, overcrowding was the housing problem. The report of
the Royal Commission in 1885 stated that overcrowding was "a central evil[681
around which most of the others group themselves." And an editorial in[691
the Pall MaZZll Gazette declared emphatically:
"What the evil is everyone knows. It is the excessive overcrowding
of enormous multitudes of the very poor in pestilential rookeries
where it is a matter of physical impossibility to live a human life."
The focus had switched from the exterior environment of the slums to the in-
teriors of the working-class houses. The previous era's incorporation of
housing problems into the broader problems of public health and sanitary[70]
improvement was no longer viable. It was a negative approach which
-217-
emphasized demolition of 'houses unfit for human habitation.' This only
made matters worse because it increased overcrowding. Housing conditions
could deteriorate while the sanitary condition of the slums improved and the
death and disease rates diminished. The housing problem, as distinct from
171]
problems of public health and sanitation, emerged in its own right in
terms not too dissimilar to those of today; there was a shortage of housing
which engendered overcrowding and forced large masses of 'respectable' workers
to suffer the degenerating pressures of the urban environment.
The theory of this urban degeneration paradigm argued that chronic
market imbalances, beyond the control of the 'respectable' slum dwellers,[72]
were responsible for overcrowding. The majority of workers competed for
scarce jobs and thus wages were low. With little money in their pockets, they
could only afford, and therefore demand, a low quality and quantity of hous-
ing. This, in turn, was all that landlords were willing to supply if they
were to receive the 'fair' profit to which they were entitled. An impasse
had been reached. The laissez faire system had been responsible for the
housing crisis and, once the demoralization paradigm was rejected, the system
provided no convincing incentives for alleviating the problem. Without
some massive form of intervention into the working-class housing process,
the housing crisis and the threat of social insurrection would not simply
'go away.' Only the state was wealthy and powerful enough to accomplish such
large-scale intervention into the problematic sector of the housing market.
The failure of previous palliatives made it apparent that only massive direct
state intervention into the housing process was necessary to deal effectively[731
with the problematic sector. State aid for the working class in their
housing quest was increasingly seen as a positive means of improving their
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lot, as opposed to a demoralizing rate-in-aid of wages as classical political
economy would have it.. Alfred Marshall, one of the most prominent instiga-
tors of this change in economic ideology, illustrated this new approach before[741
the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor in 1893:
"Suppose you could conceive a Mad Emperor of China to give to every
working man half-a-crown for nothing: according to the current no-
tions, as far as I have been able to ascertain them, that would lower
wages because it would enable people to work for less. I think that
nine economists out of ten at the beginning of the century would have
said that that would lower wages. Well, of course, it might increase
population and that might bring down wages; but unless it did increase
population, the effect according to the modern school would be to raise
wages because the increased wealth of the working classes would lead to
better living, more vigorous and better educated people with greater
earning power, and so wages would rise. That is the centre of the
difference."
Furthermore, decent housing for the 'respectable' working class had become
an insurance policy against revolution. So much so that an 1883 issue of
Punch satirised Sir Charles Dilke agreeing with Queen Victoria that housing
legislation was the "safest mode of protecting our present consitution" and
[751
"the best, if not the only, method of nipping Communism in the bud."
The disenchantment with Zaissez faire in the housing field must be seen
as part of the mounting general dissatisfaction with the doctrine, from both
[76]
the right and the left, during this period. It is important to stress
that this attack on the principles of Zaissez faire was not an attack on the
basic socio-economic institutions of capitalism, in particular, the labour,
land and housing markets. Nor was it a call for socialism, except possibly
in a few small circles. It was rather a search for a new economic philosophy
according to which the socio-economic relations of capitalism would remain
intact, while at the same time legitimating the increasing level of direct
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state intervention, which was vital to the solution of the housing crisis
and other social and economic problems. It was the outward expression of
the need to justify what Booth called a""limited socialism," whose main
purpose was the maintenance of capitalism or as Booth put it, "a socialism
which shall leave untouched the forces of individualism and the sources of
[771
wealth."
According to the early adherents of the urban degeneration paradigm,
the solution to the housing crisis was twofold: a better deal for the
'respectable' working class and the segregation of the casual 'residuum.'
As Gareth Stedman Jones has convincingly argued, in the early stirrings of
'welfare-state' legislation, alleviating the condition of the deserving
workers and a harsher attitude towards the undeserving poor, were two aspects
[78]
of a single debate. Proposals for dealing with the latter stratum com-
prised detention centres for 'loafers,' the separation of pauper children
from their degenerate parents, and shipping the 'residuum' overseas or to
[79]
state-aided labour colonies. These schemes were technically voluntary,
but coercive in reality. The strict enforcement of overcrowding legislation
was to be the force behind these segregatory policies.
By the end of the 1880's, the 'better deal for the respectable working
class' had found legislative expression, though only at embrionic levels.
It was divided along two broad policy dimensions, both subsidized by the State:
working-class suburbanization and public housing in the centre. However, in
the early part of the decade, the Radicals had proposed stricter control of
landlords, rent control, leasehold enfranchisement (a 19th century label for
[80]
owner-occupation) and even municipal ownership of urban land. The Trades
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Council, which represented the artisans, were mainly interested in policies
which facilitated working-class home-ownership and suburbanization through
[811
workmen's fares. But the Conservatives largely prevailed. From the
increasingly anachronistic demoralization standpoint, they argued that the
existing legislation was not deficient, rather lax administration was to[82]
blame for the housing crisis. The Royal Commission on Housing in 1885
confirmed this view. Thus the dominant approach in the early 1880's lay in
reinforcing existing palliatives by making the legislation mandatory instead
of permissive.
One exception to this lack of change was the Cheap Trains Act of 1883
which put compulsory workmen's fares on the statute books and thereby facili-
tated working-class suburbanization. Significantly, this policy, which had
been urged as early as 1846 and had already been implemented on a minimal
scale by some railway companies, only found legislative expression in the
[83]
1880's. It is interesting to note that, contrary to the expectations of
advocates of cheap trains in the 19th century, that the advent of cheap travel
did not lead to a breaking-down of the social-class homogeneity of residential
areas, outlined in Chapter 3. Rather, the clear class distinctions which
existed between different areas of Victorian London, especially the East End/
West End duality, have tended to be perpetuated and simply expanded into adja-[84]
cent areas.
The other strand of this attempt to co-opt the respectable working class[851
was legislated in the Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890.
Besides consolidating existing overcrowding and slum-clearance legislation,
it gave local authorities effective powers to build houses for the working
class at the cost of public funds. The concurrent drive to improve
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administration of these and other policies, led to the disbanding of the
Metropolitan Board of Works and its replacement by the London County Council[86]
in 1888. The Council rapidly established itself as an adherent of the
urban degeneration paradigm and as a powerful active agent in the working-
class housing process. It extended workmen's fares to the tramways when it
assumed ownership of these in the 1890's, and it became the most vigorous
though still reluctant local authority in the construction and letting of
[871
public housing.
In conclusion, we have seen that the origins of the new urban degenera-
tion paradigm lay in the need for a new ideology of working-class housing
problems, which could perform the status quo maintenance and legitimation
functions which the demoralization paradigm had failed to do. The way the
problem was defined and explained, and the proposals for its solution
according to this new ideology, all betray the urgent need to find ways of
averting the threat of working-class insurrection which beset London in the
1880's. This is not to say that housing policy was the only means of averting
the crisis. It must rather be seen as part of the broad current of social
enquiry and action of the 1880's, all of which spelled the doom of the laissez
faire ideology and its paradigmatic offspring in particular fields such as[88]
housing. In the words of Anthony Wohl:
"It must be placed within the context of a decade of unrest, agitation
and re-evaluation of the fundamental structure of society. Agricul-
tural depression, factory working conditions, the poor law, private
charities, education, workmen's trains, wages and cost of living, the
sweating system, and the leasehold system, were all subjected to
official investigation during the 'eighties."
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Finally, the urban degeneration paradigm was equivalent to the child-
hood phase of the modern paradigm of the housing problem, which became insti-
tutionalized in the decade or so after the First World War. While the trans-
formation from demoralization to urban degeneration was a qualitative shift,
that from urban degeneration to the modern view--state interventionism--was
one of degree. Thus, as was the case with changes in tenure relations, the
roots of the state interventionist paradigm--according to which perpetual
state intervention of one form or another is regarded as necessary and
natural, the state being viewed as the legitimate authority responsible for
the 'problematic' sectors of the working-class housing market--lie in the
responses of dominant-class London to the housing crisis of the 1880's.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
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much of my argument relies; Wohl [1971] passim; Tarn [1971] passim.
2. The word 'paradigm' is used in a special sense in this thesis and con-
sequently needs some explanation. A paradigm is a conception of
reality or of a part of reality--a way of looking at and understanding
the social or natural world, either as a whole or in part. It consists
of a set of important questions, significant facts, concepts, categories,
relationships, methods and prescriptions for action which are accepted
by a community of people as constituting the 'true' or 'correct' way of
understanding, explaining and/or acting upon an aspect of reality which
is their common concern. In the words of Thomas Kuhn, who has written
a very worthwhile if idealistic book on paradigms in the natural
sciences, a paradigm is "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an
enduring group of adherents away from competing [paradigms, but]...
sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined
group of practitioners to resolve." Kuhn [1970] p.10 and see pp.l-42.
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paradigms of working-class housing problems, is the essential unity
between problem-definition, theory and action-prescriptions--the one
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logical basis of paradigms. Louis Althusser has expressed this succinctly,
if in complex language. He uses the word 'problematic' instead of
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lematic from the subjectivist concepts of an idealist interpretation
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essence but its relation to real problems: the problematic of an ideology
cannot be demonstrated without relating and submitting it to the real
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3.' In the concluding chapter, I will argue that working-class housing
problems are a structural part of the capitalist system and therefore
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pp.4-11. However, the principles of Zaissez faire which originated with
classical economics dominated the public consciousness and especially
the ideas of housing reformers, at least until the mid-1880's. Further-
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-226-
electorate until 1867, or even 1884, this was the prime function of
Parliament: not to develop positive policies, even upon such matters
of domestic concern as public sanitation, and certainly not on rail-
way building, but simply to maintain the rule of common law and to
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS: NOTES TOWARDS A RADICAL THEORY OF URBAN LIVING AND
CITY FORM.
Having analysed London's developnent from the 1830's to the
1880's, we are now in a position to move to the synthetic phase of this
study: to abstract the ideas developed and lessons learnt about the
process of urban developnent and present then in the form of general
conclusions which are more directly relevant in understanding the
nature and dynamics of contemporary urban environments. Indeed, the
purpose of this thesis was not merely to write a socio-econcmaic history
of 19th-century London in the form of an isolated case study. It was,
rather, to describe and analyse London's development within the frame-
work of a radical theory of the nature of society and of social change,
with a view to extending the scope of radical theory into the realm
of urban social and spatial development; and, thereby, writing a history
which could contribute to contemporary scholarship and practice
regarding urban development and the problems associated with it. Thus,
the main purpose of this chapter is to briefly expose the theoretical
structure which is embedded in the historical analysis, and in so
doing, to connect the thesis to present-day urban issues, enquiries
and practice.
Though my ultimate objective is to develop a general theory of
[1]
urban development under capitalism, I would stress that this
chapter does not presume to fulfill this long-term goal--not even in
draft form. There is still a great deal of historical and theoretical
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research to be done before such a task can be attempted. Most
theories consist of a series of concepts or categories according to
which reality is understood and explained, and a series of arguments
which integrate these concepts or categories into the form of a
theory by exposing the relationships between them. In this chapter,
all I seek to do is to outline briefly the concepts which the
historical analysis has shown to be central, though not necessarily
sufficient, to a correct understanding of the process of urban
development under capitalism and, therefore, to emancipatory
practice, in relation to urban problems. The interrelationships
between the concepts are highly cmanplex; where I can, I will attempt
merely to expose some of the more important ones. Furthermore,
because I am most concerned with understanding urban housing issues
and problems, the major emphasis is on the social and spatial
structure of urban living, that is, on the residential sphere of the
urban environment. Thus, it is only in an extremely limited and
preliminary sense that this chapter can be seen as a contribution to
the construction of a radical theory of the dialectics of urban social
and spatial development in capitalist societies and to radical
practice in relation to contenporary urban problems. Its main purpose
is, rather, the generation of ideas which the historical analysis has
shown to be important in understanding the city as a social and
spatial process.
It should be borne in mind that the object of these concepts,
and eventually of general theory, is to enable us to answer the
following 'umbrella' question: why do cities and towns in capitalist
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countries develop, or decay, at the rates and in the directions and
forms which have been, or which can be, observed? This question
encanpasses a myriad other, more detailed questions. What deter-
mines the value of urban land? What determines the locational
decisions and patterns of the many urban activities? Why do certain
modes of transportation proliferate, and what determines their loca-
tion? What determines the social and spatial structure of the resi-
dential sphere of the city? What causes housing problems, and why do
they perpetuate in the face of concerted efforts to solve or even
mitigate them? The list could be enormously expanded. However,
though the concepts outlined in the following pages are aimed at
elucidating these and other questions, no attempt has been made to
answer them in a methodical fashion. Where relevant, all I have
indicated is the manner in which some of these questions may be under-
stood and answered according to the proposed schema.
The concepts--which are both conclusions from the historical
analysis, and building blocks of an eventual radical theory of urban
development--are most usefully grouped under three categories.
Firstly, those which provide the impetus for urban developnent, or
decay, in the sense of determining the directions, objects, limits
and/or rate of such developnment or decay. Secondly, those which
constitute formative mechanisms whose function is to translate the
pressures arising out of the first category into a social and spatial
reality, and thereby to determine the actual shape of the city.
Thirdly, those which relate to 'crisis management' in that their
object is to mitigate problems or conflicts which emerge from the
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day-to-day operation of those variables grouped under the first two
categories, thereby ensuring that the process of urban development
proceeds relatively snoothly. These three categories of concepts
and variables are discussed in the following six sections of this
chapter. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the
nature of the housing problem in the light of the proposed conceptual
framework and an indication of radical praxis in relation to
housing problems.
Urbanism and the Mode of Production.
The first set of concepts and variables are grouped together
because they all provide, either singly or through their mutual
interaction, the impetus for urban development, or decay, by
determining the directions, objects, limits and rate of such develop-
ment or decay. These are discussed in this and the following three sections
of this chapter.
To begin with, we must conceptualize in broad terms the nature
of the phenomen6n we wish to explain--we must develop a general[2]
notion of what the city is in reality. This might seem trite,
even tautological, but it is important as a datum--an indication of
the most appropriate mode and sequence of enquiry, and a continual
reference point that the enquiry is still on track and has not
strayed, from explaining reality, into meaningless abstraction.
It is doubly important because assumptions about what the city is in
reality inevitably get embedded into the theory as structural
features. Thus wrong, or unrealistically abstract, assumptions lead
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to incorrect and unrealistic theory.
For example, a major shortcoming of the neo-classical theory[31
of location and land rent is the naive and incorrect view of the
real world upon which it is based. Surely its proponents understand,
from their own experience, that the city is not a "featureless plane"
upon which sovereign firms and households, all of whose members
epitcmnise hc•o econanicus, compete by making trade-offs between land
area and accessibility to the "centre" in order to maximize efficiency
and "utility" respectively, thereby arriving mysteriously and
harmoniously at a "pareto-optimal" static equilibrium state in which
everyone is satisfied because improving one person's lot would
automatically deprive someone else; that urban land use patterns
evolve sequentially, not instantaneously; that social and political
power pervades the land market and is a significant structuring force;
that social and physical infrastructure (schools, sewers, roads, etc.)
investment markedly influences land rent and location decisions, does
not obey competitive market criteria and does not simply "happen" the
instant pareto optimality is reached; that whether a home is rented
or owned influences land rent and locational criteria; etcetera.
Neither the fact that these "assumptions" make it easier for the
advocates of neo-classical theory to model and quantify "reality"
nor the fact that their results loosely approximate the real-world
situation (only with respect to land rents) should detract from the
fundamental unreality of their view of the city. Such myopia merely
serves to justify both the theory and the objective inequalities of
urban existence. In order to avoid this trap, it is essential to make
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constant reference to an arguably realistic datum of 'what the
city is.'
The historical study indicates the following preliminary
definition: The city is a spatially structured enviromnent created
by society for the purpose of supporting and perpetuating a certain
mode of production and reproduction of real life, in its totality;
an environnent which both reflects and reinforces, though potentially
threatens, the snooth functioning of the mode of production and
reproduction. This complex statement holds the key to the set of
forces which provide the impetus for urban developnent. I will
briefly discuss sanme of the more important ones and simultaneously
outline the concepts and variables which are appropriate in gaining
an understanding of these forces and, therefore, in constructing a
theory of urban developnent.
The first important concept is the mode of production and
reproduction of real life. What does it mean and why is it so
important? In 1890 Frederick Engels wrote that "the ultimately
[though notthe only] determining element in history is the production[4]
and reproduction of real life." He was defending the materialist
conception of history which argues that a group of individuals cannot
survive on the basis of individual action; rather, in order to ensure
their survival they must develop a certain mode of social organization
and cooperation which enables then, as a social unit, to develop
appropriate tools and techniques for changing the natural environment,
and to apply these towards socially defined ends. The totality of
these social relations, tools and techniques, and socially defined
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15]
ends constitutes the mode of production. The mode of production,
as opposed to legal, political or ideological systems, is accorded[6]
the status of primary determinant of the structure and evolution
of a social formation because of its intimate connection to the
material survival of that social formation, at whatever stage of
development it has reached. This philosophy formed "the guiding
thread of my studies"" for Karl Marx, and his formulation of it bears
lengthy quotation in view of its centrality to the theory of urban
[71
development.
"In the social production of their life, men enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent
of their will, relations of production which correspond to
a definite stage of development of their material productive
forces. The sum total of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real
foundation, on which rises a legal and political super-
structure and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness. The mode of production of material life
conditions the social, political and intellectual life
process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social
being that determines their consciousness.....With the change
of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure
is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such
transformations, a distinction should always be made between
the material transformation of the economic conditions of
production, which can be determined with the precision of
natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic
or philosophic--in short, ideological forms in which men
beccme conscious of this conflict [in the economic founda-
tion] and fight it out ....[which] must be explained froman the
contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict
between the social productive forces and the relations of
production."
Thus, the mode of production--the ultimate determinant of the nature
and dynamics, indeed, the raison d'etre of the social formation--
constitutes the econanomic base and must be differentiated from the
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the legal, political, cultural and ideological superstructure,
which plays a vital and influencial role in reproducing and deter-
mining the form of the social formation, but which is, in the last
analysis, circumscribed by the base.
Two qualifications are important to avoid any misunderstandings.
Firstly, the base does not merely refer to the productive (primary and
secondary industry) sphere of the economany. It denotes the whole
range of evolving social and economic relationships which, of
necessity, bind the members of society together in their crucial
collective task of the material production and reproduction of society
[8]
itself, at whatever stage of developnent it has reached. In other
words, the base is comprised of the dialectical interactions between
all spheres of economic life; the processes of production (including the
service sector), distribution, exchange and consumption (the reproduction
of people and of production) form the 'seamless web' of dynamic social
and economic relationships which together define and sustain society.
This 'seamless web' constitutes the totality referred to in the definition
of the city. While these four spheres of the economy form a canple-
mentary unity, each growing out of and in turn reinforcing the other,
there are at the same time contradictions embedded in their inter-
action, and once again it is the productive sphere which holds the
1[9
ultimately decisive influence in their continual resolution. An
understanding of the nature and dynamics of these unifying and
opposing interactions is crucial to the comprehension of the evolu-
tionary dynamics of the city--their spatial container and sustainer.
This task lies outside the scope of this thesis, though the interactions
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between production and reproduction, work and living, are briefly
outlined in the following section.
Secondly, the dialectical interaction between base and super-
structure in the perpetual struggle to resolve or mitigate material
contradictions generated in the evolution of society, must not be
underplayed. The relationship is not a one-way flow from primary,
determining base to secondary, determined superstructure. Rather,
each sector possesses a degree of autonomy, and therefore to a certain
extent develops according to its own internal logic, while in their
interaction, each has an important role to play in determining the
nature of the outcomes, though the connection between the base and
material existence designates to the base the power of setting limits
and exerting pressures which ultimately circumscribe superstructural
[101
activities. It is well to recall Engel's qualificatory remarks in
[ll]
connection with his (and Marx's) statement quoted above:
"...if somebody twists this into saying that the economic
elemnent [base] is the onZy determining one, he transforms
that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless
phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the
various elemnents of the superstructure...also exercise their
influence upon the course of the historical struggles and
in many cases preponderate in determining their form."
The most important purpose of this mutual interaction between
base and superstructure is to create and maintain the conditions
necessary for the perpetuation of the mode of production itself.
[12]
According to David Harvey:
"This means the perpetuation of political, juridical and
other ideological forms (including states of social
consciousness) which are consistent with the economic basis,
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as well as the perpetuation of the various relationships
(for example, division of labour) within the economic basis
itself. The survival of an economic system requires, for
example, the survival of the property relations upon which
it is based."
It is in this respect that the various components of the superstruc-
ture play a vital role--maintaining things as they are, in some
cases, and modifying existing social and econanic relations when
they become untenable in the face of concerted opposition, but
always preserving the essential characteristics of the mode of pro-
duction. This conclusion pervades the historical study, where it
was seen to be highly influential in determining the form of London's
development. It will be developed more concretely in a subsequent
section of this chapter.
From the above discussion of the mode of production, it follows
that numerous qualitatively and quantitatively different modes of
production can exist, either in different societies or in the same
society in preceeding historical periods, depending on the concrete
social and economic relationships developed by the society in question
to ensure the material existence of its members at a certain level of
development. Furthermore, because modes of production are social
processes which cannot be expected to begin and end at discrete time
periods, it is highly likely that a particular society will simultane-
ously contain different, and potentially conflicting modes of produc-
tion, though one will dominate and can be considered to be the mode
of production which characterizes that society and differentiates it
from other social formations. Thus it is both legitimate and
instructive to analyse 'feudal' versus 'capitalist,' or 'competitive
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capitalist' versus 'monopoly capitalist' modes of production, even
though (and this should be accounted for in the analysis) elements of[131
one are present in the other.
Finally, it should be clear that the existence of cities is
not inevitable or predetermined in scne abstract manner, but is
totally dependent on the nature and requirements of the prevailing
mode of production. This fact has three important implications for
the theory of urban developnent. Firstly, each mode of production
will be characterized by a particular relationship between town and
country. For example, a mode of production may not require, and there-
fore generate, urbanism--concentrations of people and wealth-in
which case a theory of urban developnent would clearly be unwarranted!
Secondly, in those modes of production which predicate urbanism, the
nature and form of urbanismn will be determined by the characteristics
and requirements of that mode of production, because it is the pur-
pose of the city to serve the needs of the mode of production. This
does not mean that the concrete form of two cities which are situated
within similar modes of production, will be identical. The concrete
realization of urban form is a function of other criteria, discussed
in a subsequent section of this chapter, which have a high degree of
autoncany. Thus, these two cities could, and would in reality,
exhibit vastly different social and spatial patterns, each of which
lies within the limits set, and pressures exerted by the same mode of
production. The differences among Paris, London and Los Angeles,
referred to in Chapter 3, constitute an excellent example. Thirdly,
urbanism must be seen as a dynamic process, always subject to change
-243-
and constantly evolving into new forms of social and spatial struc-
ture as the mode of production evolves and changes. These considera-
tions point to a conclusion that the theory of urban development
must explain the origins and basis of particular variants of
urbanism; in other words, it must account for itself.
Class Struggle and Urbanian under Capitalism.
Up to this point, it may seenm as though I am implying that the
processes of societal and urban development are essentially egalitar-
ian and harmonious; and, therefore, that conflict and struggle between
fundamentally opposed forces play a negligible part in these processes.
However, this conclusion is blatantly contradicted by the historical
study. London's development was patently riddled with conflicts and
struggles. Indeed, it was argued that the concrete form which the
city assumed was fundamentally the resultant of their dynamic reso-
lution. And this latter conclusion clearly concords with our everyday
experiences of modern urban reality. Turn on the television, open the
newspaper, and you are bcmbarded with reports which have conflict and
struggle as their cammon theme: labour unions on strike for higher
pay, their bosses busing in blacklegs to turn the tide in their
favour; suburban residents defending the practice of exclusionary
zoning against the onslaught of the central city poor; landlords versus
tenants over rent control; public-housing tenants demanding adequate
maintenance from local councils; etcetera. Conflict and struggle
are obviously crucial in the processes of societal and urban devel-
opment. In fact, they give these processes their dynamism. Thus we
must understand the nature and basis of these conflicts and struggles.
We-can accomplish this task by dissecting the word 'society' which
figures as an active agent in our definition of the city.
'Society' means class society--to be more concrete, in this
context it means capitalist class society--and it is the evolving
struggle between classes which constitutes the dynano at the basis
of the process of urban developnent. Let us examine this assertion.
In this society, as in most existing and previous societies,
there is a basic contradiction within the mode of production between,[14]
as Ben Brewster has put it:
"the real conditions of appropriation of nature--all the social
relations,cultural and physical factors that go into the
process of production--and the conditions of erpropriation--
the relations determining the ownership and distribution of
the product."
The fact that the process of production and reproduction of material
life is overwhelmingly social in its character and consequences,
contradicts the private character of the ownership and control of the
process of production and reproduction itself and of the distribution
and reinvestment of the outputs of this process. Any society must--
if it is to develop the capacities of its mode of production and
thereby its potential for improving the material existence of its
members--produce a surplus, over and above the amount of productive
effort which is necessary to supply the consumption of, to reproduce,
the actual producers; and it must develop a particular mode of
distributing that surplus and ensuring that most of it is reinvested
so as to expand its productive capabilities in defined directions.
Under capitalisn, control over this process does not rest with the
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actual producers, and this is the social basis of the contradiction
[151
within the mode of production, state above. Exploitation, in the
non-pejorative sense of the word, is built into capitalist society
and this forms the social foundation of class formation and of the
struggle between classes.
Thus, class derives,in an objective sense, out of the relation-[16]
ships in which individuals stand to the mode of production. These
relationships are a function of both the division of ownership and
control of property and the division of labour, which together define
the social relations of production. Capitalist society, both histori-
cally and contemporaneously, consists of only two objective classes:
one having a canmon interest in preserving and extending the capital-
its power and property relationships and division of labour, and the
other having an antagonisn of interest on this issue. The former
constitutes the daninant capitalist class whose members own the means
and control the process and directions of production, the latter,the
subordinate working class, the non-owners and non-controllers. In
[17]
the words of Jeffrey Rudin:
"Membership of the dcninant class is objectively confined
to owners [and controllers] of the means of production,
all levels of management and the various appendent groups
[lawyers, teachers, planners, police, administrative
public workers, etc. who are not directly involved in the
process of production and distribution but perform functions
necessary to maintain the mode of production.] All other
people who live by selling their labour--and this
explicitly includes technocrats and the so-called white
collar workers--objectively form the subordinate class."
These social relations of production make up the objective
base of class. The fact that they are determined in a perpetual
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process of struggle enanating froma the fundamental endogenous contra-
diction of the mode of production, implies that they are dynamic,
constantly changing and evolving as the struggle unfolds. Thus,
class is a relational and oppositional concept.
However, understanding this objective dimension of class is
not sufficient to gain an understanding of the total behaviour of
the members of a class. To complete the whole, we must understand
the subjective superstructure of class, which is, once again, not
merely a passive reflection of the base but actively interacts with
it. It is also vitally important in understanding class aspirations
in connection with urban living. Briefly, the superstructure of class
refers to life style, racial and religious prejedices, educational
achievement, etcetera, all of which can be subsumed under the heading[18]
of 'status', both subjective status and accorded status. The
relative autonomay of the superstructure (consciousness) of class
means that individuals may or may not be conscious of their objective
class allegiance: while they do canprise a class in itself, they may
or may not comprise a class for itself. The lack of congruence
between the objective and subjective dimension within the subordinate
class, which seems to be the prevalent situation, makes it easier for
the dominant class to maintain control.
A good example of the interaction between the base and super-
structure of class is the behaviour of the 'labour aristocracy' during
the 19th century: they accorded themselves the status of "junior
partners in British Capitalisn Limited" and so did not present a
challenge to the dominant class. At least not until the 1880's when
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they began to develop a subjective class consciousness which was more
concordant with their objective position. It also meant that their
needs and aspirations in relation to urban living differed substan-
tially fran those of the less privileged sector of the working class.
And their failure to realize these needs and aspirations within the
prevailing socio-economic institutions played an important part in
their development of a working class consciousness towards the end
of the 19th century. The developnent of the West End during that
century further underlines the importance of the superstructure of
class in the determination of patterns of urban living. Leading
capitalists attained the status, both subjective and accorded, of
landed aristocrats, and thus gravitated towards the West End where
they could live like and with their aristocratic 'buddies' who wel-
caned them. As a result, the West End grew in size and has to this
day maintained its image, and much of its quality, as the the home of
the wealthy. The fact that both the 'labour aristocracy's' and the
capitalist's status goals originated out of struggles within the base
of class, and the reasons behind this, have been developed in Chapter 1
and should not be overlooked.
The dialectical interaction between the base and superstructure
of class must, therefore, be an important variable in the radical
theory of urban development. It raises a number of important con-
clusions about the process of urban development as a whole, and urban
living in particular. One of these is developed below, saome others
in subsequent sections of this chapter.
Given the importance of the superstructure of class, and the
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fact that the residential environment constitutes a very significant
element in the expression and satisfaction of superstructural class
aspirations, the conclusion must be drawn that struggles within the
sphere of urban living should be considered as part and parcel of the
overall process of class struggle. Thus, the radical theory of urban
development must expand our understanding, which is severely limited
at present, of the mechanisms by which, and the extent to which,
certain forms of urbanisn tend to pranote, and others (more usually)
to subvert, working class consciousness, that is, a concordance
between the base and superstructure of class. Indeed, John Foster
argues that this provides a useful means of cmanparing towns as a
[19]
whole. In an interesting paper, he
"...puts forward a method of comparing nineteenth-century
English towns; comparing them in terms of the class con-
sciousness of their inhabitants. This [he argues] provides
a way of comparing them as a whole--not just bits of them
(birthrate, street-plan, council comanposition). As a whole
(or nearly so) because the degree to which labour was
politically and socially united very largely determined a
community's mass social structure--housing and marriage,
language and politics. As a whole because class con-
sciousness or labour fragmentation refers to a canmunity
reaction to the essential nature of contenporary English
society; a reaction to it as a structured, politically
endorsed system of economic inequalities."
Thus the radical theory of urban developnent must expand our under-
standing of the relationships and contradictions between struggles
around urban living, where the subjective dimension of class seens
to dominate though the objective dimension is important (housing
quality is both a function and an objective expression of a person's
place in the division of labour and property), and those in the
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productive sphere, where subjective issues are important but objective
considerations dominate.
It should be clear from the preceeding arguments that the
phrase 'created by society' in our definition of the city essentially
means 'created by the class which is in control of society', and that
this 'creation' evolves both in response to the drive to expand
productive capacities and to challenges from the subordinate class.
But more on this in the next section. Suffice it to say that urban
development is not an entirely automatic process; that it betrays
a degree of purposefulness behind the actions of members of the
dominant class. By this, I do not mean to imply that a conscious
coordinated conspiracy is being perpetrated by the danminant class
but that we should guard against those theories which argue that
urban development is an entirely automanatic process--subject to the
"invisible hand of the market"--and therefore beyond human control.
This argument merely covers up and legitimizes the power and actions
of the dominant class and promotes the subservience of the subordi-
nate class.
Capital Accumulation and Urban Development.
In the previous section, we saw that there is a basic contra-
diction within the capitalist mode of production: that the social
character and consequences of the process of production and repro-
duction contradict the private ownership and control of that
process, which includes the production, distribution and reinvest-
ment of surplus value. It was argued that this contradiction lay
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at 'the basis of class formation and struggle, dividing capitalist
society into two opposing camps: the daninant class of owners and
controllers and the subordinate class of producers.
What the struggle between these two classes boils down to is
a twofold battle over how much of the productive effort should be
transformed into surplus value as opposed to supplying the consump-
tion of the actual producers, in the first place, and how the surplus
should be distributed and reinvested, in the second place. Fran this
formulation of the class struggle, it follows that members of the
daominant class, who control the production and realization of surplus
value and benefit directly from it, can enhance their position, both
econanically and socially, by producing and realizing increasing
amounts of surplus value;and, therefore, that this is their basic
motivation, subject, of course, to their maintaining control over the
process. On the other hand, members of the subordinate class can
improve their lot in two ways: quantitatively, by capturing relatively
more of the productive output for their own consumption and thereby
improving their standard of living (this is the basis of everyday
struggles); or qualitatively, by themselves gaining control over the
process of production and reproduction and changing its structure to
serve their needs and interests (this is the basis of revolution).
In essence, this duality is what everyday conflicts over wages,
profits, rents, taxes and interest rates are all about, and their
outcomes play an important role in shaping the city.
The concept of basic socio-econanic institutions, which was
introduced in the historical study, is very useful in gaining an
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understanding of how society mediates these conflicts in everyday
life, why certain outcomes necessarily occur and how this process
of conflict resolution patters urban developnent under capitalisn.
These issues are briefly outlined in this and the following sections.[201
What are basic socio-economaic institutions? The word
tinstitution' is not used in the popular sense which signifies a
group or collectivity of people: for example, referring to banks
as 'financial institutions' or schools as 'educations institutions'.
[21]
Rather, I will use the word in the following sense:
"An institution is simply a social process whereby individual
people or groups of people interact with one another in a
cammonly understood, typical and patterned way. An
institution, then, consists of two parts. First, there must
be cammonly understood guidelines (like rules in a game)
which point out what is considered acceptable behaviour and
on which people base their expectations of how other people
will act ... .Second, such institutional rules must be
accompanied by people actually acting according to those
rules; that is, there must be normal and patterned behaviour
consistent with the "rules of the game." A set of institu-
tional "rules" does not constitute an institution unless
people behave according to those rules."
These institutions are basic in the threefold sense of differentiating
the capitalist mode of production from other modes of production,
defining the 'rules of the game' of capitalism and thereby governing
its historical development and in facilitating an understanding of the
dynamics of capitalist society. Together these institutions define[22]
the capitalist mode of social and economic integration by means
of which the everyday actions and decisions of all the individual
members of society are fused to form the evolving captalist gestalt.
What are the basic institutions of capitalisn? According to
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Herbert Gintis, the most important are:
"(1) Private ownership of factors of production (land, labour,
capital) according to which the legal owner has virtually
full control over their disposition and developnent;
(2) a market in labour, according to which (a) the worker is
separated from ownership of non-human factors of production
(land and capital), (b) the worker relinquishes control over
the disposition of his labour during the stipulated work day
by exchanging it for money and (c) the price of a particular
type of labour (skilled, unskilled, white-collar, blue-collar,
physical, mental, managerial, technical) is determined
essentially by supply and demand; (3) a market in land,
according to which the price of each parcel of land is deter-
mined by supply and demand and the use of such parcels is
individually determined by the highest bidder; (4) income
determination on the basis of market-dictated 'returns' to
owned factors of production; (5) markets in essential commodities
-- food, shelter, social insurance, medical care; and
(6) control of the productive process by the owners of capital
or their designated managerial representatives."
It should be stressed that the word 'market' does not imply perfectly
canpetitive markets--the 'ideal type' concept so important in neo-
classical economic theory. Rather, it refers to institutions
according to which the behaviour of participants who are antagonistic
to each other is broadly governed by price movements and exchange
value, but in which non-econanic factors can, and usually do, also
play an important part. Furthermore, the concrete character of
these institutions can vary over time--markets in labour or land
in London during the 19th-century were clearly very different fran
their modern counterparts--yet in essence they remain constant. Thus
their exact nature must be determined through concrete historical
analysis, always incorporating their essential characteristics.
It should be apparent that the analysis of the mode of
production in terms of base and superstructure applies to the basic
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institutions which essentially are the mode of production. Thus
there are also superstructural institutions whose purpose is to
support and perpetuate the basic institutions. The most important
[2h]
ones are:
"[1] Hono econoaicus ['economic man'] the system of personality
traits characteristic of and functional to capitalism,
including especially the systen of individual gain incentives;
[2] the [systen maintenance] ideology which abstracts and
organizes "reality" in such a way as to justify and facilitate
the operation of the other institutions;"
and (3) the capitalist state, which provides and administers the
legal, legislative, military, police and general management functions
necessary to the maintenance and fine-tuning of the basic
[251
institutions.
Together these basic and superstructural institutions
embody the capitalist system, and, therefore, each incorporates in
[261
snme way the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist mode
of production, stated above. Thus, they are inherently unstable:
in their mutual interaction they lay down the written and unwritten
'rules of the game' of capitalism which produce both functional and
dysfunctional outcanes. Thus, while they must by definition
maintain their essential qualities, and thereby their contradictory
character, they must also be constantly modified in order to diffuse
the conflicts and crises which their normal operation generates.
I will now proceed to outline three major outcomes of the operation
of these institutions and their important implications for urban
developnent.
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Firstly, the fact that members of the dominant, capitalist class, or
their managerial representatives, control production means that capital
accumulation (that is, profit and growth maximization) is the major
goal of the productive unit. This is but a more accurate statement of
the previous argument that the production and realization of surplus
value is the capitalists' goal. Surplus value can be realized in three
different forms: directly productive (i.e., in the form of capital,
both 'human' and machine, which directly contributes to enlarged pro-
duction in the next cycle and is paid for out of profits); indirectly
productive (i.e., in the form of social and physical overhead capital
which contributes indirectly to enlarged production and is paid for mainly
out of taxes); and non-productive (i.e., in forms which absorb the surplus
without leading to enlarged production--rent, interest and capitalist
consumption). Clearly, if all surplus value is realized in its non-
productive form, then the economy cannot grow and the basis of the capi-
talists' economic and social dominance is severly undermined. Thus, a
certain proportion of the surplus must be realized in the form of directly
productive capital, if only to ensure that capitalists prosper. And same
of the surplus must be turned into indirectly productive investments--
schools, roads, power generation systems, etc.--to ensure that the basis
exists upon which the productive enterprise can grow. This leads to the
conclusion that capital accumnulation is, and must be, the goal of the
capitalist systen because it ensures the economic advancement and[27]
dominance of the capitalist class.
This conclusion has a number of important implications for urban
developnent under capitalism. In the first place, the accumulation of
capital in progressively larger units is accompanied by its
-255-
concentration in the hands of fewer and fewer people and by the
[28]
spatial concentration of capital in cities and towns. Thus,
capitalian necessarily leads to urbanisn because the capitalist
mode of realizing surplus value necessarily leads to its spatial
concentration in cities and towns. The uneven distribution of
wealth in society is mirrored by the uneven distribution of wealth
over space. This points to the conclusion that the radical theory
of urban development must explain the dialectical interactions
embedded in the antithesis between town and country, large towns
and mnall towns and between towns in advanced capitalist countries
and towns in underdeveloped capitalist countries. This is especi-
ally important in understanding the concrete development and
peculiarities of particular cities or towns, as the case of London
--the financial heart of the 19th-century capitalist world--aptly
indicates.
Secondly, because it is the locus of capital accumulation,
[29]
the city must itself be regarded as a force of production -
though indirectly productive; it is as necessary to the existence
and efficiency of the productive enterprise as machines and raw
materials. Thus, urban development must primarily occur in ways
which support and enhance the process of capital accumulation, as
opposed to those which enhance the social utility of living in the
city. As the historical study showed, this goal was an extremely
influencial force in shaping London's development: the pattern of
railway and dock development, the street improvements and the
centralization of economic activity, all derived from it--and the
-256-
social consequences were disasterous. The fact that the responsi-
bility for most urban infrastructure investments in modern cities
is the responsibility of central and local government bodies and
is paid for out of public funds does not negate this conclusion.
The actions of these organizations form part of the third super-
structural institution--the capitalist state. One of the most
important functions of the capitalist state, as both London's history
and modern urban development indicate, is to enhance or at least[30]
ensure the maintenance of a certain rate of capital accumulation
without impairing capitalist class dominance. Thus, unless popular
responses to socially irrational public investments are particularly
vehement and widely supported, priority will usually be given to
those investments which promote capital accumulation by increasing
the efficiency of the city as a force in production.
Thus, the city can be viewed as the spatial enbodiment of
the fundamental 'socio-private' contradiction of the capitalist mode
of production: the social character and consequences of the process
of urban development contradict the private--that is, the capitalist
class--control over, and benefits from, that process.
A comparison between 19th-century London and modern London
bears out this conclusion. While the productive efforts, both manual
and intellectual, of society as a whole, have engendered great
advances in urban technologies--for construction, transportation,
communication and many other urban services--it is clear that urban
problems which existed in the 19th-century continue to plague
London today, though their form may have changed in certain cases;
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and it is questionable whether the experience of urban living has
improved, in a relative sense, for a sizeable proportion of the city's
population. Pollution, congestion, slums--indeed, urban environmental
destruction in general--are but different spatial expressions of the
pervasive effects of this fundamental contradiction in shaping the
urban environment. We will return to this contradiction, in the
following section, when discussing the relationship between work and
living.
The third urban implication of the capital accumulation impera-
tive derives frcan the necessity for an adequate amount of the total
surplus to be realized in its directly and indirectly productive forms.
This exposes a contradiction between the capital accumwnulation imperative
and the institution which allocates space to competing users--the market
in land. Ccmpetition for urban space, an essentially fixed and scarce
resourse, leads to consistentinflation of land rents. This is the basis
of the mythical qualities of land ownership as a hedge against inflation.
However, land rent is a non-productive form of surplus value. Thus, to
the extent that increasing quantities of surplus value are realized in
the form of land rent, so the growth of production tends to diminish.
On the other hand, the market in land is a necessary institution, both
for allocating land to campeting users so that locational advantage
accrues in proportion to economic power and thus as a function of a
firm's ability to accumulate capital; and, equally importantly, for
Justifying the resulting configuration in the minds of those who suffer
[311
in the process. And, furthermore, the inflation of land rents is
predicated upon the perpetuation of capital accumulation from whence
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increased amounts of money to pay for increased land rents originate.
The fact that the nationalization of land has been advocated
since the days of Henry George and has yet to be implemented not only
indicates the power of the institution of private property and the
political nightmares involved in placing responsibility for a neces-
sarily uneven and anti-social allocation of land in the hands of the
state, it also implies that mechanisms exist for mediating this
contradiction between capital accumulation and land rent (and interest,
for that matter). It seems as though state budgetary and legislative
[32]
policies, the investment decisions of major financial organizations
[33]
(banks, insurance comnpanies, building societies, pension funds, etc.),
as well as the dynamics of individual struggles between firms and land-
[3•]
lords, or tenants and landlords,or bosses and workers, hold the key
to the nature of such mediating mechanisms as exist. However, our
knowledge on this subject is quite limited. Clearly, an understanding
of what these regulatory mechanians are, and how they operate, is
important to an understanding of the process of urban development under
capitalism, and, therefore, it should form part of a radical theory of
urban development. 1351
Spatially uneven developnent is a fourth consequence of the
drive to accumulate capital. The market in land ensures its uneven
distribution: the allocation of land being a function of a firm's
ability to accumulate capital, with the most successful accumulators
being in a position to outbid all others for locations which best
suit their needs. Thus, certain sectors of the city prosper and
others decay depending on the fates of the productive and cammercial
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enterprises located within then. This phenomenon is compounded by the
fact that declining productive and commercial enterprises are forced to
pay low wages and are characterized by high rates of unemployment and
underenployment. Furthermore, these workers are either excluded from
most housing sub-markets or cannot afford the cost of transportation
which would enable then to live away from their workplaces. Thus,
declining enterprises are usually intermingled with slums. And the
permanence and bulk of urban investments tends to seal the fate of
these dilapidated areas for a long time. As was shown in the historical
analysis, this, in the briefest outline, was the basic reason for the
slums of the East End, an area which has, for similar reasons, main-
tained its low quality status and character. This inevitable tendency
of the capitalist systen to generate and sustain uneven spatial develop-
ment is also the partial basis of the black central-area ghetto--
3 61
white suburbs dichotomy so characteristic of large American cities.
The second major outccme of the operation of capitalist basic
institutions arises both out of capitalist or managerial control of the
productive enterprise and the institutionalization of markets as a
mode of econcmic integration. As a result, the capitalist systen is
'Inaterially productive of individual, marketable (as opposed to social)
[37]
goods and services" because it is only through producing increased
quantities of goods and services and selling then on the market that
the capitalist firm is able to realize profits and thereby expand.
This entails the minimization of input costs and the expansion of
production and sales. Hence, land, labour and capital are used as
efficiently as possible in the production of and accelerated amounts of
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marketable ccmmodities, subject to capitalists, or their managerial
representatives, maintaining secure control over the productive
enterprise. It also engenders the pressure to find new buyers for
the increased quantity of goods and to control the nature and extent
of their denands through exaggerated advertizing campaigns stressing
personal consumption, built-in obsolescence and, in general, the[38]
creation of a whole commodity fetishist culture.
What this amounts to is the important observation, which will
be expanded in subsequent sections of this chapter, that capitalist
class control must extend beyond the productive enterprise and into[391
most aspects of people's lives. As Paul Sweezy has put it:
"The modern giant corporation has a profound need to dcninate
and control all the conditions and variables which affect its
viability."
In all of its activities, the capitalist firm renains essentially
oblivious to the social consequences of its activities, except when
social pressures mount to such a pitch that lack of attention to
them would threaten the continued existence of the firm, in which
case changes (though not necessarily of the socially responsible
variety) are initiated.
These processes have important consequences for urban develop-
ment which must be incorporated into a radical theory. Firstly, the
city functions partly as a receptacle, though not the most efficient
or straightforward one, for the necessary disposal of surplus product
(i.e., of productive capacity for which there is no effective consumer
demand, but which the state 'consumes' in order to maintain a certain
-261-[(ho]
rate of capital accumulation, e.g., military weapons, space programs).
Railway development was seen to be an important example in the case of
19th-century British cities. Monumental architecture is another
example. And:David Harvey argues that nmuch of the expansion of GNP
in capitalist societies is bound up in the whole suburbanization
[41]
process.
Secondly, the city, being itself a massive composite of indi-
vidual marketable commodities, is subject to similar pressures as
those which determine the nature of other canmodities. Built-in
obsolescence, one of the capitalist system's devices for maintaining[42]
effective demand, pervades urban areas. Buildings, once built to
last, are demolished and new buildings with much shorter life-spans
erected in their places. The shorter the economic and physical life of
products, the quicker the rate of circulation of surplus value, and the
higher the rate of capital accumulation.
Thirdly, the range of urban products available to citizens and
consumers--houses, transport systems, entertainment--tend to follow the
prerequisites of capital accumulation and not the preferences of[431
individuals. As Herbert Gintis has argued:
"....observed consumer behaviour in capitalist society is a
rational reaction to the structure of available alternatives
for social activity open to the individual. No theory of
"consumer manipulation" is needed to explain this behaviour.
Indeed, the ability of socializing institutions (family, schools,
advertising) to affect behaviour must be explained by the
verification of their "message" in the realities of day to day
social life. If consumer behaviour seemns odd or perverse, this
is due less to any' irrationality of individual preferences than
to the restricted choice-sets of social activities they face,
and to the fact that rational individuals will develop capacities
to utilize what is available."
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Thus, ranch or Spanish or colonial or ... style houses are built and
consumers buy them, displaying their relative 'preferences' for one
style or another. On a much larger and more significant scale, the
production of autnmobiles, and their network of supportive infra-
structure, especially in America has surpassed investments in public
transportation to such an extent that car ownership has beccme a
[44]
necessity of life in the city. Thus, Marx was correct when he[451
wrote:
"Production thus produces consumption: first, by furnishing
the latter with material; second, by determining the manner
of consumption; third, by creating in consumers a want for
its products as objects of consumption. It thus produces
the object, the manner and the desire for consumption."
The neo-classical theory of location and land use, which is
crucially dependent on the sovereign consumer maximizing his utility,
becomes highly suspect in the light of this argument. The East End
poor, for example, did not base their 'decision' to live in the slums
on a utility-maximizing trade-off between accessibility to the centre
and the cost of land. As we have seen, the slums of east London were
the only choice of residential location open to them. The argument that
they chose to live there merely serves to justify a system which
deprived them of any choice in the matter.
Fourthly, the structural bias towards the production of marketable
goods and services means that, wherever financiaZly feasible, urban
social and physical overhead capital will be privately produced and
marketed. However, as soon as their production ceases to be profitable,
such investments are discarded by private enterprise. If in the mean
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time, they have become essential to the survival or smooth functioning
of the economy, then the state is forced to assume ownership and to
maintain and operate these infrastructure investments, the losses being
borne by the tax payers and handsome profits accruing to the previous
[461
owners. Social diseconomies are perpetually tolerated, but the state
steps in as soon as financial losses are incurred. While I have not
made detailed investigations of any British cases, the applicability of
this model to American cities would seen to indicate that the nationali-
zation of the railways and the 'metropolitanization' of London's under-
ground, buses, roads, sewers, water and power supply--all of which were
privately owned and operated during the 19th-century--followed similar
developnental sequences.
Labour Market Stratification and Urban Living
Inequality of incane and status is a third major outcome of the
operation of capitalist institutions and it has especially important
implications for urban residential development and the relationships
[471
between work and living. In the words of Herbert Gintis:
"Incmne derives fram the market value of privately owned factors
of production. Ownership of non-human factors (land and
capital) must be unequal in order to ensure the operation of
the market in labour--i.e., in order to force workers to sell
their labour or suffer the consequences. In addition, the prices
of various types of labour and the price of capital (i.e., the
profit rate) are determined through the autonomanous operation of
basic institutions, in such a manner as to allocate then toward
their universal contribution to profit....Moreover, the organi-
zation of corporate production along lines of hierarchical author-
ity and the association of income differentials as synbolic of
relative hierarchical status, makes the income distribution a
reflection of the very technology of production ... .Thus, capitalist
societies are unequal societies."
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From this it follows that a certain degree of inccme inequality is
functionally essential to, and not a correctable abberation of, the
capitalist mode of production.
The fact that urban residential land is differentially allocated
by the market in land largely as a function of incmne obviously leads
to unequal residential development. And residential inequalities not
only reflect those emanating in production, but serve as powerful
reinforcement as well, confirming and rewarding the structural inequalities
of capitalist society. These facts 'leap out' of the historical study
and are confirmed by the reality of modern urban living.
However, I am more interested in focusing on the
dialectics of income, status and residential inequalities within the
subordinate, working class, as these hold the key to an understanding
of how urban residential development dovetails into the class struggle,
and of the basis and persistence of urban housing problems. Obviously,
such an understanding is crucial to a radical theory of urban social
and spatial development.
The first step towards this goal is a radical theory of the
nature of the market in labour--both within the firm and in general.
This is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is useful to summarise
briefly the major arguments and conclusions of the emerging radical
analysis, as these reveal important implications for the theory of
urban residential developnment.[48]
According to this view, the market in labour consists of two
mutually interacting parts--the social relations of production (i.e.,
the internal organisation of the firm) and the external relations of
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production or external labour market (i.e., overall labour supply and
demand, primary and secondary labour markets, unemployment, etc.).
The structure, characteristics and dynamics of the external labour
market are essentially determined by the social relations of production
which are in turn influenced by external labour market conditions.
"The central argument," according to Richard Edwards, "is that the
institutional arrangements within the firm which govern production--
the 'social relations of the firm'--are essential in explaining labour
[1491
market behaviour."
Thus, an explanation of what determines a certain configuration of
social relations within the firm lies at the basis of the radical theory
of the market in labour. -It is argued that the maintenance of capitalist
or managerial control of the firm--one of the basic institutions--is the
primary determinant of its organizational structure; that goals of
technical efficiency or profitability hold sway only in so far as the
configurations which they necessitate do not threaten or hamper the
control imperative, because in the last analysis, capitalist or managerial
prosperity is predicated upon their maintaining control of the productive
enterprise. After examining the organization of production under feuda-150]
lisn, capitalism and Soviet socialism, Stephen Marglin concludes that:
"....the primary determinant of basic choices with respect to
the organization of production has not been technology--
exogenous and inexorable--but the exercise of power--endogenous
and resistible."
In other words, class conflict, over the nature of the productive
process and the division of the net product (the upper and lower bounds
of which are set by external labour and capital market conditions), is
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viewed as the fundamental determinant of the social relations of
[51]
production. The radical theory, in the words of Herbert Gintis:
"...sees the internal social relations of the firm as chosen
by the director, along with the political system of the
enterprise, in order to mediate the contradiction between
workers and directors. We thus begin with the contradiction and
show why certain organizational forms, work roles and hiring
practices result. This is what is meant when Marxists say
that the social relations of production and their historical
evolution can only be understood as emanating from the 'class
.struggle.'"
The resultant social relations of production are, therefore, both
a.way of organizing the productive efforts of workers, as well as a
system of controlling them: through sanctions, incentives, the distribu-
tion of authority and other devices by which power is exercised and
legitimized. The most powerful modes of control have historically
been based on the principle of 'divide and conquer', a strategy which
has served the capitalist class well by insulating one section of the
labour force from another, thereby subverting the growth of a collective
class consciousness. These divisions have always existed under capitalism,
though the criteria upon which they have been based have changed--from
the differentiation between trades and skills within the small, hetero-
geneous firms of the 19th-century to the more arbitrary and finely tuned
bureaucratic hierarchies which seem to be necessary to hide the hono-
geneous atmosphere of mammoth modern corporations.
Thus, income and status differentials within the firm, while
bounded by external labour market conditions, are really the product of
the need for bosses to maintain control and are not simply a product of
the varying marginal productivity of different groups of workers.
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At the top of the scale, the potential loss of high wages and other
trappings of high occupational status ensure that workers essentially
control themselves; at the bottom, the threat to their existence
forces workers to accept unfulfilling, low-status jobs, paying low
wages. Furthermore, these stratificatory devices constitute a powerful
system of econanic and social incentives designed to motivate workers to
'give their all' in service of the productive enterprise.
It is important to understand that these divisions are not solely
the product of capitalist or managerial manipulation, but are partly an
expression of workers' responses to their loss of control over the
[52]
decisions which affect their daily lives. This is why sub-groups
display such a tenacity for survival and opposition to attempts at class
unification. This conclusion is amply confirmed by the development of a
'labour aristocracy' in 19th-century Britain. And the stirrings of a
working class consciousness within their ranks, partly as a result of their
housing problems during the 1880's, point to another conclusion which
exposes the dynamics of this stratification process. This conclusion is
[531
well stated by John Foster:
"If, therefore, the system's economic contradictions force the
ruling class to ask too much of these men--to countenance
attacks on existing expectations and identities--then it runs
the risk of forcing at least part of then into opposition. In
these circumstances, opponents of the syst'n itself get the
chance to take up their defence and, if the struggle goes on long
enough, may even be able to merge sectional identities into a
collective class identity developed around slogans incaompatible
with the existing order. Hence, false consciousness--while the
antithesis of class consciousness--does contain within it (as a
kind of historical ratchet stop) the crucial trigger capable of
upsetting the whole systen. And once the deeper social crisis
has occurred...either the system is successfully overthrown or,
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if the old order is to survive, its whole political economy must
be fundamentally modified...to win back at least certain sections
of the labour force."
In the light of these social relations of production, it is not
surprising to find that the external labour market is also stratified--
151]
broadly into primary and secondary sectors, and more finely within
each. Nor are the differential 'outputs' of systems which serve to
prepare people for their 'slot' in the labour market--especially
155]
schools, neighbourhoods and the family--surprising.
Finally, the radical analysis of the labour market views poverty,
which is but the low end of the incmane-status differential scale, as
both a functional and potentially antagonistic outcome of the market in
labour, of which it is a structural feature and not a tenporary aberation.
As the London casual labour market of the 19th-century showed, it is
an important part of the intricate system of incentives and controls
which keep the overall economic system going. Howard Wachtel cites four
[56]
reasons for this:
"First, extreme wage and income inequality is necessary to
induce workers to perform alienating work for external rather
than internal rewards....Second, the existence of a poverty
underclass...serves as a warning to the non-poor that their
fate could be much worse, thereby mitigating labour militancy
by dividing labour along status lines. Third, to the extent
that the poor form a "reserve army of the unemployed," wages
are depressed, some unions are weakened, and labour's ability
to obtain a greater share of incane generated in production is
diminished. Fourth, the non-poor's real inccane is substantially
increased by poverty,...since commodities and services can be
obtained at lower prices so long as wages are depressed by the
existence of the poor and capital retains its power to extract
profits."
Furthermore, guaranteeing workers a socially adequate supply of
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essential ccmmodities is patently dysfunctional to, if not destructive
of, the operation of the market in labour. Like the proverbial birds
1571
of a feather, capitalism, poverty and inequality flock together!
I will now outline sane implications which this stratification
of the working class holds for urban residential developnent. In
order to do so in a coherent and consistent fashion, it is useful to
develop a new concept: that the city is a force of reproduction of
-1581
Labour. This is the dialectical opposite of the concept of the city as a
force of production, proposed in the previous section. What it refers
to.is the important truism that the city is not only a place where goods
are produced by people, it is equally a place where people reproduce
thenselves (i.e., live) so that they are able to continue producing.
Under capitalism, these two functions of the city are spatially
separated--there is an extensive and systematic split between work and
living. And the existence of this split is fundamentally a product of the
capitalist institutional structure. In order forthe market in labour to
exist and operate efficiently, work and living must be separate. Workers
must be forced to sell their labour for a wage, the object of which is
to procure a certain standard of living for themselves, partially via the
[591
market in-urban living. However, the spatial split between work and living
tends to hide their interrelatedness and interdependence.
This uncovers another aspect of the relationship between urban form
and the capitalist mode of production. The contradictory interactions
between the city as a force of production and the city as a force of
reproduction give capitalist cities their fundamental formal character:
the split between work and living, physically linked by transportation
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and cammunication systems, and socially linked in the day-to-day
experiences of people--who inhabit both worlds. Once again, this
contradiction is but another way of formulating the dominant-subordinate
class antagonisn of capitalist society.
Clearly, a symbiotic relationship between work and living--
between the social relations of production and the social relations of
[60]
living. -- must exist if the city is to function relatively
snoothly as a 'device' for reproducing labour. This leads one to expect
that the market in urban living must exhibit certain similarities to the
market in labour, that the market in urban living must also be stratified
along income and status dimensions (which it obviously is) and, more
importantly, that this stratification is equally functional in subverting
the developnent of a collective working class consciousness. On the
other hand, this does not mean that antagonians do not exist between
these two spheres of social relations, antagonisms which either serve a
functional purpose of further diffusing class consciousness, or the
dysfunctional (fran a dcmaninant class point of view, of course) purpose of
class unification, thereby forming the basis of the evolutionary dial-
ectic of the social relations of living. In fact, the historical
study supports all of the above observations.
This can be summarized in the form of three related propositions
which support the latter part of our earlier definition of the city,
and which must be incorporated into a radical theory of urban living
and city form.
The first proposition is that the market in urban living and the
social relations of living usually reflect the market in labour
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and the social relations of production--the primary structuring spheres
of capitalist society. The autonomous operation of the market in urban
living, given the income differentials among participants, can be
expected to produce residential hierarchies which mirror work hierar-
chies. However, the fact that residential neighbourhoods, which comprise
the hierarchical rungs, are more than just houses leads one to expect
that this outcome is neither purely a market response, nor is it auto-
matic or inevitable.
This leads to the second proposition: that residential hierar-
chies, by incorporating a comprehensive range of supportive systems and
organizations (schools, shops, pubs, entertainment, welfare systems,
transportation, the complex social network of friends and acquaintances,[611
etc.) serve the purpose of supporting work hierarchies. In other
words, that the strata of residential neighbourhoods, which comprise the
overall market in urban living, are each part of the material and
ideological infrastructure which correspond to, and support strata
within the labour market. The East End during the 19th-century was a
perfect example of this.
The housing problemns of the 'labour aristocracy' during the 1880's
indicate a third proposition: that the resolution of the contradiction
between the city as a force of production and the city as a force of
reproduction can and sometimes does structure the market in urban living
so that incongruent outcomes are produced-.that the social relations of
living contradict the social relations of production--and that
such contradictions are potentially productive of collective working
class consciousness. In these instances, the maintenance of ruling
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class control necessitates changes in the structure of the market in urban
living such that new forms of social relations of living are generated which
are once again congruent with the social relations of production. Further-
more, because the social relations of production are themselves dynamic and
changing, this contradiction might arise without significant changes in
the structure of the market in urban living.
In all of these processes, the concepts of the 'market in urban living'
and the 'social relations of living' are crucial. In the following section
I will explain my understanding of the meaning and relevance of these con-
cepts, which proved to be invaluable in understanding and explaining 19th
century London's development from a radical perspective. A subsequent sec-
tion will deal with the relationship between labour market stratification,
poverty and the housing problem under capitalism.
The Social Relations of Living
The common feature of the concepts developed in the previous four sec-
tions of this chapter is that they are each related in some way to the deter-
mination of those pressures which provide the impetus for urban development
or decay, the gestalt of these pressures determining the directions, objects,
limits and/or rate of such development or decay. However, these pressures
are only part of the process of urban development--they comprise complex
bundles of decisions, usually contradictory and/or conflicting, which people
make and endeavour to satisfy in the urban environment. Just as a tennis
player's decision to hit the ball to the far left-hand corner of the oppo-
nent's court is not sufficient to actually move the ball there, so these
pressures, while absolutely necessary, are not sufficient to actually shape
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the city. For the tennis player to realize his/her intentions, he/she must
hold the racket in a certain way, stand in a certain position, swing the
racket at a certain speed, the' racket must be strung in a certain manner,
the ball must respond in a certain way, etc. Similarly with the process of
urban development: certain formative mechanisms must exist which serve to
translate the totality of pressures into the social and spatial reality which
is the city. Consequently, the concepts developed to understand only these
pressures do not constitute a sufficient basis upon which to build a radical
theory of urban development. To make the theory complete, another set of
concepts must be developed which elucidate the formative mechanisms which
determine the actual shape of the city and its parts. This is the subject
of this section.
What is the object of these pressures or intentions? Stated very
simply, it is to secure a certain quality and quantity of space which is
appropriate to the needs of all the individuals who, and corporate bodies
which, must for a variety of reasons be located in the city. As I have argued,
the totality of functions which are carried out in the city can be broadly
divided into two categories--those which relate to the city as a force of
production (not only industrial production but all those activities necessary
to keep the city viable as a locus of capital accumulation--communication,
transportation, public and private goods and services, offices, markets, etc.)
and those which relate to the city as a force of reproduction (all those
activities necessary to reproduce life in the city--housing, communication,
transportation, education, health care, essential and non-essential commodity
distribution, entertainment, other public and private goods and services, etc.).
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Of course, many urban functions are both productive and reproductive. But
the point is not the preciseness of the division; rather it is to stress that
conflicting and contradictory pressures for urban space are generated both
within each sphere and in the interactions between them, and that these
must somehow be mediated for the city to become a reality.
Under capitalism, the socially-accepted institution which performs
this mediating function is the market in Zand. According to this institution,
the price of each parcel of land is broadly regulated by supply and demand,
and the use of each parcel is largely individually determined by the highest
bidder. In my view, it is inappropriate and uninstructive to consider the
market in land as a whole. Rather, it is more useful to conceptualise the
market in land as comprised of a number of sectors, each relating to a different
category of land use (residential, industrial, commercial, office, govern-
mental, etc.) though connected by their competition for spatial locations
which satisfy their particular requirements.
Both economic and political power play important roles in deciding
the outcomes of this incremental and perpetual competition for urban space.
Due to the structural inequalities in the distribution of income and political
power in capitalist society, this competition is inherently unequal. Thus,
in the overall urban land market, there is a pecking order for land, with
those individuals and/or corporate bodies having the greatest economic and
political leverage usually achieving priority and being most likely to
acquire the area and location of land which matches their requirements; and
those at the bottom of the scale usually having little option but to accept
'left-over' parcels of land. As the historical study showed, finance and
-275-
commerce chose to locate in the City, certain industries chose to move to
the provinces, successful capitalists chose to live in the West End, most
members of the middle stratum chose to move to the suburbs though some were
forced to vacate their houses in the centre and, finally, most of the
working class were essentially forced to live in the central-area slums.
In this respect, it should be stressed that this is a dynamic process
over which no individual or corporate body has complete control. Those with
more power may be able to control outcomes to a significant degree by com-
bining their influence, but this cannot be guaranteed. On the other hand,
the process of urban development is sequential and, once locations are fixed,
the scale and permanence of the investment tends to perpetuate a certain
physical configuration which may become inappropriate to the more easily
changeable economic and social configuration. These changes are reflected
in changing relative land values which, as it were, reflect the changing
stage-set within which the actors in the land market must attempt to satisfy
their needs.
I will now narrow the analysis down somewhat by confining the remainder
of this discussion to the residential sector of the overall land market.
I do believe, however, that appropriately modified versions of the concepts
developed to understand the residential sector could be developed to under-
stand other sectors of the land market with equally enlightening results.
The residential sector of the urban land market is usually referred to
as the housing market. This is not a useful concept as its meaning is am-
[62]
biguous --ranging from just a market in houses to a market in houses-
plus-residential-services--and most connotations are too narrow and therefore
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restrictive. A more useful concept is the market in urban living.
What is urban living? It is a complex bundle of indivisible components
which people buy or rent when they buy or rent a house. These components
fall into three categories. First, those which relate to the land itself
(its size, geology, topography, etc.). Second, those which arise out of the
location of the parcel of land within the urban area. These consist of the
physical infrastructure of the locality (roads, transportation systems,
power, sewerage, parks, etc.); the access and accessibility which the location
affords to other activities, such connections being either essential, nec-
essary or desirable (workplaces, shops, entertainment, banks, social and
community services, etc.); and both positive and negative neighbourhood ex-
ternalities (people, community affairs, the physical condition of the area,
property taxes, pollution, congestion, etc.). Finally, the third category
of components of urban living relates to the house itself (its structure,
space, layout, aesthetics, fixtures and fittings, etc.). Together all these
components define the quality and quantity of the 'commodity' urban living
which people 'consume' in their daily lives, and whose consumption is an
essential aspect of urban existence.
Clearly the quality and quantity of these components and therefore
of urban living vary with the location of the house and land within the
urban area. Furthermore, no ideal quality and quantity of urban living exists,
though the socially accepted definition of what is adequate changes, usually
progressively, over time. For example, the 19th-century rookeries of central
London would be totally unacceptable by today's.standards, at least if simi-
lar proportions of the populations were forced to endure such degrading
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environments. Indeed, the historical study has shown that the definition
of what constitutes a socially acceptable standard of urban living varies
with class. Successful capitalists, whose main goal was to mingle with the
aristocracy of the West End, probably scoffed at the thought of moving to
the sprouting suburbs of the middle stratum; whereas these suburbs must
have seemed like paradise to the working class trapped in the slums of the
East End. Thus, the notion of a socially acceptable standard of urban
living for each class, being the data with respect to which people judge the
quality of their living situations, is more useful than the notion of an
ideal standard.
An important conclusion from the historical study in this regard is
that the object of the class struggle in the residential sphere of people's
lives is both to define the socially acceptable standard of urban living
for each class (and here social aspirations emanating from the relations of
production, such as the 'labour aristocracy's' struggle to separate them-
selves from the rest of the working class, are just as important as economic
considerations) and to enable members of each class to achieve, maintain or
improve upon their respective socially accepted data.
As with the analysis of the labour market, outlined in the previous
section, it is appropriate to analyse the market in urban living according to
the external and internal social and economic relations of which it is com-
prised. It is the interaction within and between these two sectors which
determine the differential quality of urban living enjoyed by the population
of the city, how much they have to pay for it, the spatial form of residential
areas and the dynamics of their development or decay. Herein lie the forma-
tive mechanisms through which the intentions and aspirations of individuals
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and corporate bodies are translated into a spatial reality. Thus it is impor-
tant to understand the nature and operation of these two broad sectors of the
market in urban living. I will first consider the external relations of the
market in urban living, then the internal relations and, finally, their
interaction.
What I have called the external relations of the market in urban living
consist partly of the whole range of economic and locational factors to
which most neoclassical economists restrict their attentions when analysing
the housing market. These factors can be divided into two broad categories:
those economic factors which affect the supply of and demand for housing and
those spatial or locational factors which define the characteristics and
quality of respective residential areas.
Briefly, the first category incorporates on the supply side: the
availability (or lack) of vacant houses for sale or rental, the availability
of capital to finance rehabilitation of the existing stock and/or new con-
struction, the capacities of the residential construction industry to reno-
vate run-down houses or build new ones, the availability of land for new
residential construction, the interest rates on loans, the existence of gov-
ernmental policies or programs designed to stimulate one or more of the above
factors or to actually provide housing, etc.; and on the demand side: wages,
salaries or other earnings which determine the occupants' abilities to pay for
housing, the availability of capital for house purchase or improvement, people's
willingness to put aside a certain proportion of their earnings to purchase or
rent housing, governmental policies or programs which affect people's abilities
to pay for housing, etc. The common feature of all the factors in this,
category is that each in some way conditions or set limits to the exchange
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vatue of urban living for both house occupants and other individuals and
corporate bodies involved in the housing process--landlords,building soci-
eties, construction companies, public housing authorities, etc. Most neo-
classical models of the urban housing market restrict the second category to
the area of land upon which the housing is built and its accessibility to
the centre. This makes modelling and quantification easier but is an incom-
plete statement of what people look for in their search for housing. A more
realistic definition of the spatial and locational factors which comprise
the second category is all those elements, stated above, which determine the
quality of the 'commodity.' In other words, all those elements which deter-
mine the use value of urban living.
However, two further categories of factors must be added to the above
two to complete the constituent parts of the external relations of the market
in urban living. First, those factors which define the socially accepted
standard of urban living for the respective classes of society, as discussed
above. This expands the purely economic definition of the demand for urban
living, to which neoclassical economists restrict their attentions, to a
sociological definition thereby incorporating urban living into the class
struggle. The socially accepted standard of living for each class is, of
course, the standard with reference to which the members of each class evaluate
the use value of urban living and base judgements of the legitimacy of and
their willingness to pay the exchange value demanded by the owners or con-
trollers of urban living. Second, those factors which determine people's
relative positions in the class structure and thereby their differential
social and political power to command a certain quality of urban living at
a certain price for themselves.
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Clearly, the boundaries between these four categories cannot be sharply
defined. Each set of factors conditions, and is in turn conditioned by, the
others. What is important, however, is that in their totality these external
relations of the market in urban living in turn condition, or set limits to,
outcomes in the internal relations of the market in urban living, to which I
now turn.
What are the internal relations of the market in urban living? These
are the institutional arrangements, both legal or quasi-legal, between
landlord (public or private) and tenant, buyer and seller, mortgagee and
mortgagor. These institutionalised arrangements are commonly referred to as
forms of tenure. However, this is another ambiguous concept. Its meaning
is commonly restricted to those legal arrangements which govern the occupants'
rights to ownership and/or control of the houses in which they live--their
security of tenure. But this is only a part of the institutional arrangements
surrounding the housing process.
The social relations of living is a more embracing and accurate concep-
tualization of the gestalt of these institutional arrangements which consti-
tute the internal relations of the market in urban living. And here we arrive
at the most crucial conclusion and contribution of this thesis--that the social
relations of living, in their totality, constitute the basic formative mech-
anism by means of which the pressures acting upon the market in urban living
are translated into a social and spatial reality, within the limits set by
the external relations of the market in urban living.
Thus, an understanding of the social relations of living holds the
key to an understanding of the processes which determine the quality of
urban living, its class distribution, its cost, its spatial form and the
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dialectical evolution of the behaviour and outcomes of the market in urban
living. The historical study, where the social relations of living were
labelled 'tenure relations,' bears out this conclusion--the quality and
spatial form of urban living experienced by members of each social class,
how much it cost them, the placement of transportation lines through resi-
dential areas, the possibilities for residential improvement, the housing
problem of the 1880's, etc., were all fundamentally a function of the vari-
ants of the leasehold form of social relations of living. I would even go
so far as to say that the concept of the social relations of living holds
the key to a general theory of urban or non-urban residential development,
irrespective of the economic system under which such development takes[631
place.
Under capitalism, the social relations of living consist of all those
social and economic relations, either legal or quasi-legal, between indivi-
duals and/or corporate bodies involved in the housing process, which control
and mediate the perpetual process of exchangethrough which the 'commodity'
urban living becomes a use value for house occupants by virtue of their
consumption of it, and simultaneously becomes an exchange value for its[64]
owners or controllers by virtue of the exchange process. In other words,
the social relations of living take the specific form of a system of legal
or quasi-legal controls which mediate the 'collision' process in which an
empty carcass of timber,bricks and mortar,which an individual or corporate
body owns or controls, and a quantity of money in the hands of a family, are
transformed into a home (use value) for the family on the one hand, and a
[651
rent (exchange value) for the owner or controller, on the other.
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Tenure relations--by which I do not mean just security of tenure, but
rather the whole range of social and economic relations which determine the
rights and responsibilities of the owners or controllers of housing and the
occupants--are the most important, though not the only, element of the social
relations of living. Urban living, as we have seen, consists of more than
just houses and, therefore, the social and economic relations governing the
rights and responsibilities of those who provide and receive a return for
the other components,must be incorporated into the concept of the social
relations of living. For example, local authorities which provide
public goods or services,paid for out of rates (or property taxes), and pri-
vate corporations which provide telephone or electricity services for which
they levy charges, must also be accounted for. Empirical observation seems
to indicate that the relative power which a particular group of occupants
are accorded in their tenure relations is generally similar to that which
is accorded them in these other relations. For instance, the working-class
inhabitants of the central London slums in the 19th century had a raw deal
from their landlords, the local vestries and the private water and sewerage
companies, whereas the opposite was the case for the wealthy West Enders.
In view of the brevity of this treatment, I will focus my attention on the
tenure relations aspect of the social relations of living.
These social relations of living, as I argued in the historical analy-
sis, were the basic determinants of the quality and spatial form of a resi-
dential area, of the rent paid for housing and even of the location of trans-
portation channels, specifically railway developments and street improvements.
For example, it was argued that the reason why Paris, London and Los Angeles,
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all cities in advanced capitalist countries, are so different, is because
their historical development has been governed by different social relations
of living. However, it must be stressed that the external relations of the
market in urban living also play an important part in these processes by
setting limits which tend to alter the balance of power between owner/con-
trollers and occupants. For example, the acute shortage of accommodation in
the East End slums gave landlords the upper hand and served to facilitate and
legitimate the charging of high rents for extremely low standards of urban
living. Thus, the social relations of living are the determining base of
urban living while the external relations of the market in urban living are
the conditioning, though important, superstructure.
As is the case with the market in labour, the market in urban living
is also stratified--broadly as a function of the various social relations of
living and more finely when these are meshed with two aspects of the external
relations: the social class of the occupants, and the physical and locational
characteristics of their neighbourhoods. For example, in modern London there
are four main social relations of living: owner occupation, public housing,
private unfurnished rental and private furnished rental. Housing associations
and institutionalized squatting are at present negligible in proportion to
these four. Each of these conveys different rights and responsibilities on
owner/controllers and on occupants. Owner-occupiers generally get the best
deal while private furnished tenants are usually worst off. Here is where
the social class of the occupants becomes important. The small proportion
of working-class owner-occupiers, for example, will probably have less
effectual control over the quality of their urban living than the small '
proportion of capitalists:-who rent private-furnished accommodation, due to
the relative power which their respective classes are accorded in capitalist
society. However, the fact that owner-occupation affords the occupants a high
degree of control over urban living, when compared to private furnished rental,
seems to be reinforced by the class distribution of tenure relations, with
members of the more powerful classes predominating in the owner-occupation
sector and those of weaker classes mainly renting private furnished accommo-
dation.
Furthermore, empirical observation seems to indicate that the quality of
urban living experienced,varies directly with the relative power which each
stratum of the market in urban living affords the occupants. For example, areas
where members of the lower strata of the working class rent private furnished
accommodation tend to be of low quality and badly maintained due to the weak
position of occupants in this stratum of the market in urban living. Thus,
the previous argument that a mutually reinforcing sociological connection exists
between the strata of the market in labour and those of the market in urban
living seems to be justified, and the social class of house occupants seems to
be the crucial common feature.
Finally, we must turn briefly to the determination of exchange value, or
rent. Each stratum of the market in urban living has its own peculiar rent [66]
structure. The two main forms of rent are absolute rent and differential rent.
Absolute rent arises by virtue of the institution which permits private owner-
ship and control of land. According to this institution, landowners are accorded
the quasi-monopolistic right to keep their land off the market until the external
relations are such that the land commands an acceptable rent. Thus, the abso-
lute rent for each stratum of the market in urban living is the rent which the
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land with the lowest standard of urban living within that stratum can command.
Differential rent is the varying increment above the absolute rent,which a
parcel of land can command by virtue of the higher standard of urban living,
within the respective strata, which it affords; this'standard being measured
in relation to the standard afforded by the land which commands only an abso-
lute rent.
The level of absolute and differential rent within each stratum of the
market in urban living is a function of five interrelated factors. First, the
quality of urban living which a certain location provides--i.e., its use value.
Landowners do not have a great deal of control over this factor. All they
can control directly is the nature of the house itself, while the remaining
elements of urban living are subject to indirect control via political and
social pressure on the bodies responsible for their provision and upkeep, mainly
local authorities. Second, the scarcity of urban living within each stratum.
A certain level of scarcity is as essential to the existence and operation of
the market in urban living,as is the necessity that the land plus improve-
ments have a certain use value. If the supply of urban living within a
certain stratum was infinitely plentiful, then the land upon which it was[671
built would command no rent. David Harvey's concept of absolute space
is useful in this respect. Each stratum of the market in urban living has a
certain amount of absolute space within the urban area available for its mem-
bers. The amount of absolute space usually diminishes in direct proportion
to the power of occupants as defined by the social relations of living and the
class structure. The more restricted the absolute space for urban living in
relation to the demand for it within each stratum, the higher the absolute
rent. The confinement of most members of the working class to.the central
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slums of 19th-century London and the high rents they had to pay,bears out
this conclusion.
The third and fourth factors in the determination of rent are the
ability and willingness, respectively, of occupants to pay the rent. These
are mainly, a function of the occupants' relative positions in the social
relations of production, their individual calculus as to how much to spend
on rent as opposed to other forms of consumption, and of governmental policies
which affect the availability of funds for purchase or rental, or which
directly control rent levels. Finally, the fifth factor is the social rela-
tions of living themselves, rent levels being a function of the respective
economic relations defined between the owners or controllers of urban living
and the occupants. For example, the lack of middlemen in the West End
leasehold system enabled occupants to pay more for their housing than those
who were housd under the 'sweated' leasehold system where each middleman had
to receive his cut. Similarly,today, the tax deduction on interest payments
which owner-occupiers are allowed enables wealthier owner-occupiers to pay
more than poorer ones, and owner-occupiers in general to pay more than renters.
This extremely preliminary analysis of the market in urban living
indicates that the three concepts--'urban living,' the 'external relations of
the market in urban living,' and the 'social relations of living'--which I
have developed,are important and useful in gaining an understanding of the
formative mechanisms which determine the actual shape of residential areas.
As such, they must command an important place in a radical theory of urban
living and city form.
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Capitalism and Working-Class Housing Problems
Much of the historical study was concerned with the causes of working-
class housing problems and the palliatives advanced for their solution or
mitigation. Though different in form, working-class housing problems and
the dilemma of what to do about them,are still as pressing today as they
were a century ago. What do the historical study and.the concepts outlined
in this chapter tell us about the nature and basis of these housing problems
and the popularly-accepted palliatives advanced for their solution or miti-
gation? In this section, I will briefly discuss some answers to this
double-barrelled question.
We have seen that labour market stratification--and with it the
stratification of the working class--and poverty, are structural features of
the capitalist mode of production. And these outcomes of the market in
labour and the social relations of production normally serve the functional
purpose of maintaining the capitalist class structure by providing the
incentive and control systems necessary to 'encourage' workers to 'play by
the rules of the game'; though the contradictions and hardships generated
in the process are potentially dysfunctional. Furthermore, as a result of
the integral economic and sociological connections between the market in
labour and the market in urban living, the market in urban living is simi-
larly stratified, with its own 'down-and-out' sector, and the resultant
residential hierarchies normally serve similarly functional incentive-and-
control purposes.
Thus, as long as the capitalist mode of production exists, residential
hierarchies will continue to exist--there will always be neighbourhoods in
which the standard of urban living is relatively low and vice versa.
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As long as people are free and able to compare their residential environments
with others, those in the lower strata of the market in urban living will
always feel that they have housing problems--that the quality of their hous-[681
ing is lower than the socially accepted norm. As Marx put it in 1847:
"A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are
equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But
let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a
little house to a hut. The little house shows now that its owner
has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may
shoot up in the course of civilisation, if the neighbouring palace
grows to an equal or even greater extent, the occupant of the rela-
tively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatis-
fied and cramped with its four walls.
A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of produc-
tive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about
an equally rapid growth of productive wealth, luxury, social wants,
social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have
risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in compari-
son with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inac-
cessible to the worker, [and] in comparison with the state of devel-
opment of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from
society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the
objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a
social nature, they are of a relative nature."
This leads to the important conclusion that reZative housing problems are
structural features of the capitalist mode of production and, that while
they may occasionally become a 'thorn in the side' of the system, they are
normally functional in maintaining the status quo, a fact which prompted
Engels to write in 1872: "Capital does not want to abolish the housing[69]
shortage even if it could; this has now been finally established."
Indeed, the fact that adequate housing at reasonable rents has perpetually
been beyond the reach of a section of the working class--that housing
problems have existed in London, for example, at least since the 1830's--
amply supports these conclusions.
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Furthermore, as we have seen, quality differentials and scarcities
in urban living must exist,in order for the market in urban living to
I70]
operate. If, by waving a magic wand, everyone could be housed in
socially satisfactory accommodation, then the demand for urban living would
become virtually non-existent and the economic consequences under capitalism
would be disastrous. The residential construction and real estate industries,
as least, would collapse and possibly the most important buffer for the en-
tire economy would disappear. Thus, capitalism must constantly make people
feel that the commodity-consumption limit is still distant and it must make
them fear the discomforts of falling to the bottom stratum of the market in
urban living. The system is 'doomed' to continually create new demands
whilst the capacity to satisfy them lags behind or is completely non-
existant. Once again we arrive at the conclusion that a "decent home for
1711
all" --the age-old goal of most bourgeois housing reformers--is an impos-
sible dream under capitalism.
Furthermore, H. G. Wells' 19th-century observation that "it was no-
body's business to see that people were well-housed under civilised con-
[72]
ditions" applies equally forcefully today. In fact, this phenomenon is
part and parcel of the capitalist institutional structure--for the basic
institutions to operate, workers must fend for themselves. And if these
institutions generate and perpetuate working-class housing problems, then
so be it.
Housing serves different and often contradictory functions for the
respective individuals and corporate bodies connected with the housing
process. This basically stems from the fact that some seek the use value1731
of a house, while others are concerned with its exchange value.
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Occupants want a home in which to live; developers and the housing con-
struction industry seek to profit from building and selling housing; real
estate agents make money by selling as many houses as possible; landlords
profit from rents; etc. Thus, there can be at least as many types of hous-
ing problems under capitalism as there are interest groups affected by the
housing process. For example, the housing problems of the Depression years
in the United States were as much problems for the housing construction
and financing interest groups as they were for people who needed roofs
over their heads. And the United States government's response--which en-
couraged new construction and suburbanization--reflected this fact. Thus,
when people propose or demand a solution to 'the housing problem,' they
must be clear about whose housing problem it is that they want solved.
Then what are the origin and nature of the everpresent working-class
housing problems? At the most fundamental level, these are products of
capitalist social relations in general and the social relations of living
in particular. As a result of the social, economic and political inequities
inherent in these relations, most members of the working class lack the
power to alter the outcomes of the basic institutions; they do not control
the decisions which determine the social and spatial geography of their
communities and their standard of urban living. And this lack of control
over urban living is but a part of the lack of power of the working class
in all spheres of life in capitalist society. In the words of
[74]
Herbert Gintis:
"...alienation from the community corresponds to our general proposition
[that alienation is a product of the basic institutions and social,
rather than psychological, in origin]: the institutions determining
the role structure, the power structure, and the physical structure
of a community operate apart from the needs of individuals."
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And this cannot be otherwise under capitalism, for the capitalist class
must extend its control into all spheres of life if it is to maintain its
hegemony. Thus, we may agree with Marx's statement to the First Interna-
[751
tional, that:
"The subjection of the man of labour to the man of capital lies at
the bottom of all servitude, all social misery, and all political
dependence."
While the external relations of the market in urban living--supply
and demand mismatches, low wages, etc.--may aggravate working-class housing
problems, they do not cause these problems. Increasing the supply or
lowering the cost of housing for the working class may help in the short
run, but unless the relative power of the working class in the social [76]
relations of living is enhanced, these gains will be lost in the long run.
Furthermore, concentrating the blame on factors in the external relations
of the market in urban living serves to exonerate the capitalist mode of
production and the capitalist form of urban development, both of which,
by assumption, are seen to be unproblematic; however, as Engels put it,
"the housing shortage...is one of the innumerable smaller, secondary evils1771
which result from the present-day capitalist mode of production,"
the central problem being the outcomes of the class struggle in the work-
[781
place. Thus:
"As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it
is folly to hope for an isolated settlement of the housing question
or of any other social question affecting the lot of the workers.
The solution lies in the abolition of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion and the appropriation of all the means of subsistence and instr-
ments of labour by the working class itself."
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What of the standard, accepted definitions, theories and solutions
advanced for working-class housing problems? A comprehensive critique is
out of context, but a few brief conclusions are in order. The historical
study has shown that the prevailing paradigm, by which these problems are
defined, explained and proposed to be solved, by virtue of the fact that[T791
it manages to prevail because the capitalist class does not oppose it,
is part of the ideological armour for maintaining the status quo--and there-
fore perpetuating the very problems it purports to be able to solve. This
end is not accomplished as a result of the malicious designs of the
paradigm's proponents; indeed, most are unaware of the inevitability of
this outcome. Rather, it is a reflection of the power of the ideological
opiate embedded in the paradigm which dulls the senses of those who uphold
it, blinding them to the central issues and the structural basis of working-
class housing problems.
This is not to say that ruling paradigms of working-class housing
problems are entirely wrong and therefore useless, but rather to put them
into perspective as one-sided views, biased in favour of the ruling class.
By viewing housing problems as separable from the essentially unproblematic
capitalist mode of production and urban development, falling in the domain
of the external relations of the market in urban living and not the social
relations of living, they inaccurately imply that these problems are only
temporary malfunctions which can, and will, be solved within the limits
of the social system. Defining these problems in terms of a shortage of[801
housing is a classic example. The implication is that if only ways
could be found to stimulate the construction industry to build more houses,
clearly a solution which lies within the capabilities of the system, then
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the housing problems of the working class will soon cease to exist. But
[811
this is not the problem, for, as Engels put it:
"...one thing is certain: there is already a sufficient quantity
of houses in the big cities to remedy immediately all real 'housing
shortage,' provided they are used judiciously. This can naturally
only occur through the expropriation of the present owners by
quartering in their houses homeless workers or workers overcrowded
in their present homes."
In other words, only by altering the balance of power within the social
relations of living will it become possible to do away with these housing
problems. Thus, the whole gestalt of actions and images emanating from
the 'housing shortage' definition serves to mystify the real causes of
these housing problems--the language of 'housing shortage' provides mean-
[82]
ingless symbols which dull critical faculties of the reality. And[83]
the same goes for the 'blaming-the-victim' view of the anachronistic
conservative school.
Thus, when dealing with working-class housing problems, it is crucial
to be clear about the purposes and interest served by defining and explaining
the nature and basis of these problems in a particular way.
The Role of the Capitalist State
Up to this point, save for the statement of the contention that the
capitalist state is a necessary superstructural institution of capitalism
charged with the function of ensuring the reproduction of the capitalist
system itself, I have made few arguments which support this contention or
which elaborate the role which the state does play in the process of urban
development under capitalism. However, the actions of the state were and
are crucial in this process. Therefore, in this section I will briefly
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[841
outline the major arguments of the radical theory of the state as these
pertain to urban development and some conclusions from the study of London's
development, which support these arguments.
As was previously argued, the basic institutions of capitalism
delineate a set of property relations which, in turn, define and demarcate
the class structure of capitalist society. These property relations ensure
the dominance of and confer material advantages on the dominant class, which
owns or controls the means of production and cause the subordinate, non-
owning class to suffer material disadvantages. The inherent instability of
[851
these class relations means that, in the words of Paul Sweezy:
"A special institution capable and willing to use force to whatever
degree is required is an essential to the maintenance of such a
set of property relations. Investigation shows that the state
possesses this characteristic to the fullest degree, and that no
other institution is or can be allowed to compete with it in this
respect....It is, therefore, not difficult to identify the state
as the guarantor of a given [in this case, capitalist] set of
property relations."
Thus, to put it another way, at the most fundamental level, the role of the
capitalist state is to reproduce the conditions which perpetuate the capi-
talist mode of production and thereby to ensure the hegemony of the domi-
nant class.
This means that the state must primarily maintain and perfect the
basic institutions. It can do so in two ways. First, by actual physical
coercion--maintaining law and order by virtue of its monopoly over the
legitimate forms of social violence: the military and the police. Second
by various forms of ideological legitimation whereby the subordinate class
is socialized to believe that the basic institutions are natural, inevitable,
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immutable and definitely non-problmatic (i.e., that social problems are
soluble within the capitalist institutional framework). The achievement
of such an acceptance obviates the need for control by means of physical
coersion, for it implies that the subordinate class agrees to 'play by the
rules' of capitalist society. The historical development of the state in
advanced capitalist countries has seen the rising effectiveness of the pro-
cesses of ideological legitimation and, therefore, the diminishing need to
resort to overt physical coercion. However, the endogenous instability of
these legitimation processes must be stressed--state actions can and must
generate the appearance that the oppression and exploitation arising out
of the operation of the basic institutions does not exist,or is at least
transient, but they cannot change the reality of their structural basis.[861
In the words of Isaac Balbus:
"...the socialization process embodies the central contradiction
of capitalist societies and is thus always a two-fold process:
capitalist society by its very logic at one and the same time
produces superordinate class consciousness and subordinate class
consciousness, and it is therefore precisely the socialization
process which serves as the 'transmission belt' through which
the underlying societal contradiction--the 'motor'--operates
to produce conflict and structural change."
The five 19th-century palliatives to London's working-class housing
problems are an excellent example of the ideological legitimation process.
Their main thrust was to serve the material needs of the capitalist class
--by facilitating street improvements and land-use changes--thereby creating
even more hardship, and to exonerate the real cause of these problems--the
capitalist mode of production--by shifting the blame from the basic institu-
tions and creating the illusion that the problems could and would soon be
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solved within the capitalist institutional framework.
Furthermore, the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production by
maintaining the basic institutions implies that the state must engage in
three further categories of activity. It must maintain a certain rate of
capital accumulation; maintain a functional labour force; and maintain
social stability. Urban development in general and working-class housing
in particular are important components of these three processes. Indeed,
it can be argued that the historical origin and evolution of city planning
lie in the necessity for the progressive institutionalization of these three
functions under the aegis of the capitalist state. I will now consider the
implications for urban development of these three functions of the state.
The expansion and maintenance of urban infrastructure--roads, rail-
ways, communications, sewers, etc.--is, as we have seen, crucial to the
reproduction of a certain rate of capital accumulation. The particular
economic characteristics of these classic 'public goods' haveprogressively
led to their nationalization, which means that through taxation the working
class bears much of the financial burden of providing these necessary
elements of capital accumulation. The part played by the state in the de-
velopment of London's railways amply supports the contention that enhancing
capital accumulation is its primary goal as far as investments in urban
infrastructure are concerned. Furthermore, state fiscal and monetary
policies designed to ensure that a certain amount of the surplus is realized
in directly and/or indirectly productive forms,influences the shape of the
city in important ways. The regulation of the flow of funds to various
sectors of the market in urban living and the 'threat' of land nationali-
zation are good examples.
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The reproduction of a functional labour force means assuming ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that 'the right quality (of both mind and body)
and quantity of workers arrive at the right workplaces at the right times.'
In this respect, urban living is as important as education, welfare, health
care, etc. For, as Engels so succinctly put it, working-class housing (and[871
urban living in general) is "a part of the factory equipment itself."
In so far as the working class is unable to achieve an adequate standard of
urban living through the autonomous operation of the basic institutions,
then the state must step in with direct (infrastructure investment, public
housing, etc.) or indirect (sanitary regulation, rent control, subsidies,
etc.) policies which change the outcomes of the market in urban living
with a view to reproducing a functional labour force.
However, the state cannot go overboard and realistically guarantee
a socially decent home and existence for all members of the working class.
Urban living, health care, food, etc. are all component parts of the market
in essential commodities, and their guaranteed provision at a socially
adequate level--if it were possible--whether or not workers work,would
almost inevitably destroy the market in essential commodities and the[88]
market in labour--two of the kingpins of capitalism. As Jeremy Bentham[891
put it in the early 19th century:
"A single mistake in extending equality too far may overthrow the
social order and dissolve the bonds of society. Equality might
require such a distribution of property as would be incompatible
with security... .Equality ought not to be favoured, except when
it does not injuriously affect security, nor dissappoint expec-
tations aroused by the law itself, nor disturb a distribution al-
ready actually settled and determined."
Thus, though the state has a high degree of autonomy and independence,
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state power is ultimately constrained by the basic institutions and the veto
power which the dominant class can exert should the existence of the basic
institutions be threatened. State power "is not exercized in a vacuum but
in a capitalist structured class society; and it is the structure of this
society which makes the formal holders of power real though decidedly
190]
junior partners in the exercize of real authority." In the last analysis,
the solution of working-class housing problems is beyond the pale of state
[911
action. In the words of Frederick Engels:
"It is perfectly clear that the state as it exists today is neither
able nor willing to do anything to remedy the housing calamity.
The state is nothing but the organized collective power of the
possessing classes,...What the individual capitalists...do not want,
their state also does not want. If therefore the individual capi-
talists deplore the housing shortage, but can hardly be moved to
palliate even superficially its most terrifying consequences, the
collective capitalist, the state, will not do much more."
The maintenance of social stability in capitalist society means the
exertion of social control by the state over the subordinate class on behalf
of the dominant class. As we have seen, dominant-class control must per-
meate all the pores of society. In so far as the 'automatic' operation of
the basic institutions generates destabilizing discontent among the subor-
dinate class, the state must intervene with modifications to some of
the basic institutions--though not fundamental changes--which serve to
diffuse social discontent and thereby reassert dominant-class control.
London's housing crisis of the 1880's is an excellent example. The state
responded with policies designed to change the social relations of living--
public housing and owner-occupation--whilst buttressing the fundamental
qualities of the basic institutions. Furthermore, the spectre of crisis
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served as justification for the 'necessary though unpleasant actions' which
state interference was seen to be at that stage--a tactic which has become[921
part and parcel of the modern state's ideological legitimation arsenal.
And the increased direct state intervention into the market in urban living
which this crisis precipitated has created an image in the public conscious-
ness that the state is the legitimate responsible authority for the problematic
sectors of the market and thereby served to shift the focus from the class
basis of working-class housing problems, a view which was prevalent during
the 1880's.
Thus, all of this bears out Marx and Engel's famous, if misquoted,
1931
statement that:
"The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the
comnon affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." (emphasis added)
The liberal argument that government is primarily oriented towards 'serving
the people,' that it impartially mediates disputes between similarly
powerful 'interest groups' in 'the national interest,' is a myth. When the
chips are down the capitalist state's primary responsibility is to guarantee
the supremacy of the dominant class.
In sum, then, the overwhelming conclusion revealed by the historical
analysis of London's development and these notes towards a radical theory of
urban living and city form is that the evolution and form of the city, like
that of society in general, is primarily and fundamentally a product of class
struggle.
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Radical Praxis and Working-Class Housing Struggles
I will conclude this thesis with a short discussion of some of the
implications which the historical analysis and the notes towards a radical
theory of urban living and city form hold for radical praxis aimed at
alleviating working-class housing problems. For, to paraphrase Marx, it is
not sufficient merely to interpret the city in a certain way; the point,
rather, is to change it.
The task of formulating prescriptions for radical praxis is a difficult
one, and this difficulty is intensified by the fundamentally oppositional
and revolutionary orientation which the radical paradigm necessitates. In
a society saturated with ruling-class ideology, most, if not all, proposals
for radical change will seem 'impractical.t Indeed, the degree of 'imprac-
ticality' which capitalist society imputes to a proposal for change can
almost be taken as a direct indication of its revolutionary character. This
tension will persist as long as capitalist society does, and radical acti-
vists must 'learn to live with it.' Furthermore, revolutions do not just
happen overnight--they are ultimately the gestalt of many small, local
struggles unified by a common theory of the faults of the existing social
formation and how and why alternative society can remedy them. Thus, the
orientation of radical praxis in relation to working-class housing
problems must be twofold--theoretical and practical.
On the one hand, radical academics in fields related to urbanism
must work to construct a convincing interdisciplinary radical theory of
the process of urban development under capitalism, to make clear to academics
and workers alike that the shape of the city and the problems of the city
are integral outcomes of the capitalist mode of production and the basic
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institutions which support it. We must expose both the fictions and falsi-
fications of dominant theories of the city and its problems and the purposes
and interests which these theories serve. And we must unite radical academics
from all disciplines in the effort to understand our present situation and
indicate the potentials for a more humane existence. In the words of[94]
David Harvey:
"This immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious
and aware construction of a new paradigm for social [urban] thought
through a deep and profound critique of our existing analytical
constructs....Our task is to mobilize our powers of thought to formu-
late concepts and categories, theories and arguments, which we can
apply to the task of bringing about a humanizing social change."
On the other hand, the major focus of the radical approach to the real
everyday housing problems and struggles of the working class must be to
build a collective working class consciousness--a unifying consciousness of
the structural antagonistic contradiction between the working class and the
dominant class and a consciousness of the powerful potential of the working
class for creating a more humane social order. We must strive to bring the
base and superstructure of class into concordance. Thus, housing struggles
must not be fought in isolation. Our analysis has shown that decent
working-class housing cannot be achieved through changes in the market in
urban living alone. And isolated struggles tend to diffuse collective class
consciousness and therefore ultimately serve to stabilize, not change, the
capitalist system which generates the problems. Instead, "the point of
revolutionary strategy, therefore, [must be] to overcome the current divi-
sions...and reconstitute them into the primary division: capitalists and[951
anticapitalists."
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We must make connections between struggles in workplaces,
residential areas and other struggles which capitalist society generates.
In struggling for socially creative and synthetic communities, we must build
groups like one existing Notting Hill and North Kensington group,which
196]
emphasizes that:
"By being a housing group, the group tends to concentrate its activities
around housing, but the way people are oppressed through housing is
only part of a much wider oppression; and many people may be brought
into the struggle if we show them how the different ways they are
oppressed fit together. This means that we must constantly be relating
the oppression at work, the oppression at school, sexual oppression,
the oppression through high prices to the oppression through housing."
Thus, while helping people deal with their day-to-day problems, we must
simultaneously help them make connections to the social and structural basis
of these problems and, therefore, make convincing the systemic changes
needed for the ultimate solution of these problems. As the editors of
197]
Socialist Revolution put it:
"The revolutionary task of our time is to unite this heterogeneity
around opposition to the corporate ruling class and to develop its
particularized grievances into explicit socialist consciousness
and practice by demonstrating their common root in capitalist
property relations."
A similar argument, more directly related to housing struggles, is that of
five radical women, the sex most intimately connected with, and oppressed by,
1981
the housing process:
"Housing struggles have been and can be struggles that unite all
sectors of the working class, men, women, kids, in common struggle.
People are confronted more directly with the need to challange the
way their interests are set against each other, through the divisions
of labour that the system creates."
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Furthermore, we must demystify dominant attitudes and 'solutions' to work
ing-class housing problems. Only through ruthless criticism of these
mainstream approaches can we discover and expose their ruling-class orien-
1991
tation.
In all of these actions, the overriding objective must be to increase
working-class people's control of the decisions which affect all aspects of
their lives and, in particular, in relation to housing struggles, to increase
their power to control the decisions which determine the social and spatial:
form of their residential communities. In this endeavour we must build on
and unify the growing working-class discontentment with capitalist society,
of which labour strikes, rent strikes, protest marches, etc. are but an
expression. Thus, the main goal of radical praxis in relation to working-[100]
class housing problems must be, in the words of a London squatting group:
"..becoming part of a many-sided movement of people taking control
over their own lives."
We must help the working class to achieve their growing demands for control,
so graphically and succinctly depicted by the Hartlepool Road, Redcar Road,
rnr 1
Stockton Road Residents Associatior
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. The canplexity of such a theory is indicated by the fact
that whilst particular aspects of cities have been scruti-
nized from many specialized points of view, few theorists
have attempted, and none have achieved, what Louis Wirth
sought in 1938: "a general theory systemnizing the avail-
able knowledge concerning the city as a social entity."
Quoted in Harvey [1973] p. 195. No general framework
exists into which the plethora of detailed investigations
-- psychological, sociological, environmental, political,
economic and more--can be meaningfully pigion-holed.
For a brief critique of the incompleteness of the most general
popular theories of urban developmnent see Harvey [1973]
pp. 130-6. Reissman [1964] pp. 39-149, contains a lengthier,
though less perceptive, treatment which surprisingly excludes
the 'economist' theories that are so widely accepted today.
In my view, our patent inability to cope effectively with
deteriorating urban environments indicates the need for a
general theory of the overall process of urban development
according to which we may begin to effectively alleviate
these objective problems. And see Harvey [1973] pp. 128-30;
Williams [1973b]; Form [1954] p. 255.
2. I mean this in a qualitative sense of understanding the city
(or village or town) as a social process. The problem of
defining the city (as opposed to village or town) in
quantifiable terms (population size or density, Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area, legal or political boundaries,
land values, etc.) may be important to neo-classical econo-
mists (e.g., Mills [1972] pp. 7-11), politicians and state
bureaucrats, but is not a valid form of definition for those
seeking to explain the city as a social process, whose
definition should be able to account for "cities" of all
shapes and sizes.
3. The most popular recent statement of neo-classical urban
location, land-use and land-rent theory is Alonso [19641].
For a brief, non-mathemnatical summary see Alonso [1960].
Mills [1972] pp. 37-102, contains a straightforward
exposition of the 'academic textbook' version of the theory
which is uncritically disseminated to students of urban
economics and city planning at American universities. For
a critique of the theory see Harvey [1973] pp. 160-94;
Edel [1969].
4. Engels [1890] p. 692.
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5. From here on, the phrase 'mode of production' is used as an
abbreviation for 'mode of production and reproduction of real
life'. The single word 'production' is used in its accepted
sense as 'the process of manufacturing ccmmodities and
services'.
6. The word 'determine' is subject to misinterpretation and,
therefore, the sense in which it is used in the thesis
must be clarified. The sanantic disparity is stated by
Raymond Williams as follows: "...there are, within
ordinary use...quite different possible meanings and
implications of the word 'determine'. There is on the
one hand, from its theological inheritance, the notion
.of an external cause which totally predicts or prefigures,
indeed totally controls a subsequent activity. But there
is also, frcma the experience of social practice, a notion
of determination as setting limits, exerting pressures"
(Emphasis added) Williams [1973a] p. 4. The word 'deter-
mine' is used in this latter sense which admits a two-way
interaction between that which is determined and that which
determines, even to the point of the possibility of limits
and pressures changing, though not without conflict, depending
on the nature and severity of the feedback from the determined
activity.
7. Marx [1859] pp. 182-3.
8. See Williams [1973a] pp. 4-6 for a more detailed argument
in favor of this view.
9. For an eloquent preliminary analysis of the dialectical
interaction between production, distribution, exchange and
consumption, see Marx [1857-8] pp. 22-33. He concludes
as follows: "The result we arrive at is not that production
distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but
that they are all members of one entity, different aspects
of one unit. Production predaninates not only over production
itself in the opposite sense of that term, but over the other
elements as well. With production the process constantly
starts over again. That exchange and consumption cannot be
predcminating elements is self-evident. The same is true of
distribution in the narrow sense of distribution of products;
as for distribution in the sense of distribution of the agents
of production, it is itself but a factor of production. A
definite form of production thus determines the forms of con-
sumption, distribution, exchange and also the mutual relations
between these various eZlenents. Of course, production in its
one-sided form is in its turn influenced by other elements,
e.g., with the expansion of the market, i.e., of the sphere of
exchange, production grows in volume and is subdivided to a
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greater extent. With a change of distribution, production
undergoes a change; as for example in the case of concen-
tration of capital, of a change in the distribution of
population in city and country, etc. Finally, the demands
of consumption also influence production. A mutual inter-
action takes place between the various elements. Such is the
case with every organic body."
10. For a constructive analysis of the dialectual interaction
between base and superstructure, see Williams [1973a].
11. Engels [1890] p. 692 and see notes 4 and 7 for the statements
which he qualified.
12. Harvey [1973] pp. 200-1.
13. Harvey [19731 pp. 202-3; 205-6; Dobb [19631 p. 14.
14. Introduction to Lukacs [1966] p.26; and see pp. 29-31.
15. See Meszaros 11971] passim.
16. My definition and analysis of 'class' and 'class struggle'
relies heavily on Rudin [1972], a paper which has unfortunately
not been published. I have also benefitted in this respect fran
reading Balbus [1971]; Bendix and Lipset [1953]; Dobb [1963]
pp. 11-17; Gintis [1970]; and Thanpson [19631 pp. 9-11.
17. Rudin [1972] pp. 18.
18. Rudin (1972] pp. 11-16, 18-21.
19. Foster [1968] pp.2 81-2. This argument is developed in greater
detail, both theoretically and historically, in Foster [1974],
an excellent book. For a discussion of the relationship between
city form and working-class militancy, see Hobsbawn [1973] pp. 220-33,
"Cities and Insurrection."
20. For the remainder of this chapter, I will abbreviate 'basic socio-
economic institutions' to 'basic institutions.' This analysis of
the nature and mo~us operandi of the basic institutions of
capitalisn relies heavily on Edwards and MacEwen [1970]; Edwards,
Reich and Weisskopf [1972]; Gintis [1972a]; and Gintis [1972b].
I have only referenced direct quotes from these works.
21. Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf [1970] p. 89.
22. For a more extensive analysis of capitalist and other modes of
econanic integration, see Harvey [1973] pp. 206-15; and Polanyi
(1944], especially pp. 43-76. On the implications of different
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modes of econcnic integration for patterns of urbanism, see
Harvey [19731 pp. 240-84.
23. Gintis [1972a] p.45. The nature of markets in land and housing
is developed in more detail in the following section.
24. Edwards and MacEwan [1970] p. 14. It is pertinant to quote
Edwards, Reich and Weissk6pf's [1970] p. 91,qualifications of
the concept hcmo econanicus: "It is important to note here that
we are not saying that people are inevitably motivated by econcmic
self-interest or the other characteristics of hano econaoicus.
Nor are we saying that hono econcmicus is 'rational' or 'good.'
Nor are we saying that people in a capitalist society act only
according to the dictates of hano econanicus. Indeed, much of
the rest of this book is devoted to describing the tension which
results fran the need of capitalist institutions to have people
behave as if they were hano econanicus when in reality they are
not--when they feel many needs and have many aspects and are not
the single-mindedly greedy, materialistic people posited by hano
econon icus. "
25. The role of the capitalist state is developed in more detail in
relation to urban issues in a subsequent section of this chapter.
26. For a concise definition of 'contradiction' see Gintis [1972b] p. 27.
27. As David Harvey has put it: "Capitalisn, however, has shown itself
to be an inherently expansionary force; insofar as its existence
is predicted on putting surplus value into circulation to increase
surplus value, it has to expand in order to survive." Harvey [19731
p. 249. And, in the words of Paul Sweezy: "The central dynamic
force in the world capitalist systen as a whole is the capital
accumulation process in the developed countries." Sweezy [1971] p.6.
28. On the concentration of capital in general, see Marx [1867] pp. 621-8.
On the spatial concentration of capital, see Harvey [1973] pp. 232-8.
It is interesting to note that neo-classical location and land-use
theory is fundamentally an argument for the logic of the spatial
concentration of productive capital, given capitalist basic institu-
tions, and it forms a powerful justificatory device for such concen-
tration, because it assumes capitalist basic institutions as given
and immutable.
29. Henri Lefebvre canes to a similar conclusion in La Revolution
Urbaine [1970]: "Can the realities of urbanisn be defined as
sanething super-structural, on the surface of the econmaic basis,
whether capitalist or socialist? Or, as a simple result of econanic
growth and the increasing power of the forces of production, as a
modest marginal elaboration of social relations of production? No.
The reality of urbanism modifies the relations of production without
being sufficient to transform then. Urbanisn becanes a force in
production, rather like science." (Emphasis added). 4Qoted in
Harvey [1970] p. 306.
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30. For the clearest statement on this issue, see O'Connor [1973].
Pages 5-10 contain a summary of his argument. And see Sweezy
[1971], where he states (p.6) that: "Creating conditions favorable
to the most rapid accumulation of capital and removing obstacles
which impede the process are the central tasks of the capitalist
state to which, in the final analysis, all its other functions are
subordinated."
31. This is not to preclude nationalization of land as feasible
under capitalisn. This would merely place responsiblility for a
necessarily identical and, therefore, antisocial pattern of land
allocation under the aegis of the capitalist state. Without
counteracting certain basic attributes of the capitalist system,
which is clearly impossible under capitalism, the state would be
powerless to implement substantially different, and more socially
responsible, policies. In other words, the socialization of land
under capitalism is patently impossible. In this regard, it is
interesting to note part of a passage by Marx already quoted in
Chapter 2, note 31. He argues that the capitalist mode of
production's "only requirement is that land should not be common
property, that it should confront the working class as a condition
of production, not belonging to it, and the purpose is completely
fulfilled if it becomes state-property." Marx [18631 pp. 44-5.
Thus, demands for land nationalization under capitalism merely
represent a call for a new forn of the basic institution 'market in
land,' whose essential characteristics-the non-common ownership of
land and the allocation of land as a function of exchange value
(contribution to capital accumulation) as opposed to social use
value--would renain,and a call for the productive realization of
surplus value. It is therefore not surprising that (relatively) high
rents lead to demands for land nationalization. Thus, pundits of land
nationalization as a panacea to urban problems would do well to
consider whether they are proposing a qualitatively different insti-
tution or merely passing the buck. In this respect, it is well to
note Donald Olsen's perceptive statement that: "Many of the argu-
ments for land nationalization apply on a smaller scale to the big
[leasehold] estate," Olsen [1964] p. 160, and to reflect on the
inequitable and often hideous outcomes which the leasehold system
engendered. And the inadequate performance of most local councils
in the field of public housing (the nationalization of housing)
usually due to forces beyond their control, makes one wonder if they
could do any better when it caoes to land.
32. For example, George Brown's ban on office building in London in
1964 swung the balance in favour of land rent. In the words of
Oliver Marriott, it "was the crowning gift to the developers,"
Marriott [1967] p. 22. Planning permission revisions in favour of
more intensive developnent (re-zoning in the U.S.) is another
device by which developers realize greater rents. See Counter
Information Services [19731 pp. 3-23. The mortgage insurance policy
adopted in the U.S. by the Federal Housing Administration represents
a more complex case. It led directly to increased property values
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in the suburbs which netted land developers a fortune but at the
same time it promoted substantial growth in residential construc-
tion and, thereby, capital accumulation.
33. The activities of financial organisations in the residential
sphere in Baltimore, Maryland, are analysed in sane detail in
Harvey [1974] and Harvey and Chatterjee [1974].
34. The wage bargain can be regarded as a means whereby productive
capital both defines the amount of surplus value and indirectly
controls the amount of surplus realised in non-productive and in-
directly productive forms. Conversely, the residential rent
bargain can be regarded as a means whereby non-productive capital
both realizes a certain amount of the surplus and indirectly
controls the amount of surplus realized in its directly and indi-
rectly productive forms. Likewise, the tax bargain can be regarded
as a means whereby indirectly productive capital both realizes part
of the surplus, and indirectly controls the amount of surplus
realized in its productive and non-productive forms. In these
struggles, the worker is a kind of go-between--fighting both for
himself and for the three factions of capital.
35. This is but a spatial version of the capitalist 'law of uneven
development,' which holds: "The key to the dynamics of capitalism.
.... Those who are in a position to make new investments (capital-
ists) will tend to invest in those particular product lines,
machinery and workers prcanising the highest return. Conversely,
investment will tend to decline where potential expected profit
is relatively low...the simple dynamics of profit maximization,
especially in a period of monopoly capital, produce a tendency
towards a 'secular deterioration of terms of trade'between nations,
between industries and between social classes." Bluestone [1972]
p. 65. And see Hymer [1972] pp. 122-35.
36. On the political economy of black ghettoes in the U.S., see Fusfeld
[1968]; and Vietorisz and Harrison [1970] Chapter 1.
37. Gintis [1972a] p. 46 (anphasis added). And see Edwards [1972a].
38. On cammodity fetishismn, see Sweezy [1942] pp. 34-40 and Gintis [1971].
39. Sweezy [1972] p. 21.
40. The most famous modern analysis of the tendency of the capitalist
systemn towards over-production and how it copes with the problems
of surplus absorbtion is Baran and Sweezy [1966], especially
Chapters 1-7.
41. Harvey [1973] p. 271.
42. Harvey [1973] pp. 271-2.
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43,. Gintis [1972d] pp. 267-8. And see the entire article for a
more detailed argument in support of this thesis.
44. "A need has been created out of a luxury. And it is essential
that this effective demnand for automobiles-the linch-pin of the
contemporary capitalist econanies-be maintained and expanded.
Otherwise there will be severe economic and financial disrup-
tion throughout the whole econany." Harvey [1973] p. 271.
For an argument on the power of the automobile-industrial ccmplex
in the U.S., and the impact of "automobilization" on the lives of
city dwellers, see Sweezy [1966] and Baran and Sweezy [1966]
pp. 300-5. The general argument that producers control much of
the process of urban developnent is developed in more detail in
Sawers [1972].
45. Marx [1857-8] p. 26.
46. For an example of this process in relation to Boston's street-
cars, see note 64, Chapter 3.
47. Gintis [1972a] p. 46. And see Edwards and MacEwen [1970] p. 15;
and Weisskopf [1972].
48. This is the briefest summary of the radical theory of the firm
and the labour market, based on the following articles: Edwards
[1973]1; Gintis [1973]; Marglin [1971]; and Vietorisz and Harrison
[19731]. Only quotes froman these articles are referenced in detail.
49. Edwards [19731 p. 2.
50. Marglin [1971] p. 73. This thesis is borne out by Stone [19731], an
impressive historical study of the United States' Steel Industry.
51. Gintis [1973] p. 21.
52. Foster [1974] pp. 4-5.
53. Foster [1974] pp. 5-6.
54. "The primary Zabour market functions more or less in keeping with
public perceptions of work and its rewards and is characterized
by high wages, high productivity, high stability and high rates of
technical progress. Not so the secondary Zabour market; here a
vicious circle keeps wages, productivity and stability to catas-
trophically low levels and brings about technological stagnation."
Vietorisz and Harrison [1973] p. 366.
55. See Bowles [1971].
56. Wachtel [1972] p. 52.
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57. As Marx wrote: "Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore,
at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery,
ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole."
Quoted in Bendix and Lipset [1953] p.10.
58. For an indirect discussion of the place of the city in the repro-
duction of labour, see Gorz [1964] pp.82-94.
59. This is a composite expression for the urban housing and 'housing-
land' markets, which are most usefully considered in combination.
The market in urban living is analysed in the following section of
this chapter.
60. This concept is developed in the following section.
61. Hodes [1973] pp.22-39 develops this argument in more detail.
62. For a brief discussion of this issue, see Aaron [1972] pp.3-6 . And
see Harvey [1973] pp.157-160.
63. David Harvey comes to the opposite conclusion, "that there can be no
such thing as a 'general' urban land use theory," (Harvey [1973] p.192)
because, in my opinion, he attempts to base such a theory on the con-
cept of rent, which, as he correctly argues, exists only in a contin-
gent sense. The concept of the social relations of living, however,
can, like its counterpart in the productive sphere--the social relations
of production--be applied to an understanding of the process of resi-
dential development under any social formation because it is based on
the social relations of men to one another from which as Lukacs [1966]
p.29, putsit, "all economic and 'sociological' (and, one might add,
spatial) phenomena derive."
64. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between use value and
exchange value in housing, see Harvey [1973] pp.153-1 66 ,190; for
commodities in general, see Marx [1867] pp.36-41.
65. The word 'rent' is used generally and specifically and includes funds
derived from the 'sale' or 'lease' of property. Referring to each
process specifically each time would be cumbersome. Furthermore, all
property,with the exception of property sold for cash (i.e., not
mortgaged), is effectively rented, be it from a landlord, leaseholder
or building society.
66. The following analysis is an extremely brief summary of three sources:
Roweis [1973]being the main one and Harvey [1973] pp.139-142,176-189,and
Marx [1894] pp. 640-648 ,748-781, being secondary.
67. See Harvey [1974] pp.26-27.
68. Marx [1847] pp.84-85.
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69. Engels [1872] p.57.
70. A recent example of this 'necessity', albeit in another market, was
the government sanctioned action taken by United States chicken
farmers. In the face of blatant food shortages for a sizeable number
of Americans, they suffocated millions of baby chicks because it was
"too expensive to raise them for the market at current prices"!
71. This phrase comes from the most recent U.S. example of the impossible
dreaming of bourgeois housing reformers, see President's Committee on
Urban Housing [1969].
72. Quoted from Tono Bungay in Briggs [1963] pp.357-368 . As we shall see
in the following section, this goal is really not even the business
of the modern capitalist state.
73. See Harvey [1973] pp.16 3-166 .
74. Gintis [1972c] p.282.
75. Quoted in Sheppard [1971] p.337. More specifically, Engels wrote of
"the great central fact that the cause of the miserable condition
of the working-class is to be sought...in the capitalist system it-
self." Engels [1892] p.362.
76. Engels [1872] p.47.
77. Engels [1872] p.17.
78. Engels [1872] p.71.
79. "What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual
production changes its character in proportion as material production
is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas
of the ruling class." Marx and Engels [1848] p.51. For a more
detailed and general critique of bourgeois ideology, see Blackburn
[1969].
80. The classic English statement of this view is Donnison [1967] esp.
pp.17-78, a book which should, therefore be used with care.
81. Engels [1872] pp.30-31.
82. On the mystificatory powers of language, see Edelman [1964] pp.114-129,190.
83. For a critique of this view, see Ryan [1972].
84. My arguments in this respect rest heavily on the following sources:
Edelman [1964]; Lenin [1932] pp.272-2 85; Miliband [1973]; Miliband
[1972]; Miliband [1969]; O'Connor [1973]; Poulantzas [1969]; and
Sweezy [194 2a].
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I have only made detailed reference to these works where I have
quoted directly from them.
85. Sweezy [1942a] p.25.
86. Balbus [1971] p.43. Or, in the words of James O'Connor: "...the capi-
talist state must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contra-
dictory functions--accwnulation and legitimation. This means that
the state must try to maintain or create the conditiors in which profit-
able capital accumulation is possible. However, the state must also
try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capi-
talist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class
accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legiti-
macy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But
a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital
accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's
surplus production capacity, and the taxes drawn from this surplus."
O'Connor [1973] p.6 .
87. Engels [1872] p.51.
88. See Gordon [1972]; Wachtel [1972] pp.58-61; Edwards [1972b] pp.249-251.
89. Quote from Bentham's, The Theory of Morals and Legislation, in
Nairn [1972] p.192.
90. Rudin [1972] p.28.
91. Engels [1872] p.65.
92. Edelman [1964] pp.13-14.
93. Marx and Engels [1848] P.37.
94. Harvey [1973] p.145.
95. Socialist Revolution... [1970] p.510.
96. "The Housing Fight..." [19731 pp.5-6. Similar sentiments are ex-
pressed in "Residents..." [1973] pp.11,14: "The activities of resi-
dents and tenants groups and those of unions and workers are usually
seen in isolation. But if you are living in bad housing and have a
low paid job with rotten schools and shops, and no park then you
certainly do not experience these things in isolation--they all
weigh you down at once, (it is only when you try to do something
about it that you find one department handles rent, another educa-
tion and distant companies control the job situation). That is why
we have tried in this article to stress the... links between commu-
nity action and industrial action, in the belief that the two
cannot continue to be isolated if an effective means of changing
this country's power structure is to be developed."
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97. Socialist Revolution... [1970] p.504 . And see 011man [1973] pp.38-39.
98. Marion, et al [1973) p.h.
99. See Baran [1961] p.14 and passim. In the words of David Harvey, we must
distinguish "between revolutionary theories which are productive of
change, status quo theories which are derived out of and help to pre-
serve an existing situation, and counter-revolutionary theories which
produce only confusion, obfuscation and frustration." Harvey [19731
p.298.
100. B I T... [1973] p.1.
101. From: Community Action, No.10, p.5.
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